On Boyd's Rebuttal of Kripke's Argument for Dualism

Papers of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium 22:175-177 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The essay presents Saul Kripke's argument for mind/body-dualism and makes the suppositions explicit on which it rests. My claim, inspired by Richard Boyd, is that even if one of Kripke’s central suppositions - the principle of necessity of identities using rigid designators - is shared by the non-traditional identity theorist, it is still possible for her to rebut Kripke’s dualism.

Author's Profile

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-01-31

Downloads
86 (#59,552)

6 months
586 (#29,438)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?