The essay presents Saul Kripke's argument for mind/body-dualism and makes the suppositions explicit on which it rests. My claim, inspired by Richard Boyd, is that even if one of Kripke’s central suppositions - the principle of necessity of identities using rigid designators - is shared by the non-traditional identity theorist, it is still possible for her to rebut Kripke’s dualism.

The kinds of real or natural kinds that support explanation and prediction in the social sciences are difficult to identify and track because they change through time, intersect with one another, and they do not always exhibit their properties when one encounters them. As a result, conceptual practices directed at these kinds will often refer in ways that are partial, equivocal, or redundant. To improve this epistemic situation, it is important to employ open-ended classificatory concepts, to understand when different research (...) programs are tracking the same real kind, and to maintain an ongoing commitment to interact causally with real kinds to focus reference on those kinds. A tempting view of these non-idealized epistemic conditions should be avoided: that they signal an ontological structure of the social world so plentiful that it would permit ameliorated classificatory schemes to achieve their normative aims regardless of whether they defer to real-kind classificatory schemes. To ground these discussions, the essay appeals to an overlooked convergence in the systematic naturalistic frameworks of Richard Boyd and Ruth Millikan. (shrink)

Twenty years ago, Richard Boyd suggested that physicalism could be formulated by appeal to a notion of realization, with no appeal to the identity of the non-physical with the physical. In (Melnyk 2003), I developed this suggestion at length, on the basis of one particular account of realization. I now ask what happens if you try to formulate physicalism on the basis of other accounts of realization, accounts due to LePore and Loewer and to Shoemaker. Having explored two (...) new formulations of physicalism, I conclude that my 2003 formulation remains the most promising. (shrink)

The Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) account of natural kinds has become popular since it was proposed by Richard Boyd in the late 1980s. Although it is often taken as a defining natural kinds as such, it is easy enough to see that something's being a natural kind is neither necessary nor sufficient for its being an HPC. This paper argues that it is better not to understand HPCs as defining what it is to be a natural kind but (...) instead as providing the ontological realization of (some) natural kinds. (shrink)

The paper considers whether psychiatric kinds can be natural kinds and concludes that they can. This depends, however, on a particular conception of ‘natural kind’. We briefly describe and reject two standard accounts – what we call the ‘stipulative account’ (according to which apparently a priori criteria, such as the possession of intrinsic essences, are laid down for natural kindhood) and the ‘Kripkean account’ (according to which the natural kinds are just those kinds that obey Kripkean semantics). We then rehearse (...) a more permissive account: Richard Boyd’s ‘homeostatic property cluster’ (HPC) account. We argue that psychiatric kinds can in principle count as natural kinds on the HPC account. Moreover, specific psychiatric kinds (Tourette’s, schizophrenia, etc.) can be natural kinds even if the category psychiatric disorder is not itself a natural kind. (shrink)

Despite the common use of the concept of emergence, no uncontroversial theoretical framework has been yet formulated in this regard. In this paper, I examine what this circumstance suggests about the significance and usefulness of this concept. I first trace a brief history of the notion of emergence from its first formulation among the British Emergentists to its contemporary uses. Then, I outline its most common features and examine three examples of emergent phenomena, namely particle decay, free will, and division (...) of labour in ant colonies. These three cases of emergence exhibit different features and imply criteria which only partially overlap. I then suggest that the multiplicity of features and criteria recognised as defining emergence, rather than being a threat to the tenability of the concept, should encourage the assumption of a pluralist attitude that is consistent with both the employment of this idea in different sciences and the recognition of emergent phenomena across different levels of organisation. Finally, I propose that emergence can be approached in a similar way to how Richard Boyd approached the problem of natural kinds, namely by identifying an open cluster of properties, rather than a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. (shrink)

This collection of original essays--by philosophers of biology, biologists, and cognitive scientists--provides a wide range of perspectives on species. Including contributions from David Hull, John Dupre, David Nanney, Kevin de Queiroz, and Kim Sterelny, amongst others, this book has become especially well-known for the three essays it contains on the homeostatic property cluster view of natural kinds, papers by Richard Boyd, Paul Griffiths, and Robert A. Wilson.

Reading Putnam consists largely of papers from the fantastic ‘Putnam @80’ conference (organised by Maria Baghramian in 2007) together with replies from Hilary Putnam. Given the diversity of Putnam’s work, the papers in this collection cover many different topics. This makes the collection difficulty to read but, ultimately, extremely rewarding. In this review, I focus on the contributions from Michael Devitt, Charles Parsons, Richard Boyd, Ned Block, Charles Travis and John McDowell, together with Putnam’s responses. My aim is (...) to highlight some connections between Putnam’s (evolving) views on ontology, conceptual relativism, and perception. (shrink)

I present and defend a novel version of the homeostatic property cluster account of natural kinds. The core of the proposal is a development of the notion of co-occurrence, central to the HPC account, along information-theoretic lines. The resulting theory retains all the appealing features of the original formulation, while increasing its explanatory power, and formal perspicuity. I showcase the theory by applying it to the problem of reconciling the thesis that biological species are natural kinds with the fact that (...) many such species are polymorphic. (shrink)

Moral realism and ethical naturalism are both highly attractive ethical positions but historically they have often been thought to be irreconcilable. Since the late 1980s defenders of Cornell Realism have argued that the two positions can consistently be combined. They make three constitutive claims: (i) Moral properties are natural kind properties that (ii) are identical to (or supervene) on descriptive functional properties, which (iii) causally regulate our use of moral terms. We offer new arguments against the feasibility of Cornell realism (...) and then show that there is a way to be a naturalistic realist that avoids internal inconsistency and uniquely provides for moral normativity. (shrink)

According to the orthodox treatment of risk preferences in decision theory, they are to be explained in terms of the agent's desires about concrete outcomes. The orthodoxy has been criticised both for conflating two types of attitudes and for committing agents to attitudes that do not seem rationally required. To avoid these problems, it has been suggested that an agent's attitudes to risk should be captured by a risk function that is independent of her utility and probability functions. The main (...) problem with that approach is that it suggests that attitudes to risk are wholly distinct from people's (non-instrumental) desires. To overcome this problem, we develop a framework where an agent's utility function is defined over chance propositions (i.e., propositions describing objective probability distributions) as well as ordinary (non-chance) ones, and argue that one should explain different risk attitudes in terms of different forms of the utility function over such propositions. (shrink)

Largely thanks to Mill’s influence, the suggestion that the state ought to restrict the distribution of misinformation will strike most philosophers as implausible. Two of Mill’s influential assumptions are particularly relevant here: first, that free speech debates should focus on moral considerations such as the harm that certain forms of expression might cause; second, that false information causes minimal harm due to the fact that human beings are psychologically well equipped to distinguish truth and falsehood. However, in addition to our (...) moral obligations, we also have a distinct set of epistemic obligations—and even when a false belief doesn’t harm anyone, it constitutes an epistemically bad outcome. Moreover, Mill was profoundly mistaken about human psychology: human beings are vulnerable to the influence of a wide variety of false claims via a wide variety of psychological mechanisms. Consequently, there is a purely epistemic justification for restricting the distribution of misinformation: because each of us has an individual epistemic obligation to avoid unnecessary exposure to misinformation, and because avoiding such exposure is simply too difficult when acting alone, we all have a shared epistemic obligation to establish laws or regulations restricting the widespread distribution of misinformation. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that individual moral obligations and responsibility entail shared (or joint) moral obligations and responsibility. However, whether individual epistemic obligations and responsibility entail shared epistemic obligations and responsibility is rarely discussed. Instead, most discussions of doxastic responsibility focus on individuals considered in isolation. In contrast to this standard approach, I maintain that focusing exclusively on individuals in isolation leads to a profoundly incomplete picture of what we're epistemically obligated to do and when we deserve epistemic blame. First, (...) I argue that we have epistemic obligations to perform actions of the sort that can be performed in conjunction with other people, and that consequently, we are often jointly blameworthy when we violate shared epistemic obligations. Second, I argue that shared responsibility is especially important to doxastic responsibility thanks to the fact that we don't have the same kind of direct control over our beliefs that we have over our actions. In particular, I argue that there are many cases in which a particular individual who holds some problematic belief only deserves epistemic blame in virtue of belonging to a group all the members of which are jointly blameworthy for violating some shared epistemic obligation. (shrink)

The fact that you see some particular object seems to be due to the causal relation between your visual experience and that object, rather than to your experiences’ phenomenal character. On the one hand, whenever some phenomenal element of your experience stands in the right sort of causal relation to some object, your experience presents that object (your experience’s phenomenology doesn’t need to match that object). On the other hand, you can’t have a perceptual experience that presents some object unless (...) you stand in the right sort of causal relation to that object (no matter how closely your experience’s phenomenology matches some object). According to the continuity thesis, property perception is similar to object perception in these two respects. A standard reason to reject the continuity thesis is the assumption that the environmental properties that a perceptual experience presents are determined by its phenomenal properties (which are not determined by the environmental properties that cause the experience). I maintain that the continuity thesis is false but for a different reason: perceptual experiences present both objects and properties via manners of presentation; but, whereas perceptual manners of presentation for objects are purely relational, perceptual manners of presentation for properties are satisfactional. (shrink)

Thanks to the advent of social media, large numbers of Americans believe outlandish falsehoods that have been widely debunked. Many of us have a tendency to fault the individuals who hold such beliefs. We naturally assume that the individuals who form and maintain such beliefs do so in virtue of having violated some epistemic obligation: perhaps they failed to scrutinize their sources, or failed to seek out the available competing evidence. I maintain that very many ordinary individuals who acquire outlandish (...) false beliefs thanks to their use of popular social media platforms (and other similar internet technologies) deserve little or no blame for believing these falsehoods. Such individuals would be fully blameworthy only if they had formed or maintained the relevant beliefs partly in virtue of violating some epistemic obligation and had no excuse for violating that obligation. However, the nature of these internet technologies provides excuses for violating the relevant epistemic obligations, and so individuals are excused for holding the resulting false beliefs. (shrink)

Reading, taking notes, and holding study sessions are all examples of routine, habitual study behaviors that pupils engage in to fulfill the learning objective. This study was conducted to the two hundred-five (n=205) grade 6 pupils at Malitbog 1 District, Division of Bukidnon, School Year 2022-2023. It attempted to answer the level of pupils’ study habits and academic performance and determine the significant relationship between the study habits and academic performance. The study utilized the descriptive-correlational research design with documentary analysis (...) and used an adapted and modified questionnaire to gather the necessary data to answer the specific questions of the study. Purposive sampling was employed to determine the respondents. Mean, Standard Deviation, Frequency, Percentage and Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient or Pearson r were used as statistical tools. Results revealed that pupils’ overall level of study habits was high while their overall academic performance was at very satisfactory level. Significant correlation was registered between pupils’ study habits and their academic performance. Thus, teachers, parents and stakeholders may collaborate with each other to create and conduct activities that will continue to enhance and improve the pupils study habits to improve their academic performance. (shrink)

Kripke’s Wittgenstein is standardly understood as a non-factualist about meaning ascription. Non-factualism about meaning ascription is the idea that sentences like “Joe means addition by ‘plus’” are not used to state facts about the world. Byrne and Kusch have argued that Kripke’s Wittgenstein is not a non-factualist about meaning ascription. They are aware that their interpretation is non-standard, but cite arguments from Boghossian and Wright to support their view. Boghossian argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incompatible with a deflationary (...) theory of truth. Wright argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incoherent. To support the standard interpretation, I’ll respond to each argument in turn. To the degree that my responses are successful, Byrne and Kusch have an unmotivated interpretation of Kripke’s Wittgenstein. Wilson provides a factualist interpretation that is not based on Boghossian and Wright’s arguments. Miller argues for a non-factualist interpretation against Wilson, but I’ll show that Miller’s interpretation faces a dilemma. Miller’s argument cannot be maintained if a coherent interpretation of the skeptical solution is to be provided. I’ll show how this dilemma can be avoided and provide an independent argument against Wilson so that a non-factualist interpretation of the skeptical solution can be maintained. (shrink)

Very often when the vast majority of experts agree on some scientific issue, laypeople nonetheless regularly consume articles, videos, lectures, etc., the principal claims of which are inconsistent with the expert consensus. Moreover, it is standardly assumed that it is entirely appropriate, and perhaps even obligatory, for laypeople to consume such anti-consensus material. I maintain that this standard assumption gets things backwards. Each of us is particularly vulnerable to false claims when we are not experts on some topic – such (...) falsehoods have systematic negative impacts on our doxastic attitudes that we can neither prevent nor correct. So, when there is clear expert consensus on a given scientific issue, while it is permissible for experts to consume anti-consensus material, laypeople have an epistemic obligation to avoid such material. This argument has important consequences for philosophical discussions of our epistemic obligations to perform or omit belief-influencing actions. Such discussions typically abstract away from the important differences between experts and laypeople. Accordingly, we should reject this typical practice as problematic, and insist instead that laypeople and experts have fundamentally different epistemic obligations. (shrink)

The issue of how best to combat the negative impacts of misinformation distributed via social media hangs on the following question: are there methods that most individuals can reasonably be expected to employ that would largely protect them from the negative impact that encountering misinformation on social media would otherwise have on their beliefs? If the answer is “yes,” then presumably individuals bear significant responsibility for those negative impacts; and, further, presumably there are feasible educational remedies for the problem of (...) misinformation. However, I argue that the answer is “no.” Accordingly, I maintain that individuals do not bear significant responsibility for the negative impacts at issue; and, further, I maintain that the only effective remedies for the problem of misinformation involve changing the information environment itself. (shrink)

ABSTRACTConventional wisdom holds that there is no lucky knowledge: if it is a matter of luck, in some relevant sense, that one's belief that p is true, then one does not know that p. Here I will argue that there is similarly no lucky understanding, at least in the case of one type of luck, namely environmental luck. This argument has three parts. First, we need to determine how we evaluate whether one has understanding, which requires determining what I will (...) call understanding's evaluative object. I argue that as the evaluative object of knowledge is a belief in a proposition, the evaluative object of understanding is a mental representation of a relational structure. Next, I show that arguments that environmental luck is incompatible with understanding miss the mark by considering cases in which one has a belief in a proposition is lucky to be true, instead of ones in which one's mental representation of a relational structure is lucky to obtain. I agree, then, with those who argue that one can have understanding when one's beliefs are environmentally lucky to be true, but that this compatibility is not relevant when considering the question of whether one can have environmentally lucky understanding. I then present what I take to be a properly constructed case which shows the incompatibility of environmental luck with understanding. (shrink)

While social epistemologists have recently begun addressing questions about whether groups can possess beliefs or knowledge, little has yet been said about whether groups can properly be said to possess understanding. Here I want to make some progress on this question by considering two possible accounts of group understanding, modeled on accounts of group belief and knowledge: a deflationary account, according to which a group understands just in case most or all of its members understand, and an inflationary account, according (...) to which a group’s understanding does not depend solely on whether its members understand. I argue that both accounts face problems. The deflationary account has two such problems: aggregation problems that are familiar from discussions of group belief, and the problem of different bases, wherein members possess understanding for different but consistent reasons. The inflationary account faces what I call the problem of distributed grasping: while it is widely accepted that understanding requires a kind of “grasping”, it is hard to make sense of how this requirement could be met at the group level while not necessarily being met by any individual member. Despite its problems, I make a case for the inflationary account. This will require addressing the problem of distributed grasping: to do this, I propose a different way of thinking about the grasping relation at the group level, such that it is constituted by a dependency relationship between members. (shrink)

While it is widely acknowledged that knowledge can be acquired via testimony, it has been argued that understanding cannot. While there is no consensus about what the epistemic relationship of understanding consists in, I argue here that regardless of how understanding is conceived there are kinds of understanding that can be acquired through testimony: easy understanding and easy-s understanding. I address a number of aspects of understanding that might stand in the way of being able to acquire understanding through testimony, (...) focusing on understanding ’s paradigmatic form and what it means to say that in order to understand something you need to “grasp” some information or the relationship between bits of information. I argue that in cases of both easy and easy-s understanding, no aspect of understanding stands in the way of it being able to acquire it through testimony. As a result, while not all understanding be acquired through testimony in all instances and for all subjects, this failure of acquisition is only a product of the complexity of the relevant information or one’s unfamiliarity with it, and not a product of the epistemic relationship of understanding. (shrink)

The fact that each of us has significantly greater confidence in the claims of co-partisans – those belonging to groups with which we identify – explains, in large part, why so many people believe a significant amount of the misinformation they encounter. It's natural to assume that such misinformed partisan beliefs typically involve a rational failure of some kind, and philosophers and psychologists have defended various accounts of the nature of the rational failure purportedly involved. I argue that none of (...) the standard diagnoses of the irrationality of misinformed partisan beliefs is convincing, but I also argue that we ought to reject attempts to characterize these beliefs as rational or consistent with epistemic virtue. Accordingly, I defend an alternative diagnosis of the relevant epistemic error. Specifically, I maintain that such beliefs typically result when an individual evaluating testimony assigns more weight to co-partisanship than he ought to under the circumstances, and consequently believes the testimony of co-partisans when better alternatives are available. (shrink)

If we acknowledge that a perceptual experience’s sensory phenomenology is not inherently representational, we face a puzzle. On the one hand, sensory phenomenology must play an intimate role in the perception of ordinary physical objects; but on the other hand, our experiences’ purely sensory element rarely captures our attention. I maintain that neither indirect realism nor the dual component theory provides a satisfactory solution to this puzzle: indirect realism is inconsistent with the fact that sensory phenomenology typically goes unnoticed by (...) perceivers; while, the dual component theory cannot do justice to the important role that sensory phenomenology plays in our perceptual awareness of physical objects. I argue that in order to avoid the difficulties with each of the standard alternatives, we must characterize sensory phenomenology as functioning in the way that linguistic symbols function in thought. (shrink)

Isaac Levi targets an implicit tension in C.S. Peirce’s epistemology, one that exists between the need to always be open-minded and aware of our propensity to make mistakes so that we do not “block the road of inquiry,” and the need to treat certain beliefs as infallible and to doubt only in a genuine way so that inquiry can proceed in the first place. Attempts at alleviating this tension have typically involved interpreting Peirce as ascribing different normative standards to different (...) areas of inquiry. I argue here that such “double-standard” interpretations face significant problems. I offer instead an interpretation of Peirce on which the differences between different areas of inquiry are descriptive rather than normative. Such a view resolves Levi’s tension while interpreting Peirce as consistently subscribing to one normative standard for all inquiry. (shrink)

Recently, there has been growing concern that increased partisanship in news sources, as well as new ways in which people acquire information, has led to a proliferation of epistemic bubbles and echo chambers: in the former, one tends to acquire information from a limited range of sources, ones that generally support the kinds of beliefs that one already has, while the latter function in the same way, but possess the additional characteristic that certain beliefs are actively reinforced. Here I argue, (...) first, that we should conceive of epistemic bubbles and echo chambers as types of epistemically pernicious groups, and second, that while analyses of such groups have typically focused on relationships between individual members, at least part of what such groups epistemically pernicious pertains to the way that members rely on the groups themselves as sources of information. I argue that member reliance on groups results in groups being attributed a degree of credibility that outruns their warrant, a process I call groupstrapping. I argue that by recognizing the groupstrapping as an illicit method of forming and updating beliefs we can make progress on some of the open questions concerning epistemically pernicious groups. (shrink)

It is has been argued that there is a problem with moral testimony: testimony is deferential, and basing judgments and actions on deferentially acquired knowledge prevents them from having moral worth. What morality perhaps requires of us, then, is that we understand why a proposition is true, but this is something that cannot be acquired through testimony. I argue here that testimony can be both deferential as well as cooperative, and that one can acquire moral understanding through cooperative testimony. The (...) problem of moral testimony is thus not a problem with testimony generally, but a problem of deferential testimony specifically. (shrink)

According to an influential variety of the representational view of perceptual experience—the singular content view—the contents of perceptual experiences include singular propositions partly composed of the particular physical object a given experience is about or of. The singular content view faces well-known difficulties accommodating hallucinations; I maintain that there is also an analogue of Frege's puzzle that poses a significant problem for this view. In fact, I believe that this puzzle presents difficulties for the theory that are unique to perception (...) in that strategies that have been developed to respond to Frege's puzzle in the case of belief cannot be employed successfully in the case of perception. Ultimately, I maintain that this perceptual analogue of Frege's puzzle provides a compelling reason to reject the singular content view of perceptual experience. (shrink)

The reports of individuals who have had their vision restored after a long period of blindness suggest that, immediately after regaining their vision, such individuals are not able to recognize shapes by vision alone. It is often assumed that the empirical literature on sight restoration tells us something important about the relationship between visual and tactile representations of shape. However, I maintain that, immediately after having their sight restored, at least some newly sighted individuals undergo visual experiences that instantiate basic (...) shape phenomenology but which do not present (that is, neither represent nor involve acquaintance with) the corresponding shape properties. Consequently, the empirical literature on sight restoration tells us something important about the role that perceptual phenomenology plays in our perceptual awareness of an object’s properties—it tells us that the properties presented by perceptual experiences are not determined by or “built into” perceptual phenomenology. In addition, I maintain that the evidence concerning sight restoration suggests an alternative theory concerning the role that sensory phenomenology plays in our perceptual awareness of an object’s properties. Specifically, it suggests that, while not inherently representational, sensory phenomenal properties can serve as vehicles for the representation of an object’s properties. (shrink)

In addition to being a founder of American pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce was a scientist and an empiricist. A core aspect of his thoroughgoing empiricism was a mindset that treats all attitudes as revisable. His fallibilism seems to require us to constantly seek out new information, and to not be content holding any beliefs uncritically. At the same time, Peirce often states that common sense has an important role to play in both scientific and vital inquiry, and that there cannot (...) be any “direct profit in going behind common sense.” Our question is the following: alongside a scientific mindset and a commitment to the method of inquiry, where does common sense fit in? Peirce does at times directly address common sense; however, those explicit engagements are relatively infrequent. In this paper, we argue that getting a firm grip on the role of common sense in Peirce’s philosophy requires a three-pronged investigation, targeting his treatment of common sense alongside his more numerous remarks on intuition and instinct. By excavating and developing Peirce’s concepts of instinct and intuition, we show that his respect for common sense coheres with his insistence on the methodological superiority of inquiry. We conclude that Peirce shows us the way to a distinctive epistemic position balancing fallibilism and anti-scepticism, a pragmatist common sense position of considerable interest for contemporary epistemology given current interest in the relation of intuition and reason. (shrink)

In this essay I respond to three of the most forceful objections to the open view of the future. It is argued that a) open view advocates must deny bivalence; b) the open view offers no theodicy advantages over classical theism; and c) the open view can’t assure believers that God can work all things to the better. I argue that the first objection is premised on an inadequate assessment of future tensed propositions, the second is rooted in an inadequate (...) assessment of free will, and the third is grounded in an inadequate assessment of God’s intelligence. (shrink)

In Sense and Content , Christopher Peacocke points out that two equally-sized trees at different distances from the perceiver are normally represented to be the same size, despite the fact that in a certain sense the nearer tree looks bigger ; he concludes on the basis of this observation that visual experiences possess irreducibly phenomenal properties. This argument has received the most attention of all of Peacocke’s arguments for separatism—the view that the intentional and phenomenal properties of experiences are independent (...) of one another. However, despite its notoriety, the argument is widely misunderstood and underappreciated. I argue that once the structure of the argument is clarified and the replies that have been offered are considered closely, one must conclude that the trees argument is successful. (shrink)

Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that property illusions—cases in which we perceive a property, but that property is not the property it seems to us to be in virtue of our perceptual experience—and veridical illusions—cases in which we veridically perceive an object’s properties, but our experience of some specific property is nonetheless unsuccessful or illusory—can occur. I defend the contrary view. First, I maintain that there are compelling reasons to conclude that property illusions and veridical illusions can’t occur; (...) and second, I maintain that the considerations supporting the possibility of such cases are uncompelling. (shrink)

It is well-known that naïve realism has difficulty accommodating perceptual error. Recent discussion of the issue has focused on whether the naïve realist can accommodate hallucination by adopting disjunctivism. However, illusions are more difficult for the naïve realist to explain precisely because the disjunctivist solution is not available. I discuss what I take to be the two most plausible accounts of illusion available to the naïve realist. The first claims that illusions are cases in which you are prevented from perceiving (...) properties you would ordinarily perceive and subsequently form a mistaken judgment about the perceived object. The second appeals to an unusual look or appearance that the perceived object instantiates. I argue that neither account is satisfactory and that, consequently, naïve realism ought to be rejected. (shrink)

我们必须记住的第一件事是，当说中国这样说或中国这样做时，我们不是说中国人民，而是控制中国共产党的社会路径者，即七大社会病态连环杀手。中共常务委员会或中央政治局委员等25人。 -/- 中共对三战和全面统治的计划在中国政府的出版物和演讲中已经非常明确地阐述了，这就是习近平的"中国梦"。只有统治中国的少数人（也许只有几十到几百人）的梦想，也是其他人（包括14亿中国人 ）的噩梦。每年100亿美元使他们或他们的傀儡拥有或控制报纸、杂志、电视和广播频道，每天在世界各地的大多数主要媒体上放置假新闻。 此外，他们有一支军队（也许有数百万人），他们滚动所有媒体进行更多的宣传，淹没合法的评论（50美分的军队）。 -/- 除了剥夺第三世界的资源外，数万亿美元的"一带一路"倡议的主要主旨是在全世界建立军事基地。他们迫使自由世界陷入大规模的高科技军备竞赛，使得与苏联的冷战看起来像是野餐。 -/- 尽管SSSSK和世界上其他的军事国家都在高级硬件上花费巨资，但WW3（或导致它的小型交战）很可能以软件为主。SSSSK，可能有更多的黑客（编码器）为他们工作，然后世界其他国家加起来，通过通过网络瘫痪他 们的敌人，以最小的物理冲突赢得未来的战争。"没有卫星，没有电话，没有通讯，没有金融交易，没有电网，没有互联网，没有先进的武器，没有车辆，火车，船舶和飞机。 -/- 罢免中共只有两条主要途径，即释放14亿中国囚犯，结束向第三次世界大战的疯狂进军。 和平的一个方案是发动一场全面的贸易战来摧毁中国经济，直到军方受够了，把中共赶出去。 -/- 关闭中国经济的替代方案是一场有限的战争，比如在中共第20届大会上，50架热压无人机进行有针对性的打击，当时所有高层成员都在一个地方，但这种情况要到2022年才会发生。一个可以击中年度全体会议。 袭击发生后，中国人将被告知，他们必须放下武器，准备举行民主选举，否则就要进入石器时代。另一种选择是全面核攻击。 鉴于中共目前的路线，军事对抗是不可避免的。 几十年后，这种情况可能会发生在南中国海或台湾的岛屿上，但随着它们在世界各地建立军事基地，它可能发生在任何地方（见"卧虎藏"等）。 未来的冲突将有硬性与软性方面与中共的既定目标，强调网络战争，通过黑客和瘫痪控制系统的所有军事和工业通信，设备，发电厂，卫星，互联网，银行，以及连接到网络的任何设备或车辆。 SS正在缓慢地部署一系列全球载人和自主水面和水下潜艇或无人驾驶飞机，这些潜艇或无人机能够发射可能处于休眠状态，等待中国发出信号，甚至寻找美国船只或飞机的签名。 在摧毁我们的卫星，从而消除美国和我们全球部队之间的通信的同时，他们将使用他们的卫星，与无人机一起瞄准和摧毁我们目前优越的海军部队。 当然，所有这一切都是越来越多地由AI自动完成的。 -/- 到目前为止，中共最大的盟友是美国民主党。 -/- 选择是现在停止中共，或者看着他们把中国监狱扩展到全世界。 -/- 当然，对我们的生活进行普遍监控和数字化是不可避免的。任何不这么认为的人，都是极度脱节的。 -/- 当然，正是那些期待中国社会路径者统治世界的人，而悲观主义者（他们认为自己是现实主义者）则期望AI的社会病态（或我称之为"假愚蠢"或"人造社会病态"）的选择性。） 接管，也许到2030年。 -/- 那些有兴趣在现代社会的疯狂道路的进一步细节可能会参考我的其他作品，如自杀的民主-美国和世界第三版2019年和自杀乌托邦幻想在21日世纪：哲学、人性与文明的崩溃（2019） .

Thomas Reid famously claimed that our perceptual experiences reveal what primary qualities are in themselves, while providing us with only an obscure notion of secondary qualities. I maintain that this claim is largely correct and that, consequently, any adequate theory of perception must explain the fact that perceptual experiences provide significantly less insight into the nature of secondary qualities than into the nature of primary qualities. I maintain that neither naïve realism nor the standard Russellian variety of the content view (...) can provide a satisfying explanation; instead, in order to provide a satisfying explanation, we must posit that perceptual experiences represent properties via Fregean modes of presentation. Further, I maintain that we must depart from the standard Fregean variety of the content view in two important respects. First, the relevant modes of presentation must be characterized without appealing to causal relations between perceptual experiences and perceived properties; and second, we must posit that primary and secondary qualities are represented via modes of presentation of different kinds. The resulting view is that primary qualities are represented via perceptual modes of presentation analogous to highly detailed descriptions, while secondary qualities are represented via perceptual modes of presentation analogous to impoverished descriptions. (shrink)

There have been many discussions recently from philosophers, cognitive scientists, and psychologists about group polarization, with online and social media environments in particular receiving a lot of attention, both because of people's increasing reliance on such environments for receiving and exchanging information and because such environments often allow individuals to selectively interact with those who are like-minded. My goal here is to argue that the group epistemologist can facilitate understanding the kinds of factors that drive group polarization in a way (...) that has been overlooked by the existing research. Specifically, I argue that polarization can occur in part because of the ways that members of a group treat the group itself (as opposed to an individual member within that group) as a source of information, and in doing so makes their own position, as well as that of the group, more extreme. I refer to this as a structural factor in driving polarization, and argue that such factors can contribute to explanations of polarization that occurs specifically in an important subset of groups, namely online and social media groups in which little is known about other members within the group, what I refer to as anonymous, semi-anonymous and pseudonymous (ASAP) groups. (shrink)

Early in Plato’s Republic, two cities are depicted, one healthy and one with “a fever”—the so- called luxurious city. The operative difference between these two cities is that the citizens of the latter “have surrendered themselves to the endless acquisition of money and have overstepped the limit of their necessities” (373d).i The luxury of this latter city requires the seizure of neighboring lands and consequently a standing army to defend those lands and the city’s wealth. According to the main character, (...) Socrates, war thus finds its origin in communities living beyond the natural limits of necessity. In short, the healthy or true city is sustainable, limiting its consumption to actual needs, while the luxurious city seems not to be sustainable, living beyond its needs in a perpetual quest for more. Plato spends the rest of the Republic in the attempt to reveal the political organization and virtues—in particular, the virtue of moderation—necessary for the luxurious city to be just, healthy and thereby sustainable. The contrasting images of the two cities and Plato’s subsequent discussion raise important questions about the interrelations between justice, consumption and sustainability. In this paper we appropriate Plato’s images of these metaphorical cities to discuss over-consumption and unsustainable practices by the nations of the contemporary “first world”, which in turn perpetuate poverty and environmental degradation in the nations of the “two-thirds world”. Matters of equity and justice are preeminent in our discussion. (shrink)

The consensus in contemporary philosophy of mind is that how a perceptual experience represents the world to be is built into its sensory phenomenology. I defend an opposing view which I call ‘moderate separatism’, that an experience's sensory phenomenology does not determine how it represents the world to be. I argue for moderate separatism by pointing to two ordinary experiences which instantiate the same sensory phenomenology but differ with regard to their intentional content. Two experiences of an object reflected in (...) a mirror can possess the same spatial phenomenology while representing that object to occupy different spatial locations. So, contrary to the current consensus, the representation of spatial location is not fixed by an experience's sensory phenomenology. (shrink)

In their responses to my article “Epistemically Pernicious Groups and the Groupstrapping Problem” (Boyd, 2018), Bert Baumgaertner (“Groupstrapping, Boostrapping, and Oops-strapping: A Reply to Boyd”) and C. Thi Nguyen (“Group-strapping, Bubble, or Echo Chamber?”) have raised interesting questions and opened lines of inquiry regarding my discussion of what I hope to be a way to help make sense of how members of groups can continue to hold beliefs that are greatly outweighed by countervailing evidence (e.g. antivaxxers, climate-change deniers, (...) etc.). Here I respond to these arguments and suggestions by providing three new reasons to believe that groupstrapping as I describe it occurs in epistemically pernicious groups. (shrink)

When you have a perceptual experience of a given physical object that object seems to be immediately present to you in a way it never does when you consciously think about or imagine it. Many philosophers have claimed that naïve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world) can provide a satisfying account of this phenomenological directness of perceptual experience while the content view (the view that to perceive is to (...) represent the world to be a certain way) cannot. I argue that this claim is false. Specifically, I maintain that the only acceptable naïve realist account of the relevant phenomenology is circular and that the content view can provide a similar account. In addition, I maintain that a certain specific variety of the content view provides a non-circular and thus more satisfactory account of this phenomenology. If so, then contrary to what is commonly assumed there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view to naïve realism. (shrink)

まず心に留めておくべきことは、中国がこれを言うか、中国がそうすると言うとき、我々は中国の人々の話ではなく、中国共産党を支配する社会学者、すなわち、7人の老人社会病的連続殺人犯(SSSSK)の話だという ことです。e 中国共産党常任委員会、または政治局員25名等 -/- 中国共産党の第三次世界大戦と総支配の計画は、中国政府の出版物や演説で非常に明確に示されており、これは習近平の「チャイナ・ドリーム」である。中国を支配する少数派(おそらく数十人から数百人)だけが夢であり 、他の全ての人(14億人の中国人を含む)にとっては悪夢だ。年間100億ドルは、彼らまたはその人形が新聞、雑誌、テレビ、ラジオチャンネルを所有または制御し、毎日どこでもほとんどの主要メディアに偽のニュー スを配置することを可能にします。 さらに、彼らはすべてのメディアをより多くのプロパガンダを配置し、正当な解説(50セントの軍隊)をかき消す軍隊(おそらく何百万人もの人々)を持っています。 -/- 資源の第3の世界を取り除くことに加えて、数兆ドルのベルトとロードイニシアチブの主要な推進力は、世界中の軍事基地を構築しています。彼らは、ソ連との冷戦をピクニックのように見せる大規模なハイテク軍拡競争に 自由な世界を強制しています。 -/- SSSSKと世界の他の軍隊は、高度なハードウェアに巨額を費やしていますが、WW3(またはそれに至る小規模な関与)がソフトウェア支配される可能性が非常に高いです。SSSSKは、おそらくより多くのハッカー (コーダー)が彼らのために働いて、世界の残りの部分を組み合わせることで、ネットを介して敵を麻痺させるだけで、最小限の物理的な紛争で将来の戦争に勝つことは問題外ではありません。衛星、電話なし、通信なし、 金融取引なし、送電網なし、インターネットなし、高度な武器なし、車両、列車、船舶、飛行機なし。 -/- 中国共産党を排除し、14億人の中国人囚人を解放し、第三次世界大戦への狂気の行進を終わらせる主な道は2つしかない。 平和的な一つは、軍がうんざりして中国共産党を追い出すまで、中国経済を荒廃させるために全面的な貿易戦争を開始することです。 -/- 中国経済を閉鎖する代わりに、中国共産党の第20回会議で50機の熱圧ドローンによる標的ストライキなど、限定的な戦争が起こるが、それは2022年まで行われないだろう。年次総会に当たる可能性がある。 中国人は、攻撃が起こったように、彼らが武器を置き、民主的な選挙を開催する準備をしなければならない、または石器時代に裸にされなければならないことを知らされるだろう。もう一つの選択肢は、全面的な核攻撃です 。 中国共産党の現在の進路を考えると、軍事的対立は避けられない。 数十年以内に南シナ海や台湾の島々で起こる可能性が高いが、世界中に軍事基地を設立すれば、どこでも起こりうる(しゃがむ虎など)。 将来の紛争は、すべての軍事および産業通信、機器、発電所、衛星、インターネット、銀行、およびすべての軍事および産業通信の制御システムをハッキングし、麻痺することによってサイバー戦争を強調するために、中国 共産党の明記された目的とハードキルとソフトキルの側面を持つことになります。ネットに接続されている任意のデバイスまたは車両。 SSは、中国からの信号を待っているか、さらには米国の船や飛行機の署名を探して休眠しているかもしれない従来または核兵器を発射することができる有人および自律的な表面と水中潜水艦や無人機の世界的な配列をゆっ くりとフィールドにしています。 我々の衛星を破壊し、世界中の米軍との通信を排除する一方で、彼らはドローンと組み合わせて、我々の現在の優れた海軍を標的にし、破壊するために、彼ら(彼ら)を使用します。 もちろん、これらすべてがAIによって自動的に行われるようになりました。 -/- 中国共産党の最大の同盟国はアメリカの民主党である。 選択は、今CCPを停止するか、彼らが世界中に中国の刑務所を拡張するのを見てです。 -/- もちろん、私たちの生活の普遍的な監視とデジタル化は、どこでも避けられません。そう思わない人は、深く接触していない。 -/- もちろん、中国の社会パスが世界を支配することを期待する楽観主義者であり、悲観主義者(現実主義者と見なす)は、おそらく2030年までにAI社会病(または私が呼ぶAS)が引き継ぐことを期待している。 現代社会の狂気の道の詳細に興味がある人は、アメリカのための民主主義による自殺、2019年第3版、21stの自殺ユートピアの妄想など、私の他の作品を参照してください。世紀:哲学、人間性と文明崩壊5位(2 019年) .

In the distant future, a thousand years after "The Seven Days of Fire"—the holocaust that rapacious industrialization spawned—the earth is a wasteland of sterile deserts and toxic jungles that threaten the survival of the few remaining human beings. This is the world of Hayao Miyazaki's film, Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind. In this film, Miyazaki offers a vision of an alternative to the violent quest for dominion that has brought about this environmental degradation, through the struggle of the (...) young princess of the Valley of the Wind, Nausicaä. As a messianic figure, I contend the shōjo Nausicaä offers a beneficial estrangement from common conceptions of the gospel and opens up the ecological significance of Christ's message of non-violence. Exploring the ecological and pacific aspects of the gospel through this figure, I argue, may provide a helpful lens for examining our own distorting visions in this age of war and environmental crisis. (shrink)

A perennial problem in social epistemology is the problem of expert testimony, specifically expert testimony regarding scientific issues: for example, while it is important for me to know information pertaining to anthropogenic climate change, vaccine safety, Covid-19, etc., I may lack the scientific background required to determine whether the information I come across is, in fact, true. Without being able to evaluate the science itself, then, I need to find trustworthy expert testifiers to listen to. A major project in social (...) epistemology has thus become determining what the markers of trustworthiness are that laypersons can appeal to in order to identify and acquire information from expert testifiers. At the same time, the ways in which we acquire scientific information has changed significantly, with much of it nowadays being acquired in online environments. While much has been said about the potential pitfalls of seeking information online, little has been said about how the nature of seeking information online should make us think about the problem of expert testimony. Indeed, it seems to be an underlying assumption that good markers of trustworthiness apply equally well when seeking information from expert testifiers in online and offline environments alike, and that the new challenges and opportunities presented by online environments merely affects the methods by which we can acquire evidence of said trustworthiness. Here I argue that in making this assumption one risks failing to account for how unique features of the ways in which we acquire information online affect how we evaluate the trustworthiness of experts. Specifically, I argue for two main claims: first, that the nature of information-seeking online is such that the extent to which information is susceptible to manipulation is a dominant marker of trustworthiness; second, as a result, one will be more likely to seek out a particular kind of expert testifier in online environments, what I call a cooperative as opposed to preemptive expert. The result is that criteria for expert trustworthiness may look significantly different when acquiring information online as opposed to offline. (shrink)

The first thing we must keep in mind is that when saying that China says this or China does that, we are not speaking of the Chinese people, but of the Sociopaths who control the CCP -- Chinese Communist Party, i.e., the Seven Senile Sociopathic Serial Killers (SSSSK) of the Standing Committee of the CCP or the 25 members of the Politburo etc.. -/- The CCP’s plans for WW3 and total domination are laid out quite clearly in Chinese govt publications (...) and speeches and this is Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”. It is a dream only for the tiny minority (perhaps a few dozen to a few hundred) who rule China and a nightmare for everyone else (including 1.4 billion Chinese). The 10 billion dollars yearly enables them or their puppets to own or control newspapers, magazines, TV and radio channels and place fake news in most major media everywhere every day. In addition, they have an army (maybe millions of people) who troll all the media placing more propaganda and drowning out legitimate commentary (the 50 cent army). -/- In addition to stripping the 3rd world of resources, a major thrust of the multi-trillion dollar Belt and Road Initiative is building military bases worldwide. They are forcing the free world into a massive high-tech arms race that makes the cold war with the Soviet Union look like a picnic. -/- Though the SSSSK, and the rest of the world’s military, are spending huge sums on advanced hardware, it is highly likely that WW3 (or the smaller engagements leading up to it) will be software dominated. It is not out of the question that the SSSSK, with probably more hackers (coders) working for them then all the rest of the world combined, will win future wars with minimal physical conflict, just by paralyzing their enemies via the net. No satellites, no phones, no communications, no financial transactions, no power grid, no internet, no advanced weapons, no vehicles, trains, ships or planes. -/- There are only two main paths to removing the CCP, freeing 1.4 billion Chinese prisoners, and ending the lunatic march to WW3. The peaceful one is to launch an all-out trade war to devastate the Chinese economy until the military gets fed up and boots out the CCP. -/- An alternative to shutting down China’s economy is a limited war, such as a targeted strike by say 50 thermobaric drones on the 20th Congress of the CCP, when all the top members are in one place, but that won’t take place until 2022 so one could hit the annual plenary meeting. The Chinese would be informed, as the attack happened, that they must lay down their arms and prepare to hold a democratic election or be nuked into the stone age. The other alternative is an all-out nuclear attack. Military confrontation is unavoidable given the CCP’s present course. It will likely happen over the islands in the South China Sea or Taiwan within a few decades, but as they establish military bases worldwide it could happen anywhere (see Crouching Tiger etc.). Future conflicts will have hardkill and softkill aspects with the stated objectives of the CCP to emphasize cyberwar by hacking and paralyzing control systems of all military and industrial communications, equipment, power plants, satellites, internet, banks, and any device or vehicle connected to the net. The SS are slowly fielding a worldwide array of manned and autonomous surface and underwater subs or drones capable of launching conventional or nuclear weapons that may lie dormant awaiting a signal from China or even looking for the signature of US ships or planes. While destroying our satellites, thus eliminating communication between the USA and our forces worldwide, they will use theirs, in conjunction with drones to target and destroy our currently superior naval forces. Of course, all of this is increasingly done automatically by AI. -/- By far the biggest ally of the CCP is the Democratic party of the USA. The choice is to stop the CCP now or watch as they extend the Chinese prison over the whole world. -/- Of course, universal surveillance and digitizing of our lives is inevitable everywhere. Anyone who does not think so is profoundly out of touch. -/- Of course it is the optomists who expect the Chinese sociopaths to rule the world while the pessimists (who view themselves as realists) expect AI sociopathy (or AS as I call it – i.e., Artificial Stupidity or Artificial Sociopathy) to take over, perhaps by 2030 Those interested in further details on the lunatic path of modern society may consult my other works such as Suicide by Democracy-an Obituary for America and the World 3rd Edition 2019 and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization 5th ed (2019) -/- . (shrink)

पहली बात हमें ध्यान में रखना चाहिए कि जब यह कहना है कि चीन यह कहता है या चीन ऐसा करता है, तो हम चीनी लोगों की बात नहीं कर रहे हैं, लेकिन उन सोशियोपैथों की जो सीसीपी को नियंत्रित करते हैं - चीनी कम्युनिस्ट पार्टी, अर्थात, सात सेनेले सोसाइपैथिक सीरियल किलर (एसएसएसएसके) के सीसीपी की स्थायी समिति या पोलितब्यूरो आदि के 25 सदस्य। -/- WW3 और कुल प्रभुत्व के लिए सीसीपी की योजना चीनी सरकार के प्रकाशनों और भाषणों में (...) काफी स्पष्ट रूप से बाहर रखी हैं और यह शी जिनपिंग की "चीन ड्रीम" है. यह केवल छोटे अल्पसंख्यक के लिए एक सपना है (शायद कुछ दर्जन से कुछ सौ) जो चीन शासन और हर किसी के लिए एक बुरा सपना (1.4 अरब चीनी सहित). 10 अरब डॉलर वार्षिक उन्हें या उनकी कठपुतलियों के मालिक हैं या समाचार पत्र, पत्रिकाओं, टीवी और रेडियो चैनलों को नियंत्रित करने और सबसे प्रमुख मीडिया में हर जगह हर दिन नकली खबर जगह सक्षम बनाता है. इसके अलावा, वे एक सेना है (शायद लाखों लोगों के) जो सभी मीडिया और अधिक प्रचार रखने और वैध टिप्पणी (50 प्रतिशत सेना) बाहर डूब ट्रोल. -/- संसाधनों के 3rd दुनिया अलग करना के अलावा, बहु खरब डॉलर बेल्ट और सड़क पहल का एक प्रमुख जोर दुनिया भर में सैन्य ठिकानों का निर्माण कर रहा है. वे एक बड़े पैमाने पर उच्च तकनीक हथियारों की दौड़ है कि सोवियत संघ के साथ शीत युद्ध एक पिकनिक की तरह लग रही है में मुक्त दुनिया मजबूर कर रहे हैं. -/- हालांकि SSSSK, और दुनिया की सेना के बाकी, उन्नत हार्डवेयर पर भारी रकम खर्च कर रहे हैं, यह अत्यधिक संभावना है कि WW3 (या छोटे सगाई यह करने के लिए अग्रणी) सॉफ्टवेयर प्रभुत्व होगा. यह सवाल से बाहर नहीं है कि SSSSK, शायद अधिक हैकर्स के साथ (कोडर्स) उनके लिए काम कर रहे तो संयुक्त दुनिया के सभी बाकी, कम से कम शारीरिक संघर्ष के साथ भविष्य के युद्ध जीत जाएगा, बस नेट के माध्यम से अपने दुश्मनों को paralyzing द्वारा. कोई उपग्रहों, कोई फोन, कोई संचार, कोई वित्तीय लेनदेन, कोई पावर ग्रिड, कोई इंटरनेट, कोई उन्नत हथियार, कोई वाहन, गाड़ियों, जहाजों या विमानों. -/- वहाँ केवल दो मुख्य रास्ते सीसीपी को हटाने के लिए कर रहे हैं, 1.4 अरब चीनी कैदियों को मुक्त, और WW3 के लिए पागल मार्च समाप्त. शांतिपूर्ण एक एक सब बाहर व्यापार युद्ध शुरू करने के लिए चीनी अर्थव्यवस्था को तबाह जब तक सेना तंग आ जाता है और सीसीपी बाहर जूते है. -/- चीन की अर्थव्यवस्था को बंद करने के लिए एक विकल्प एक सीमित युद्ध है, जैसे कि सीसीपी के 20वें कांग्रेस पर 50thermobaric ड्रोन कहते हैं, जब सभी शीर्ष सदस्य ों को एक ही स्थान पर हैं, लेकिन यह 2022 तक नहीं होगा तो एक लक्षित हड़ताल एक वार्षिक पूर्ण बैठक हिट सकता है. चीनियों को सूचित किया जाएगा, जैसा कि हमला हुआ है, कि उन्हें अपने हथियार डाल देके और लोकतांत्रिक चुनाव कराने के लिए तैयार रहना चाहिए या पत्थर की उम्र में नकेल कसी हुई है। दूसरा विकल्प एक सर्व-बाह्य परमाणु हमला है। सीपी के वर्तमान पाठ्यक्रम को देखते हुए सैन्य टकराव अपरिहार्य है। यह संभावना कुछ दशकों के भीतर दक्षिण चीन सागर या ताइवान में द्वीपों पर होगा, लेकिन के रूप में वे दुनिया भर में सैन्य ठिकानों की स्थापना यह कहीं भी हो सकता है (क्रोचिंग टाइगर आदि देखें). भविष्य के संघर्षों में सीसीपी के कथित उद्देश्यों के साथ कठोर और नरम पहलुओं को होगा ताकि सभी सैन्य और औद्योगिक संचार, उपकरण, बिजली संयंत्रों, उपग्रहों, इंटरनेट, बैंकों की नियंत्रण प्रणालियों को हैक करके और पैरालाइजिंग करके साइबरवार पर जोर दिया जा सके। और किसी भी डिवाइस या वाहन नेट से जुड़ा है। एसएस धीरे-धीरे मानव और स्वायत्त सतह और पानी के नीचे subs या पारंपरिक या परमाणु हथियार है कि चीन से एक संकेत का इंतजार कर निष्क्रिय झूठ हो सकता है या यहां तक कि अमेरिकी जहाजों या विमानों के हस्ताक्षर के लिए देख शुरू करने में सक्षम ड्रोन की एक दुनिया भर में सरणी क्षेत्ररक्षण कर रहे हैं। जबकि हमारे उपग्रहों को नष्ट करने, इस प्रकार दुनिया भर में संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका और हमारे बलों के बीच संचार को नष्ट करने, वे उनके उपयोग करेंगे, ड्रोन के साथ संयोजन के रूप में लक्ष्य और हमारे वर्तमान में बेहतर नौसेना बलों को नष्ट करने के लिए. बेशक, यह सब तेजी से एअर इंडिया द्वारा स्वचालित रूप से किया जाता है. -/- द्वारा अब तक सीसीपी का सबसे बड़ा सहयोगी संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका के डेमोक्रेटिक पार्टी है. विकल्प सीसीपी अब बंद करो या घड़ी के रूप में वे पूरी दुनिया में चीनी जेल का विस्तार है. -/- बेशक, सार्वभौमिक निगरानी और हमारे जीवन के digitizing हर जगह अपरिहार्य है. जो कोई ऐसा नहीं सोचता है, वह गहराई से संपर्क से बाहर है। -/- बेशक यह optomists जो चीनी socipaths दुनिया पर शासन करने की उम्मीद है, जबकि निराशावादी (जो खुद को यथार्थवादी के रूप में देखने) ऐ socipathy की उम्मीद (या के रूप में के रूप में मैं इसे कहते हैं - यानी, कृत्रिम बेवकूफी या कृत्रिम समाज) पर ले, शायद 2030 तक आधुनिक समाज के पागल रास्ते पर अधिक जानकारी में रुचि रखने वालों को लोकतंत्र द्वारा आत्महत्या जैसे अन्य कार्यों से परामर्श कर सकते हैं- अमेरिका के लिए एक प्रसूति और विश्व 3rd संस्करण 2019 और 21सेंट में आत्मघाती यूटोपियाई भ्रम सदी: दर्शन, मानव प्रकृति और सभ्यता के पतन 5वें एड (2019) . (shrink)

It is often assumed that there is a perceptual conflict in looking at a picture since one sees both a two-dimensional surface and a three-dimensional scene simultaneously. In this paper, I argue that it is a mistake to think that looking at pictures requires the visual system to perform the special task of reconciling inconsistent impressions of space, or competing information from different depth cues. To the contrary, I suggest that there are good reasons to think that the perception of (...) depth in pictures is achieved in much the same way as is the perception of depth in any ordinary case. (shrink)

I argue here for a view I call epistemic separabilism , which states that there are two different ways we can be evaluated epistemically when we assert a proposition or treat a proposition as a reason for acting: one in terms of whether we have adhered to or violated the relevant epistemic norm, and another in terms of how epistemically well-positioned we are towards the fact that we have either adhered to or violated said norm. ES has been appealed to (...) most prominently in order to explain why epistemic evaluations that conflict with the knowledge norm of assertion and practical reasoning nevertheless seem correct. Opponents of such a view are committed to what I call epistemic monism , which states that there is only one way we can be properly evaluated as epistemically appropriate asserters and practical reasoners, namely in terms of whether we have adhered to or violated the relevant norm. Accepting ES over EM has two significant consequences: first, a “metaepistemological” consequence that the structure of normative epistemic evaluations parallels that found in other normative areas , and second, that the knowledge norms of assertion and practical reasoning are no worse off than any alternatives in terms of either explanatory power or simplicity. (shrink)