Broader contexts of non-domination: Pettit and Hegel on freedom and recognition

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This study compares Philip Pettit’s account of freedom to Hegelian accounts. Both share the key insight that characterizes the tradition of republicanism from the Ancients to Rousseau: to be subordinated to the will of particular others is to be unfree. They both also hold that relations to others, relations of recognition, are in various ways directly constitutive of freedom, and in different ways enabling conditions of freedom. The republican ideal of non-domination can thus be fruitfully understood in light of the Hegelian structure of ‘being at one with oneself (Beisichsein) in another’. However, while the Hegelian view converges with Pettit on non-domination and recognition, their comprehensive theories of freedom are based on radically different metaphysics. One key difference concerns the relationship between freedom and nature, and there is a further difference between Pettit’s (ahistorical) idea of the concept dependence of freedom, and the Hegelian (historical) idea of the conception dependence of freedom. -/- Keywords: Pettit; Hegel; freedom; non-domination; mutual recognition; republicanism; ‘being at one with oneself’; social freedom.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-04-07
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Elements of the Philosophy of Right.Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich

View all 40 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
142 ( #27,327 of 49,973 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #31,107 of 49,973 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.