A Puzzle About the Fixity of the Past

Analysis (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It is a widely held principle that no one is able to do something that would require the past to have been different from how it actually is. This principle of the fixity of the past has been presented in numerous ways, playing a crucial role in arguments for logical and theological fatalism, and for the incompatibility of causal determinism and the ability to do otherwise. I will argue that, assuming bivalence, this principle is in conflict with standard views about knowledge and the semantics for ‘actually’. I also consider many possible responses to the argument.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LAMAPA-5
Upload history
First archival date: 2021-12-23
Latest version: 2 (2022-01-09)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-12-23

Total views
155 ( #42,351 of 71,139 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
87 ( #8,332 of 71,139 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.