Other‐Sacrificing Options

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I argue that you can be permitted to discount the interests of your adversaries even though doing so would be impartially suboptimal. This means that, in addition to the kinds of moral options that the literature traditionally recognises, there exist what I call other-sacrificing options. I explore the idea that you cannot discount the interests of your adversaries as much as you can favour the interests of your intimates; if this is correct, then there is an asymmetry between negative partiality toward your adversaries and positive partiality toward your intimates.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2019-07-09
Latest version: 2 (2020-12-22)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
356 ( #18,882 of 64,121 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
92 ( #6,729 of 64,121 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.