Other‐Sacrificing Options

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):612-629 (2019)
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I argue that you can be permitted to discount the interests of your adversaries even though doing so would be impartially suboptimal. This means that, in addition to the kinds of moral options that the literature traditionally recognises, there exist what I call other-sacrificing options. I explore the idea that you cannot discount the interests of your adversaries as much as you can favour the interests of your intimates; if this is correct, then there is an asymmetry between negative partiality toward your adversaries and positive partiality toward your intimates.

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Benjamin Lange
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München


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