Results for 'Partiality'

977 found
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  1.  70
    Implicational Partial Gaggle Logics and Matrix Semantics.Eunsuk Yang - 2023 - Korean Journal of Logic 26 (2):131-144.
    Implicational tonoid logics and their extensions with abstract Galois properties have been introduced by Yang and Dunn. They introduced matrix semantics for the implicational tonoid logics but did not do for the extensions. Here we provide such semantics for implicational partial gaggle logics as one sort of such extensions. To this end, first we discuss implicational partial gaggle logics in Hilbert-style. We next introduce one kind of matrix semantics based on Lindenbaum– Tarski matrices for the logics and show that those (...)
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  2. Partiality Traps and our Need for Risk-Aware Ethics and Epistemology.Guy Axtell - 2023 - In Eric Siverman (ed.), Virtuous and Vicious Expressions of Partiality. Routledge.
    Virtue theories can plausibly be argued to have important advantages over normative ethical theories which prescribe a strict impartialism in moral judgment, or which neglect people’s special roles and relationships. However, there are clear examples of both virtuous and vicious partiality in people’s moral judgments, and virtue theorists may struggle to adequately distinguish them, much as proponents of other normative ethical theories do. This paper first adapts the “expanding moral circle” concept and some literary examples to illustrate the difficulty (...)
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  3. Partiality and Meaning.Benjamin Lange - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-28.
    Why do relationships of friendship and love support partiality, but not relationships of hatred or commitments of racism? Where does partiality end and why? I take the intuitive starting point that important cases of partiality are meaningful. I develop a view whereby meaning is understood in terms of transcending self-limitations in order to connect with things of external value. I then show how this view can be used to distinguish central cases of legitimate partiality from cases (...)
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  4. Partiality, Asymmetries, and Morality's Harmonious Propensity.Benjamin Lange & Joshua Brandt - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):1-42.
    We argue for asymmetries between positive and negative partiality. Specifically, we defend four claims: i) there are forms of negative partiality that do not have positive counterparts; ii) the directionality of personal relationships has distinct effects on positive and negative partiality; iii) the extent of the interactions within a relationship affects positive and negative partiality differently; and iv) positive and negative partiality have different scope restrictions. We argue that these asymmetries point to a more fundamental (...)
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  5. The Ethics of Partiality.Benjamin Lange - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 1 (8):1-15.
    Partiality is the special concern that we display for ourselves and other people with whom we stand in some special personal relationship. It is a central theme in moral philosophy, both ancient and modern. Questions about the justification of partiality arise in the context of enquiry into several moral topics, including the good life and the role in it of our personal commitments; the demands of impartial morality, equality, and other moral ideals; and commonsense ideas about supererogation. This (...)
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  6. Epistemic Partialism and Taking Our Friends Seriously.Cathy Mason - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (3):233-243.
    Two doxastically significant demands of friendship have been discussed in recent literature, a demand to be epistemically partial and a demand to take our friends seriously. Though less discussed than epistemic partialism, I suggest that the demand to take our friends seriously is motivated by similar cases and considerations, and can avoid key objections to epistemic partialism that have been raised. I further suggest that it does justice to what we care about in friendship, and thus is to be preferred.
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  7. Partial Content and Expressions of Part and Whole. Discussion of Stephen Yablo: Aboutness.Friederike Moltmann - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):797-808.
    In 'Aboutness' (MIT Press 2014), Yablo argues for the importance of the notions of partial content and of partial truth. This paper argues that those notions are involved in a much greater range of entities than acknowledged by Yablo. The paper also argues that some of those entities involve a notion of partial satisfaction as well as partial existence (and partial validity).
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  8. The Partial Identity Account of Partial Similarity Revisited.Matteo Morganti - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):527-546.
    This paper provides a defence of the account of partial resemblances between properties according to which such resemblances are due to partial identities of constituent properties. It is argued, first of all, that the account is not only required by realists about universals à la Armstrong, but also useful (of course, in an appropriately re-formulated form) for those who prefer a nominalistic ontology for material objects. For this reason, the paper only briefly considers the problem of how to conceive of (...)
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  9. Moral Partiality and Duties of Love.Berit Brogaard - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (5):83.
    In this paper, I make a case for the view that we have special relationship duties (also known as “associative duties”) that are not identical to or derived from our non-associative impartial moral obligations. I call this view “moral partialism”. On the version of moral partialism I defend, only loving relationships can normatively ground special relationship duties. I propose that for two capable adults to have a loving relationship, they must have mutual non-trivial desires to promote each other’s interests or (...)
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  10. Parental Partiality and Future Children.Thomas Douglas - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (1).
    Prospective parents are sometimes partial towards their future children, engaging in what I call ‘pre-parental partiality’. Common sense morality is as permissive of pre-parental partiality as it is of ordinary parental partialitypartiality towards one’s existing children. But I argue that existing justifications for partiality typically establish weaker reasons in support of pre-parental partiality than in support of parental partiality. Thus, either these existing justifications do not fully account for our reasons of parental (...), or our reasons to engage in pre-parental partiality are indeed typically weaker than our reasons to engage in parental partiality. (shrink)
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  11. Epistemic Partiality.A. K. Flowerree - forthcoming - In Mathias Steup (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  12. Personal Reactive Attitudes and Partial Responses to Others: A Partiality-Based Approach to Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes.Rosalind Chaplin - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25 (2):323-345.
    This paper argues for a new understanding of Strawson’s distinction between personal, impersonal, and self-reactive attitudes. Many Strawsonians take these basic reactive attitude types to be distinguished by two factors. Is it the self or another who is treated with good- or ill-will? And is it the self or another who displays good- or ill-will? On this picture, when someone else wrongs me, my reactive attitude is personal; when someone else wrongs someone else, my reactive attitude is impersonal; and when (...)
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  13. Partially Autonomous Belief.Lukas Schwengerer - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (2):207–221.
    Adam Carter (2022) recently proposed that a successful analysis of knowledge needs to include an autonomy condition. Autonomy, for Carter, requires a lack of a compulsion history. A compulsion history bypasses one’s cognitive competences and results in a belief that is difficult to shed. I argue that Carter’s autonomy condition does not cover partially autonomous beliefs properly. Some belief-forming processes are partially bypassing one’s competences, but not bypassing them completely. I provide a case for partially autonomous belief based on processing (...)
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  14. A partial model theory and some of its applications.Rodolfo Cunha Carnier - manuscript
    In this paper, we introduce the basics of what we shall call "partial model theory", which is an extension of traditional model theory to partial structures. These are a specific kind of structure developed within the partial structures approach, which is a view constituting the semantic approach of theories. And together with other related semantical concepts, like the concept of quasi-truth, partial structures have been used in contemporary philosophy of science for several purposes. Nonetheless, those uses presuppose certain technical results, (...)
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  15. Bioconservatism, Partiality, and the Human-Nature Objection to Enhancement.Pugh Jonathan, Guy Kahane & Julian Savulescu - 2016 - The Monist 99 (4):406-422.
    “Bioconservatives” in the human enhancement debate endorse the conservative claim that we should reject the use of biotechnologies that enhance natural human capacities. However, they often ground their objections to enhancement with contestable claims about human nature that are also in tension with other common tenets of conservatism. We argue that bioconservatives could raise a more plausible objection to enhancement by invoking a strain of conservative thought developed by G.A. Cohen. Although Cohen’s conservatism is not sufficient to fully revive the (...)
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  16. The Partial Coherence of Cicero’s De officiis.Thornton Lockwood - manuscript
    Martha Nussbaum has provided a sustained critique of Cicero’s De officiis (or On Duties), concerning what she claims is Cicero’s incoherent distinction between duties of justice, which are strict, cosmopolitan, and impartial, and duties of material aid, which are elastic, weighted towards those who are near and dear, and partial. No doubt, from Nussbaum’s cosmopolitan perspective, Cicero’s distinction between justice and beneficence seems problematic and lies at the root of modern moral failures to conceptualize adequately our obligations in situations of (...)
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  17. The Partiality of Faith.Blake McAllister - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):36-45.
    ABSTRACT Katherine Dormandy argues that there is no partiality in virtuous faith. Partiality biases and leads to noetic entrenchment. In response, I contend there is an important sense in which virtuous faith is partial towards its object. Namely, it disposes one to perceive the object as more trustworthy and to rely on this partialist evidence in forming beliefs, even when the impartialist evidence points in the other direction. There are, after all, situations in which impartialist evidence is apt (...)
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  18. Partial Twinning and the Boundaries of a Person.Eric T. Olson - 2023 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 36 (1):7-24.
    In special cases of partial twinning, two heads, each supporting a more-orless normal human mental life, emerge from a single torso. It is often argued that there must be two people in such a case, even if there is only one biological organism. That would pose a problem for ‘animalism’, the view that people are organisms. The paper argues that it is very hard to say what sort of non-organisms the people in such cases would be. Reflection on partial twinning (...)
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  19. Partial Compliance Theory.Henrik D. Kugelberg & Zofia Stemplowska - forthcoming - In David Copp, Tina Rulli & Connie Rosati (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    People often fail to comply with the demands of morality. Partial compliance theory takes this noncompliance or its possibility into account in the formulation of moral requirements for people to comply with, or in the evaluation of people’s actions against those requirements. This chapter critically engages with recent work on partial compliance theory. It examines the relationship between noncompliance and injustice, assesses different ways of doing partial compliance theory, sketches the relationship between partial compliance theory and other central methodological debates (...)
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  20. Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.
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  21. Neutrality, Partiality, and Meaning in Life.Thaddeus Metz - 2017 - De Ethica 4 (3):7-25.
    Discussion of whether values and norms are neutral or not has mainly appeared in works on the nature of prudential rationality and morality. Little systematic has yet appeared in the up and coming field of the meaning of life. What are the respects in which the value of meaningfulness is neutral or, in contrast, partial, relational, or ‘biased’? In this article, I focus strictly on answering this question. First, I aim to identify the salient, and perhaps exhaustive, respects in which (...)
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  22. Partial explanations in social science’.Robert Northcott - 2012 - In Harold Kincaid (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 130-153.
    Comparing different causes’ importance, and apportioning responsibility between them, requires making good sense of the notion of partial explanation, that is, of degree of explanation. How much is this subjective, how much objective? If the causes in question are probabilistic, how much is the outcome due to them and how much to simple chance? I formulate the notion of degree of causation, or effect size, relating it to influential recent work in the literature on causation. I examine to what extent (...)
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  23. On Partial and Paraconsistent Logics.Reinhard Muskens - 1999 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (3):352-374.
    In this paper we consider the theory of predicate logics in which the principle of Bivalence or the principle of Non-Contradiction or both fail. Such logics are partial or paraconsistent or both. We consider sequent calculi for these logics and prove Model Existence. For L4, the most general logic under consideration, we also prove a version of the Craig-Lyndon Interpolation Theorem. The paper shows that many techniques used for classical predicate logic generalise to partial and paraconsistent logics once the right (...)
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  24.  91
    Epistemic logic with partial grasp.Francisca Silva - 2024 - Synthese 204 (92):1-27.
    We have to gain from recognizing a relation between epistemic agents and the parts of subject matters that play a role in their cognitive lives. I call this relation “grasping”. Namely, I zone in on one notion of having a partial grasp of a subject matter—that of agents grasping part of the subject matter that they are attending to—and characterize it. I propose that giving up the idealization that we fully grasp the subject matters we attend to allows one to (...)
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  25. Do We Need Partial Intentions?Avery Archer - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):995-1005.
    Richard Holton has argued that the traditional account of intentions—which only posits the existence of all-out intentions—is inadequate because it fails to accommodate dual-plan cases; ones in which it is rationally permissible for an agent to adopt two competing plans to bring about the same end. Since the consistency norms governing all-out intentions prohibit the adoption of competing intentions, we can only preserve the idea that the agent in a dual-plan case is not being irrational if we attribute to them (...)
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  26. Fair machine learning under partial compliance.Jessica Dai, Sina Fazelpour & Zachary Lipton - 2021 - In Jessica Dai, Sina Fazelpour & Zachary Lipton (eds.), Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society. pp. 55–65.
    Typically, fair machine learning research focuses on a single decision maker and assumes that the underlying population is stationary. However, many of the critical domains motivating this work are characterized by competitive marketplaces with many decision makers. Realistically, we might expect only a subset of them to adopt any non-compulsory fairness-conscious policy, a situation that political philosophers call partial compliance. This possibility raises important questions: how does partial compliance and the consequent strategic behavior of decision subjects affect the allocation outcomes? (...)
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  27. Partial Aggregation: What the People Think.Markus Kneer & Juri Viehoff - manuscript
    This article applies the tools of experimental philosophy to the ongoing debate about both the theoretical viability and the practical import of partially aggregative moral theories in distributive ethics. We conduct a series of three experiments (N=383): First, we document the widespread occurrence of the intuitions that motivate this position. Our study then moves beyond establishing the existence of partially aggregative intuitions in two dimensions: First, we extend experimental work in such a way as to ascertain which amongst existing versions (...)
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  28. Is partial compliance with reason always better than non-compliance?Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    Joseph Raz claims that there can be reason to do the impossible; but partial compliance with reason is better than non-compliance and the closer one gets to complying with reason, the better. I propose some exceptions.
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  29. Parity, Pluralism, and Permissible Partiality.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - In Eric Siverman (ed.), Virtuous and Vicious Expressions of Partiality. Routledge.
    We can often permissibly choose a worse self-interested option over a better altruistic alternative. For example, it is permissible to eat out rather than donate the money to feed five hungry children for a single meal. If we eat out, we do something permissibly partial toward ourselves. If we donate, we go beyond the call of moral duty and do something supererogatory. Such phenomena aren’t easy to explain, and they rule out otherwise promising moral theories. Incommensurability and Ruth Chang’s notion (...)
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  30. Validity in Simple Partial Logic.Daisuke Kachi - 2002 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 10 (4):139-153.
    Firstly I characterize Simple Partial Logic (SPL) as the generalization and extension of a certain two-valued logic. Based on the characterization I present two definitions of validity in SPL. Finally I show that given my characterization these two definitions are more appropriate than other definitions that have been prevalent, since both have some desirable semantic properties that the others lack.
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  31. The Limits of Partial Doxasticism.Facundo M. Alonso - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):326-345.
    Doxasticism is the thesis that intention is or involves belief in the forthcoming action (Velleman, Harman). Supporters claim that it is only by accepting that thesis that we can explain a wide array of important phenomena, including the special knowledge we have of intentional action, the roles intention plays in facilitating coordination, and the norms of rationality for intention. Others argue that the thesis is subject to counterexample (Davidson, Bratman). Yet some others contend that the thesis can be reformulated in (...)
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  32. Partial Manifestations.Nick Kroll - 2016 - In Morphological, Syntactic and Semantic Aspects of Dispositions. pp. 85-91.
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  33. Full and partial grounding.Kelly Trogdon & D. Gene Witmer - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (2):252-271.
    Discussion of partial grounds that aren't parts of full grounds; definition of full grounding in terms of partial grounding.
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  34. A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism About Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux.James Andow - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (1-2):183-195.
    Bernard Molyneux presents some new arguments against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions. Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Molyneux's arguments are that: the propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited; intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as evidence; and certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are treated as (...)
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  35. Scope Restrictions, National Partiality, and War.Jeremy Davis - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20 (2).
    Most of us believe that partiality applies in a broad range of relationships. One relationship on which there is much disagreement is co-nationality. Some writers argue that co-national partiality is not justified in certain cases, like killing in war, since killing in defense of co-nationals is intuitively impermissible in other contexts. I argue that this approach overlooks an important structural feature of partiality—namely, that its scope is sometimes restricted. In this essay, I show how some relationships that (...)
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  36. Partial Desert.Tamler Sommers - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Theories of moral desert focus only on the personal culpability of the agent to determine the amount of blame and punishment the agent deserves. I defend an alternative account of desert, one that does not focus only facts about offenders and their offenses. In this revised framework, personal culpability can do no more than set upper and lower limits for deserved blame and punishment. For more precise judgments within that spectrum, additional factors must be considered, factors that are independent of (...)
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  37.  71
    Partial Relationships and Epistemic Injustice.Ji-Young Lee - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (3):543-556.
    In moral and political philosophy, topics like the distributive inequities conferred via special partial relationships – family relationships, for example – have been frequently debated. However, the epistemic dimensions of such partiality are seldom discussed in the ethical context, and the topic of partial relationships rarely feature in the realm of social epistemology. My view is that the role of partial relationships is worth exploring to enrich our understanding of epistemic injustice and its transmission. I claim that epistemic features (...)
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  38. Instantiation as Partial Identity: Replies to Critics.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (2):291-299.
    One of the advantages of my account in the essay “Instantiation as Partial Identity” was capturing the contingency of instantiation—something David Armstrong gave up in his experiment with a similar view. What made the contingency possible for me was my own non-standard account of identity, complete with the apparatus of counts and aspects. The need remains to lift some obscurity from the account in order to display its virtues to greater advantage. To that end, I propose to respond to those (...)
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  39. A partial defense of extended knowledge.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):39-62.
    The paper starts out by distinguishing two closely related hypotheses about extended cognition. According to the strong hypothesis, there are no intrinsic representations in the brain. This is a version of the extended-mind view defended by Andy Clark and Richard Menary. On the weak hypothesis, there are intrinsic representations in the brain but some types of cognition, knowledge or memory are constituted by particular types of external devices or environmental factors that extend beyond the skull and perhaps beyond the skin. (...)
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  40. Faith: How to be Partial while Respecting the Evidence.Derek Haderlie & Taylor-Grey Miller - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):67-72.
    In her paper, “True Faith: Against Doxastic Partiality about Faith (in God and Religious Communities) and in Defense of Evidentialism,” Katherine Dormandy argues against the view that there is a partiality norm on faith. Dormandy establishes this by showing that partiality views can’t give the right responses to encounters with stubborn counter evidence. Either they (anti-epistemic-partiality views) recommend flouting the evidence altogether in order hold on to positive beliefs about the object of faith or they (epistemic- (...) views) lower the epistemic standards in objectionable ways to alleviate the epistemic pressure imposed by the counterevidence. However, one cannot have praiseworthy faith when one refuses to really grapple with the evidence against the goodness of the faith’s object. So, partiality norms, far from constituting what makes for great faith, importantly stand in its way. Thus, we should reject any partiality norms on faith. We argue that cases of praiseworthy faith involve dispositions to confront the object of faith when presented with stubborn counter evidence against their goodness. Recognizing this enables us to endorse a partiality norm while avoiding Dormandy’s worries. We argue that dispositions to confront the object of faith presuppose positive beliefs about it, thus vindicating partiality. We further argue that the confrontation makes an epistemic demand of the object of faith: produce high confidence in whether it is still worth having faith in, thus carving out a central role for evidentialist norms. (shrink)
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  41. The Enmity Relationship as Justified Negative Partiality.Benjamin Lange & Joshua Brandt - forthcoming - In Monika Betzler & Jörg Löschke (eds.), The Ethics of Relationships: Broadening the Scope. Oxford University Press.
    Existing discussions of partiality have primarily examined special personal relationships between family, friends, or co-nationals. The negative analogue of such relationships – for example, the relationship of enmity – has, by contrast, been largely neglected. This chapter explores this adverse relation in more detail and considers the special reasons generated by it. We suggest that enmity can involve justified negative partiality, allowing members to give less consideration to each other’s interests. We then consider whether the negative partiality (...)
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  42. Immoral lies and partial beliefs.Neri Marsili - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):117-127.
    In a recent article, Krauss (2017) raises some fundamental questions concerning (i) what the desiderata of a definition of lying are, and (ii) how definitions of lying can account for partial beliefs. This paper aims to provide an adequate answer to both questions. Regarding (i), it shows that there can be a tension between two desiderata for a definition of lying: 'descriptive accuracy' (meeting intuitions about our ordinary concept of lying), and 'moral import' (meeting intuitions about what is wrong with (...)
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  43. Instantiation as partial identity.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):449 – 464.
    Construing the instantiation of a universal by a particular in terms of my theory of aspects resolves the basic mystery of this "non-relational tie", and gives theoretical unity to the four characteristics of instantiation discerned by Armstrong. Taking aspects as distinct in a way akin to Scotus's formal distinction, I suggest that instantiation is the sharing of an aspect by a universal and a particular--a kind of partial identity. This approach allows me to address Plato's multiple location and One over (...)
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  44. Personhood and Partialism in African Philosophy.Molefe Motsamai - 2018 - African Studies 3.
    This article ascertains what philosophical implications can be drawn from the moral idea of personhood dominant in African philosophy. This article aims to go beyond the oft-made submission that this moral idea of personhood is definitive of African moral thought. It does so by advancing discourse with regards to personhood by exploring its relationship with another under-explored idea in African ethics, the idea of partialism. This article ultimately argues that the idea of personhood can be associated with two (related) sorts (...)
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  45. Priority monism, partiality, and minimal truthmakers.A. R. J. Fisher - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):477-491.
    Truthmaker monism is the view that the one and only truthmaker is the world. Despite its unpopularity, this view has recently received an admirable defence by Schaffer :307–324, 2010b). Its main defect, I argue, is that it omits partial truthmakers. If we omit partial truthmakers, we lose the intimate connection between a truth and its truthmaker. I further argue that the notion of a minimal truthmaker should be the key notion that plays the role of constraining ontology and that truthmaker (...)
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  46. Axiomatic Theories of Partial Ground I: The Base Theory.Johannes Korbmacher - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (2):161-191.
    This is part one of a two-part paper, in which we develop an axiomatic theory of the relation of partial ground. The main novelty of the paper is the of use of a binary ground predicate rather than an operator to formalize ground. This allows us to connect theories of partial ground with axiomatic theories of truth. In this part of the paper, we develop an axiomatization of the relation of partial ground over the truths of arithmetic and show that (...)
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  47. Objective smells and partial perspectives.Giulia Martina - 2021 - Rivista di Estetica 3 (78):27-46.
    The thesis that smells are objective and independent of perceivers may seem to be in tension with the phenomenon of perceptual variation. In this paper, I argue that there are principled reasons to think that perceptual variation is not a threat to objectivism about smells and is indeed integral to our perceptual relation to the objective world. I first distinguish various kinds of perceptual variation, and argue that the most challenging cases for the objectivist are those where an odourant smells (...)
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  48. A (Partial) Defence of Moderate Skeptical Invariantism.Robin McKenna - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 154-171.
    Skeptical invariantism isn’t a popular view about the semantics of knowledge attributions. But what, exactly, is wrong with it? The basic problem is that it seems to run foul of the fact that we know quite a lot of things. I agree that it is a key desideratum for an account of knowledge that it accommodate the fact that we know a lot of things. But what sorts of things should a plausible theory of knowledge say that we know? In (...)
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  49. Axiomatic Theories of Partial Ground II: Partial Ground and Hierarchies of Typed Truth.Johannes Korbmacher - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (2):193-226.
    This is part two of a two-part paper in which we develop an axiomatic theory of the relation of partial ground. The main novelty of the paper is the of use of a binary ground predicate rather than an operator to formalize ground. In this part of the paper, we extend the base theory of the first part of the paper with hierarchically typed truth-predicates and principles about the interaction of partial ground and truth. We show that our theory is (...)
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  50. Intentionality and partial belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7).
    Suppose we wish to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality. Like several other philosophers, we focus on the intentionality of belief, hoping that we may later supplement our account to accommodate other intentional states like desires and fears. Now suppose that we also take partial beliefs or credences seriously. In cashing out our favoured theory of intentionality, we may for the sake of simplicity talk as if belief is merely binary or all-or-nothing. But we should be able to supplement or (...)
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