Practical Reasons for Belief Without Stakes

Analytic Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Pragmatic encroachment can be thought of as the idea that knowledge is in some way sensitive to practical considerations, including practical considerations involving what's at stake in getting things right. Recently, Mark Schroeder defends pragmatic encroachment by showing how it could be true. This paper argues that the view proposed by Schroeder is vulnerable to a simple but important objection. It also argues that the objection can be avoided by claiming that there are even more kinds of practical considerations that can be epistemic reasons than those kinds involving stakes.
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First archival date: 2021-07-22
Latest version: 2 (2021-08-13)
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2021-07-22

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