Forgiveness: From Conceptual Pluralism to Conceptual Ethics

In Court Lewis (ed.), The Philosophy of Forgiveness, Volume V. Vernon. pp. 207-233. (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Forgiveness theorists focus a good deal on explicating the content of what they take to be a shared folk concept of forgiveness. Our empirical research, however, suggests that there is a range of concepts of forgiveness present in the population, and therefore that we should be folk conceptual pluralists about forgiveness. We suggest two possible responses on the part of forgiveness theorists: (1) to deny folk conceptual pluralism by arguing that forgiveness is a functional concept and (2) to accept folk conceptual pluralism and focus on a revisionary conceptual ethics project.

Author Profiles

James Norton
University of Tasmania
Luke Russell
University of Sydney
Andrew James Latham
Aarhus University
1 more

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-07-27

Downloads
455 (#41,910)

6 months
106 (#49,219)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?