Forgiveness: From Conceptual Pluralism to Conceptual Ethics

In Court Lewis (ed.), The Philosophy of Forgiveness, Volume V. Vernon (forthcoming)
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Forgiveness theorists focus a good deal on explicating the content of what they take to be a shared folk concept of forgiveness. Our empirical research, however, suggests that there is a range of concepts of forgiveness present in the population, and therefore that we should be folk conceptual pluralists about forgiveness. We suggest two possible responses on the part of forgiveness theorists: (1) to deny folk conceptual pluralism by arguing that forgiveness is a functional concept and (2) to accept folk conceptual pluralism and focus on a revisionary conceptual ethics project.
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