The Nature of Desire

New York, USA: Oxford University Press (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Desires matter. What are desires? Many believe that desire is a motivational state: desiring is being disposed to act. This conception aligns with the functionalist approach to desire and the standard account of desire's role in explaining action. According to a second influential approach, however, desire is first and foremost an evaluation: desiring is representing something as good. After all, we seem to desire things under the guise of the good. Which understanding of desire is more accurate? Is the guise of the good even right to assume? Should we adopt an alternative picture that emphasizes desire's deontic nature? What do neuroscientific studies suggest? Essays in the first section of the volume are devoted to these questions, and to the puzzle of desire's essence. In the second part of the volume, essays investigate some implications that the various conceptions of desire have on a number of fundamental issues. For example, why are inconsistent desires problematic? What is desire's role in practical deliberation? How do we know what we want? This volume will contribute to the emergence of a fruitful debate on a neglected, albeit crucial, dimension of the mind.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LAUTNO-11
Revision history
First archival date: 2019-04-08
Latest version: 1 (2019-04-08)
View upload history
Chapters BETA
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-08-17

Total views
66 ( #27,093 of 38,902 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #28,848 of 38,902 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.