Rethinking Human and Machine Intelligence through Kant’s Incongruent Counterparts (3rd edition)

Abstract

This paper proposes a metaphysical framework for distinguishing between human and machine intelligence. By drawing an analogy from Kant’s incongruent counterparts, it posits two identical deterministic worlds -- one comprising a human agent and the other comprising a machine agent. These agents exhibit different types of information processing mechanisms despite their apparent sameness in a causal sense. By postulating the distinctiveness of human over machine intelligence, this paper resolves what it refers to as “the vantage point problem” – namely, how to legitimize a determinist’s assertion of determinism by placing the determinist within the universe.

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