Reconsidering the Alleged Cases of Knowledge from Falsehood

Philosophical Investigations 44 (2):151-162 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A number of philosophers have recently proposed several alleged cases of “knowledge from falsehood,” i.e., cases of inferential knowledge epistemised by an inference with a false crucial premise. This paper examines such cases and argues against interpreting them as cases of knowledge from falsehood. Specifically, I argue that the inferences in play in such cases are in no position to epistemise their conclusions.

Author's Profile

Kok Yong Lee
National Chung Cheng University

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-11-11

Downloads
548 (#37,954)

6 months
164 (#26,999)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?