Reconsidering the Alleged Cases of Knowledge from Falsehood

Philosophical Investigations 44 (2):151-162 (2021)
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A number of philosophers have recently proposed several alleged cases of “knowledge from falsehood,” i.e., cases of inferential knowledge epistemised by an inference with a false crucial premise. This paper examines such cases and argues against interpreting them as cases of knowledge from falsehood. Specifically, I argue that the inferences in play in such cases are in no position to epistemise their conclusions.
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First archival date: 2021-06-20
Latest version: 2 (2021-06-20)
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