"Арґумент зомбі" проти матеріалізму: основи та перспективи подальшого дослідження

Philosophical Thought 3 (3):57-77 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The paper deals with the main argument against the doctrine of Materialism and the heart of the mind-body problem — the Zombie argument. The main proponent of the idea of philosophical zombies is the Australian philosopher David Chalmers, whose main opus 'The Conscious Mind' is wholly based on the idea of conceivability and logical possibility of zombies. The author aims to show that for the adequate analysis of Chalmers' zombie argument, the frame of the Analytic philosophy alone is not sufficient, and due to that, one needs to involve Rene Descartes' philosophy as well as Husserlian phenomenology. It is because the author considers Chalmers' zombie argument as an inverted Cartesian argument from mind-body distinction and which has two levels of argumentation: intuitive obviousness and logical (conceivability-possibility frame). Chalmers' appeal to phenomenal consciousness, experience and intuition gives a solid basis to call his Philosophy of Mind project and himself as analytic phenomenology, and analytic phenomenologist respectively. Key words: the zombie argument, epiphenomenalism, the knowledge argument, intuitive obviousness, analytic phenomenology, continental phenomenology, Chalmers, Descartes, Husserl.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LEOTZA
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-12-03
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-12-03

Total downloads
5 ( #36,326 of 35,838 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #31,383 of 35,838 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.