Truth and meaning redux

Philosophical Studies 154 (2):251-77 (2011)
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Abstract
In this paper, we defend Davidson's program in truth-theoretical semantics against recent criticisms by Scott Soames. We argue that Soames has misunderstood Davidson's project, that in consequence his criticisms miss the mark, that appeal to meanings as entities in the alternative approach that Soames favors does no work, and that the approach is no advance over truth-theoretic semantics.
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Archival date: 2015-10-15
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Word and Object.Quine, Willard Van Orman; Churchland, Patricia Smith & Føllesdal, Dagfinn
Word and Object.Quine, Willard Van Orman
Word and Object.Quine, Willard Van Orman

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