Commanding, Giving, Vulnerable: What is the Normative Standing of the Other in Levinas

In Michael Fagenblat & Melis Erdur (eds.), Levinas and Analytic Philosophy: Second-Person Normativity and the Moral Life. New York: Routledge (2019)
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Abstract

At the heart of Levinas’s work is the apparently simple idea that through the encounter with another person, we are forced to give up our self-concern and take heed of the ethical relation between us. But, while simple on the surface, when one tries to characterize it in more detail, it can be hard to fit together the various ways in which Levinas talks about this relation and to identify precisely what he took its normative structure to be, as this is described in a number of apparently different ways, that are not obviously compatible or equivalent, such as “command,” “call,” “summons,” “demand,” and so on. In this chapter, we intend to focus on these different characterizations and show what makes them different while also endeavoring to find a way in which Levinas’s conception may nonetheless be fitted together into a coherent account of the face-to-face encounter that is at the heart of his ethics. We will begin by considering the different normative terms used to characterize the encounter in that text and show how they are conceptually distinct from one another; we will then offer a way to read Levinas’s position to nonetheless show how these different normative relations can be fitted together into a stable position.

Author Profiles

James H. P. Lewis
Cardiff University
Robert Stern
University of Sheffield

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