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  1. Beyond the Morality of Justice: Gergen’s Radical Constructionist Critique of Relational Autonomy.Joshua Soffer - manuscript
    This paper draws attention to a divergence in approach to the social between Ken Gergen’s radical form of social constructionism and the more moderate constructionist approaches exemplified by the thinking of Shaun Gallagher, Jan Slaby and Karen Barad. Specifically, I argue that the latter stop just short of radical constructionism’s ontological and ethical implications. The ethical question for Gergen is not whether and how we achieve just relations but whether and how we deal with the struggle between competing goods, how (...)
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  2. How Emotions Grasp Value.Antti Kauppinen - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1).
    It’s plausible that we only fully appreciate the value of something, say a painting or a blameworthy action, when we have a fitting emotional response to it, such as admiration or guilt. But exactly how and why do we grasp value through emotion? I propose, first, that a subject S phenomenally grasps property P only if what it is to be P is manifest in the phenomenal character of S’s experience. Second, following clues from the Stoics, I argue that the (...)
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  3. En el mundo de la vida con los otros en comunidad.Nathalie de la Cadena - 2023 - Conjectura: Filosofia E Educação 28:e023019.
    Resumen: Husserl propone una teoría sobre la intersubjetividad que parte de la conciencia trascendental como inserta en el mundo de la vida donde están los otros y donde la comunidad se construye bajo una estructura de esencias que garantiza la comunalidad. El mundo de la vida es dado y compartido por todas las conciencias intencionales y trascendentales, es condición para intuiciones empíricas y eidéticas, la epoché y las reducciones eidética y trascendental. Cada momento del método fenomenológico se basa en la (...)
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  4. 道德感知與現象對比.Jr-Jiun Lian - 2023 - Dissertation, 國立中正大學 Translated by 祉鈞 連.
    道德感知主義(moral perceptualism)主張「(至少有一些)道德性質(moral properties)可以是主體感知內容(perceptual content)的一部分」,其中的支持者包含了Audi (2013, 2015); Lord (2018); McNaughton (1988); McBrayer (2010a, 2010b); Cowan (2015); Werner (2016, 2020b)。其中,Werner (2016)認為他所提出的「現象對比論證(Phenomenal Contrast Arguments, PCAs)」可以用來證立道德感知主義。此論證強調了某些道德情境中有「跨主體的現象對比」(inter-subjective phenomenal contrast)的存在;換句話說,兩個主體面對同一場景時,其經驗各別顯現出不同的現象特性/現象特徵(phenomenal character)。此論證認為對於「跨主體間的現象對比(inter-subjective phenomenal contrast)」的最佳解釋說明是兩個不同主體在道德感知經驗上有所差異(contrast in moral perceptual experience)。簡言之,根據此論證,跨主體的現象對比的最佳解釋是:某個主體感知到了道德性質,但另一個主體則缺乏這種感知。若此解釋成立,則其蘊含,主體的確可以感知到道德性質 (至少其中一個主體的確感知到了道德性質),也因此,道德感知主義就可以被證立。然而,Werner (2016)所擁護的現象對比論證與道德感知主義,卻遭受許多哲學家的質疑與抨擊,尤以Väyrynen(2018); Reiland(2021); Chudnoff(2015)等人為代表。他們也分別提供了各自對於「跨主體間的現象對比」的相競替代解釋方案,並嘗試論證他們的說法相較於Werner (2016)的道德感知主義解釋方案來得更有解釋效力、且更為合理。本篇論文的主要目標是,剖析與回應以下兩個問題:(I)上述質疑者的替代解釋方案是否說得通?它們是否較之道德感知主義的解釋方案來得更好呢?( II)道德感知主義者是否能恰當回應質疑者的挑戰呢?倘若Werner (2016, 2020b)的說法不足以回應質疑者的話,道德感知主義者是否能夠有其他的解套方案呢?針對問題(I),筆者將論證,Väyrynen(2018); Reiland(2021); Chudnoff(2015)等人對於道德感知主義的質疑大致上言之成理,可和Werner (2016)的理論成為具有同等解釋力的相競解釋方案。但針對問題(II),筆者將指出Väyrynen(2018); Reiland(2021); Chudnoff(2015)等人頂多只能說明「對錯好壞」這類的整體道德性質(overall moral properties)無法作為感知的內容,但並未排除掉道德主體仍舊可以感知到「道德顯著性」(moral salience)這類初步確定道德性質(pro-tanto moral properties)的可能性。也因此,這並未排除一種本論文所擁護的改良版本的道德感知主義。根據此改良版本的道德感知主義,雖然對錯好壞這類的整體道德性質本身也許無法做為感知的內容,然而道德顯著性仍然可 以是感知內容。筆者將此改良版本稱之為「道德顯著性感知主義」(moral salience perceptualism)。為了突顯此版本的優點,筆者將進一步論述,此改良版的道德感知主義可以恰當地解釋跨主體間的現象對比(inter-subjective phenomenal contrast),並可規避原來Werner (2016)版本所招來的質疑。 -/- 關鍵詞:道德感知主義、現象對比論證、道德顯著性、道德經驗與道德判斷、道德教育 .
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  5. Moral Perception and Phenomenal Contrast.Jr-Jiun Lian - 2023 - Dissertation, National Chung Cheng University Translated by Jr-Jiun Lian.
    This thesis is a defense of (a version of) moral perceptualism. Moral perceptualism (MP), as is generally understood, advocates the bold view that “moral properties can be perceptual content”; its supporters include Audi (2013, 2015), Lord (2018), McNaughton (1988), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Cowan (2015), and Werner (2016, 2020b). In support of MP, Werner (2016) bolsters what he calls ‘phenomenal contrast arguments(PCAs)’. According to PCAs, the best explanation for inter-subjective phenomenal contrast between two subjects facing the same moral situation is that (...)
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  6. Моральные архетипы: этика в доистории.Roberto Thomas Arruda - 2023 - São Paulo: Terra à Vista.
    Философские, традиционные подходы к морали в основном основаны на метафизических и теологических концепциях и теориях. Среди традиционных концепций этики наиболее заметной является теория божественного повеления (DCT). Согласно DCT, Бог дает человечеству моральные основы через его творение и откровение. Мораль и божественность были неразделимы со времен самой далекой цивилизации. Эти концепции укладываются в теологические рамки и в основном принимаются большинством последователей трех авраамических традиций: иудаизма, христианства и ислама: наиболее значительной части человеческого населения. Теории Божественного повеления основываются на вере и откровении и (...)
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  7. Su Max Scheler. Riflessioni a partire da Wesen und Formen der Sympathie.Elia Gonnella - 2022 - Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 24.
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  8. Godless Conscience.Tom O'Shea - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (3):95-114.
    . John Cottingham suggests that “only a traditional theistic framework may be adequate for doing justice to the role of conscience in our lives.” Two main reasons for endorsing this proposition are assessed: the religious origins of conscience, and the need to explain its normative authority. I argue that Graeco-Roman conceptions of conscience cast doubt on this first historical claim, and that secular moral realisms can account for the obligatoriness of conscience. Nevertheless, the recognition of the need for an objective (...)
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  9. Responsibility in Cases of Structural and Personal Complicity: A Phenomenological Analysis.Charlotte Knowles - 2021 - The Monist 104 (2):224-237.
    In cases of complicity in one’s own unfreedom and in structural injustice, it initially appears that agents are only vicariously responsible for their complicity because of the roles circumstantial and constitutive luck play in bringing about their complicity. By drawing on work from the phenomenological tradition, this paper rejects this conclusion and argues for a new responsive sense of agency and responsibility in cases of complicity. Highlighting the explanatory role of stubbornness in cases of complicity, it is argued that although (...)
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  10. Beyond adaptive preferences: Rethinking women's complicity in their own subordination.Charlotte Knowles - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):1317–1334.
    An important question confronting feminist philosophers is why women are sometimes complicit in their own subordination. The dominant view holds that complicity is best understood in terms of adaptive preferences. This view assumes that agents will naturally gravitate away from subordination and towards flourishing as long as they do not have things imposed on them that disrupt this trajectory. However, there is reason to believe that ‘impositions’ do not explain all of the ways in which complicity can arise. This paper (...)
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  11. Indignation, Appreciation, and the Unity of Moral Experience.Uriah Kriegel - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (1):5-19.
    Moral experience comes in many flavors. Some philosophers have argued that there is nothing common to the many forms moral experience can take. In this paper, I argue that close attention to the phenomenology of certain key emotions, combined with a clear distinction between essentially and accidentally moral experiences, suggests that there is a group of (essentially) moral emotions which in fact exhibit significant unity.
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  12. Moral Phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2021 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
    In the philosophy of mind, the study of mental life has tended to focus on three central aspects of mental states: their representational content, their functional role, and their phenomenal character. The representational content of a mental state is what the state represents, what it is about; its functional role is the role it plays within the functional organization of the subject’s overall psychology; its phenomenal character is the experiential or subjective quality that goes with what it is like, from (...)
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  13. Moral Phenomenology (2nd edition).Uriah Kriegel - 2021 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd print edition. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Moral phenomenology is the dedicated study of the experiential dimension of our moral inner life – of the phenomenal character of moral mental states. Many different questions arise within moral phenomenology, but three stand out. The first concerns the scope of moral experience: How much of our moral mental life is experienced by us? The second concerns the nature of moral experience: What is it like to undergo the various kinds of moral experience we have? The third concerns the theoretical (...)
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  14. The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons.Uriah Kriegel & Mark Timmons - 2021 - In Richard Dean & Oliver Sensen (eds.), Respect: philosophical essays. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 77-98.
    Emotions can be understood generally from two different perspectives: (i) a third-person perspective that specifies their distinctive functional role within our overall cognitive economy and (ii) a first-person perspective that attempts to capture their distinctive phenomenal character, the subjective quality of experiencing them. One emotion that is of central importance in many ethical systems is respect (in the sense of respect for persons or so-called recognition-respect). However, discussions of respect in analytic moral philosophy have tended to focus almost entirely on (...)
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  15. 道德命題是否能作為感知內容呢︖.Jr-Jiun Lian - 2021 - 台灣哲學學會2021年學術研討會「台灣哲學 與在台灣的哲學研究」.
    內容型道德感知主義者(Contentful Moral Perceptualists): Audi (2013), Lord (2018), McNaughton (1988), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Cowan (2014, 2015), Werner (2016, 2018) 宣稱 道德命題(moral proposition)可以作為道德主體的感知內容(content of perception)。然而,在筆 者原創的詮釋下,晚近反駁道德感知主義的學者,如: Faraci (2015), Väyrynen (2018), Chudnoff (2015),則隱約透露出以下想法:「與其宣稱道德命題是感知內容,不如宣稱道德 命題是認知信念內容(content of cognition)〕更為合理」。Faraci、Väyrynen、Chudnoff 都認為 「內容型道德感知主義者所謂的道德感知」背後其實是受到宰制型的道德原則(dominative moral principles)所主導的,是一種從原則所推論產生的心理狀態; 也因此,上述反駁者認為 「內容型道德感知主義者所謂的〔道德感知〕」缺乏貨真價實的感知經驗所具有的「非推論 的」(non-inferential)特徵,並不是真正的感知。本文將評估:「內容型的道德感知模型」是 否有辦法回應上述反駁者所提出的挑戰呢? 筆者將為肯定的答案供提初步的辯護。 -/- 關鍵詞:道德感知、現象對比⽅法、感知內容、現象經驗、感知的非推論特徵.
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  16. (DRAFT) Can Moral Propositions Serve as Perceptual Content?Jr-Jiun Lian - 2021 - Taiwanese Philosophical Association Annual Conference 2021. Translated by Jr-Jiun Lian.
    Contentful Moral Perceptualists such as Audi (2013), Lord (2018), McNaughton (1988), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Cowan (2014, 2015), and Werner (2016, 2018) claim that moral propositions can serve as the content of perception for moral subjects. However, in my original interpretation, recent critics of moral perceptualism, such as Faraci (2015), Väyrynen (2018), and Chudnoff (2015), subtly suggest that it is more reasonable to claim that moral propositions are the content of cognition rather than perception. Faraci, Väyrynen, and Chudnoff argue that the (...)
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  17. Nietzsche’s Theory of Empathy.Vasfi O. Özen - 2021 - Philosophical Papers 50 (1-2):235-280.
    Nietzsche is not known for his theory of empathy. A quick skimming of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on empathy demonstrates this. Arthur Schopenhauer, Robert Vischer, and Theodor Lipps are among those whose views are considered representative, but Nietzsche has been simply forgotten in discussion of empathy. Nietzsche’s theory of empathy has not yet aroused sufficient interest among commentators. I believe that his views on this subject merit careful consideration. Nietzsche scholars have been interested in his naturalistic accounts of (...)
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  18. The Phenomenal Appreciation of Reasons.Marilie Coetsee - 2020 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15. Oxford University Press. pp. 24-48.
    Huckleberry Finn believes that by helping Miss Watson’s slave Jim escape to freedom, he is doing something wrong. But Huck does it anyway—and many want to give him moral credit for this choice. If Huck is to be worthy of such moral esteem, however, it seems there must be some implicit way of appreciating and responding to considerations as moral reasons that does not involve explicitly believing that those considerations are moral reasons. This chapter argues that an agent like Huck (...)
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  19. The Necessity of Understanding Disasters in the Language of Suffering.Srajana Kaikini - 2020 - Voices in Bioethics 6.
    The categorization of disasters as natural or manmade does little for our understanding of the moral stakes of institutions and collectives involved in the aftermath of disasters. This paper presents a brief account of how disasters can be understood philosophically taking cues from studies in sociology. Having articulated the gap in conceptualizing disasters, the paper argues that an interpretation of disasters as “events of social suffering,” will help foreground the complex moral and phenomenological nature of such events to prompt a (...)
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  20. Matters of Trust as Matters of Attachment Security.Andrew Kirton - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (5):583-602.
    I argue for an account of the vulnerability of trust, as a product of our need for secure social attachments to individuals and to a group. This account seeks to explain why it is true that, when we trust or distrust someone, we are susceptible to being betrayed by them, rather than merely disappointed or frustrated in our goals. What we are concerned about in matters of trust is, at the basic level, whether we matter, in a non-instrumental way, to (...)
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  21. Moral Experience: Its Existence, Describability, and Significance.Uriah Kriegel - 2020 - In Keiling C. Erhard and T. (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency. Routledge. pp. 396-411.
    One of the newest research areas in moral philosophy is moral phenomenology: the dedicated study of the experiential dimension of moral mental life. The idea has been to bring phenomenological evidence to bear on some central issues in metaethics and moral psychology, such as cognitivism and noncognitivism about moral judgment, motivational internalism and externalism, and so on. However, moral phenomenology faces certain foundational challenges, pertaining especially to the existence, describability, and importance of its subject matter. This paper addresses these foundational (...)
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  22. Which Moral Properties Are Eligible for Perceptual Awareness?Preston J. Werner - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (3):290-319.
    Moral perception has made something of a comeback in recent work on moral epistemology. Many traditional objections to the view have been argued to fail upon closer inspection. But it remains an open question just how far moral perception might extend. In this paper, I provide the beginnings of an answer to this question by assessing the relationship between the metaphysical structure of different normative properties and a plausible constraint on which properties are eligible for perceptual awareness which I call (...)
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  23. Commanding, Giving, Vulnerable: What is the Normative Standing of the Other in Levinas.James H. P. Lewis & Robert Stern - 2019 - In Michael Fagenblat & Melis Erdur (eds.), Levinas and Analytic Philosophy: Second-Person Normativity and the Moral Life. New York: Routledge.
    At the heart of Levinas’s work is the apparently simple idea that through the encounter with another person, we are forced to give up our self-concern and take heed of the ethical relation between us. But, while simple on the surface, when one tries to characterize it in more detail, it can be hard to fit together the various ways in which Levinas talks about this relation and to identify precisely what he took its normative structure to be, as this (...)
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  24. Inarticulate Forgiveness.Emer O'Hagan - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (4):536-550.
    Influentially, Pamela Hieronymi has argued that any account of forgiveness must be both articulate and uncompromising. It must articulate the change in judgement that results in the forgiver’s loss of resentment without excusing or justifying the misdeed, and without comprising a commitment to the transgressor=s responsibility, the wrongness of the action, and the transgressed person=s self-worth. Non-articulate accounts of forgiveness, which rely on indirect strategies for reducing resentment (for example, reflecting on the transgressor’s bad childhood) are said to fail to (...)
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  25. Breaking Good: Moral Agency, Neuroethics, and the Spontaneity of Compassion.Christian Coseru - 2017 - In Jake H. Davis (ed.), A Mirror is for Reflection: Understanding Buddhist Ethics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 109-128.
    This paper addresses two specific and related questions the Buddhist neuroethics program raises for our traditional understanding of Buddhist ethics: Does affective neuroscience supply enough evidence that contempla- tive practices such as compassion meditation can enhance normal cognitive functioning? Can such an account advance the philosophical debate concerning freedom and determinism in a profitable direction? In response to the first question, I argue that dispositions such as empathy and altruism can in effect be understood in terms of the mechanisms that (...)
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  26. From Phenomenology to Ethics: Intentionality and the Other in Marion’s Saturated Phenomenon.Cheongho Lee - 2017 - Journal of Ethics: The Korean Association of Ethics 1 (116):63-83.
    The “saturated phenomenon” is Jean-Luc Marion’s principal hypothesis, by which he tries to ground the source of phenomenality. Against the transcendental phenomenology, Marion finds phenomena that go beyond the constitutional power of intention. The saturated phenomenon is never possessed because the saturated phenomenon withdraws itself and thus it endlessly escapes from us. A problem of intelligibility thus arises. The essential finitude of the subject requires that the subject passively receives what the saturated phenomenon gives. Marion, however, endows the gifted with (...)
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  27. Agent-Regret and the Social Practice of Moral Luck.Jordan MacKenzie - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):95-117.
    Agent-regret seems to give rise to a philosophical puzzle. If we grant that we are not morally responsible for consequences outside our control (the ‘Standard View’), then agent-regret—which involves self-reproach and a desire to make amends for consequences outside one’s control—appears rationally indefensible. But despite its apparent indefensibility, agent-regret still seems like a reasonable response to bad moral luck. I argue here that the puzzle can be resolved if we appreciate the role that agent-regret plays in a larger social practice (...)
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  28. Private Solidarity.Nicolas Bommarito - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):445-455.
    It’s natural to think of acts of solidarity as being public acts that aim at good outcomes, particularly at social change. I argue that not all acts of solidarity fit this mold - acts of what I call ‘private solidarity’ are not public and do not aim at producing social change. After describing paradigmatic cases of private solidarity, I defend an account of why such acts are themselves morally virtuous and what role they can have in moral development.
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  29. Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?Gunnar Björnsson - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.
    Many philosophers think that moral objectivism is supported by stable features of moral discourse and thinking. When engaged in moral reasoning and discourse, people behave ‘as if’ objectivism were correct, and the seemingly most straightforward way of making sense of this is to assume that objectivism is correct; this is how we think that such behavior is explained in paradigmatically objectivist domains. By comparison, relativist, error-theoretic or non-cognitivist accounts of this behavior seem contrived and ad hoc. After explaining why this (...)
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  30. Subjective Normativity and Action Guidance.Andrew Sepielli - 2012 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. II. Oxford University Press.
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  31. Moral realism, face-values and presumptions.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):158-179.
    Many philosophers argue that the face-value of moral practice provides presumptive support to moral realism. This paper analyses such arguments into three steps. (1) Moral practice has a certain face-value, (2) only realism can vindicate this face value, and (3) the face-value needs vindicating. Two potential problems with such arguments are discussed. The first is taking the relevant face-value to involve explicitly realist commitments; the second is underestimating the power of non-realist strategies to vindicate that face-value. Case studies of each (...)
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  32. Kant, Skepticism, and Moral Sensibility.Owen Ware - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    In his early writings, Kant says that the solution to the puzzle of how morality can serve as a motivating force in human life is nothing less than the “philosophers’ stone.” In this dissertation I show that for years Kant searched for the philosophers’ stone in the concept of “respect” (Achtung), which he understood as the complex effect practical reason has on feeling. -/- I sketch the history of that search in Chapters 1-2. In Chapter 3 I show that Kant’s (...)
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  33. Origins of Otherness: Nonconceptual Ethical Encounters in Beauvoir and Levinas.Jennifer McWeeny - 2009-2010 - Simone de Beauvoir Studies 26 (1):5-17.
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  34. Attention, Self, and The Sovereignty of Good.Christopher Mole - 2006 - In Anne Rowe (ed.), Iris Murdoch: A reassessment. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 72-84.
    Iris Murdoch held that states of mind and character are of the first moral importance, and that attention to one's states of mind and character are a widespread source of moral failure. Maintaining both of these claims can lead to problems in the account of how one could become good. This paper explains the way in which Murdoch negotiated those problems, focusing, in particular on /The Sovereignty of Good/ and /The Nice and The Good/.
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  35. Moral Distress in Healthcare.Judith Andre - 2002 - Bioethics Forum 18 (1-2):44-46.
    Moral distress is the sense that one must do, or cooperate in, what is wrong. It is paradigmatically faced by nurses, but it is almost a universal occupational hazard.
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  36. Dietrich von Hildebrand.Jean Moritz Müller - 1920 - In Hilge Landweer & Thomas Szanto (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion. London, New York: Routledge. pp. 114-122.
    It is sometimes alleged that the study of emotion and the study of value are currently pursued as relatively autonomous disciplines. As Kevin Mulligan notes, “the philosophy and psychology of emotions pays little attention to the philosophy of value and the latter pays only a little more attention to the former.” (2010b, 475). Arguably, the last decade has seen more of a rapprochement between these two domains than used to be the norm (cf. e.g. Roeser & Todd 2014). But there (...)
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