The Imagination Box

Journal of Philosophy 111 (5):259-275 (2014)
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Abstract
Imaginative immersion refers to a phenomenon in which one loses oneself in make-believe. Susanna Schellenberg says that the best explanation of imaginative immersion involves a radical revision to cognitive architecture. Instead of there being an attitude of belief and a distinct attitude of imagination, there should only be one attitude that represents a continuum between belief and imagination. We argue otherwise. Although imaginative immersion is a crucial data point for theorizing about the imagination, positing a continuum between belief and imagination is neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining the phenomenon. In addition, arguing against Schellenberg’s account reveals important but underappreciated lessons for theorizing about the imagination and for interpreting boxological representations of the mind.
Reprint years
2014
ISBN(s)
0022-362X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LIATIB
Revision history
First archival date: 2013-12-30
Latest version: 6 (2014-11-18)
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References found in this work BETA
Alief and Belief.Gendler, Tamar Szabó
Alief in Action (and Reaction).Gendler, Tamar Szabó
Mimesis as Make-Believe.Walton, Kendall L.

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2013-12-30

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