View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

35 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. added 2018-12-10
    Re-Imagining Text — Re-Imagining Hermeneutics.Christopher Duncanson-Hales - 2011 - Postscripts: The Journal of Sacred Texts and Contemporary Worlds 7 (1):87-122.
    With the advent of the digital age and new mediums of communication, it is becoming increasingly important for those interested in the interpretation of religious text to look beyond traditional ideas of text and textuality to find the sacred in unlikely places. Paul Ricoeur’s phenomenological reorientation of classical hermeneutics from romanticized notions of authorial intent and psychological divinations to a serious engagement with the “science of the text” is a hermeneutical tool that opens up an important dialogue between the interpreter, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2018-07-01
    Aboutness in Imagination.Franz Berto - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1871-1886.
    I present a formal theory of the logic and aboutness of imagination. Aboutness is understood as the relation between meaningful items and what they concern, as per Yablo and Fine’s works on the notion. Imagination is understood as per Chalmers’ positive conceivability: the intentional state of a subject who conceives that p by imagining a situation—a configuration of objects and properties—verifying p. So far aboutness theory has been developed mainly for linguistic representation, but it is natural to extend it to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3. added 2018-01-27
    Mental Imagery and Fiction.Dustin Stokes - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    Fictions evoke imagery, and their value consists partly in that achievement. This paper offers analysis of this neglected topic. Section I identifies relevant philosophical background. II offers a working definition of imagery. III identifies empirical work on visual imagery. IV and V criticize imagery essentialism, through the lens of genuine fictional narratives. This outcome, though, is not wholly critical. The expressed spirit of imagery essentialism is to encourage philosophers to "put the image back into the imagination." The weakened conclusion is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2016-12-08
    Focused Daydreaming and Mind-Wandering.Fabian Dorsch - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):791-813.
    In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency, mind-wandering is not—though this does not mean that mind-wandering cannot involve mental agency at (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5. added 2016-06-15
    Emotional Imagining and Our Responses to Fiction.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 46:153-176.
    The aim of this article is to present the disagreement between Moran and Walton on the nature of our affective responses to fiction and to defend a view on the issue which is opposed to Moran’s account and improves on Walton’s. Moran takes imagination-based affective responses to be instances of genuine emotion and treats them as episodes with an emotional attitude towards their contents. I argue against the existence of such attitudes, and that the affective element of such responses should (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2016-06-15
    Review: Hegel's Theory of Imagination. [REVIEW]Fabian Dorsch - 2005 - British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (3):309-311.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2016-06-14
    Hume and the Recreative Imagination.Fabian Dorsch - 2013 - Rivista di Estetica 53:25-54.
    Two particular approaches to the imagination as a recreative capacity have recently gained prominence: neo-Humeanism and simulationatism. According to neo-Humeanism, imaginings have cognitions as a constitutive part of their representational contents; while simulationalists maintain that, in imagining, we essentially simulate the occurrence of certain cognitive states. Two other kinds of constitutive dependence, that figure regularly in the debate, concern the necessity of cogni­tions for, respectively, the causation and the semantic power of imaginings. In what follows, I dis­cuss each of these (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2016-06-14
    Hume e l’immaginazione ricreativa.Fabian Dorsch - 2013 - Rivista di Estetica 53:25-54.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2016-05-14
    Hume.Fabian Dorsch - 2016 - In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge. pp. 40-54.
    This chapter overviews Hume’s thoughts on the nature and role of imagining and focusses primarily on three important distinctions that Hume draws among our conscious mental episodes: (i) between impressions and ideas; (ii) between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination; and (iii), among the ideas of the imagination, between ideas of the judgement and ideas of the fancy. In addition, the chapter considers Hume’s views on the imagination as a faculty of producing ideas, as well as on (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2016-05-14
    Imagination and the Will.Fabian Dorsch - 2005 - Dissertation, University College London
    The principal aim of my thesis is to provide a unified theory of imagining, that is, a theory which aspires to capture the common nature of all central forms of imagining and to distinguish them from all paradigm instances of non-imaginative phenomena. The theory which I intend to put forward is a version of what I call the Agency Account of imagining and, accordingly, treats imaginings as mental actions of a certain kind. More precisely, it maintains that imaginings are mental (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2016-04-02
    Imagination in Mathematics.Andrew Arana - 2016 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Routledge Handbook on the Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge. pp. 463-477.
    This article will consider imagination in mathematics from a historical point of view, noting the key moments in its conception during the ancient, modern and contemporary eras.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. added 2015-09-09
    The Past, the Present, and the Future of Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel: Editors' Introduction.Kourken Michaelian, Stanley B. Klein & Karl K. Szpunar - 2016 - In Kourken Michaelian, Stanley B. Klein & Karl K. Szpunar (eds.), Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-18.
    This introductory chapter reviews research on future-oriented mental time travel to date (the past), provides an overview of the contents of the book (the present), and enumerates some possible research directions suggested by the latter (the future).
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2015-09-07
    Perception and Imagination.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In S. Miguens, G. Preyer & C. Bravo Morando (eds.), Prereflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 245-276.
    According to a traditional view, there is no categorical difference between the phenomenology of perception and the phenomenology of imagination; the only difference is in degree (of intensity, resolution, etc.) and/or in accompanying beliefs. There is no categorical difference between what it is like to perceive a dog and what it is like to imagine a dog; the former is simply more vivid and/or is accompanied by the belief that a dog is really there. A sustained argument against this traditional (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. added 2015-09-02
    Imagination and Belief.Neil Sinhababu - 2016 - In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. pp. 111-123.
    This chapter considers the nature of imagination and belief, exploring how deeply these two states of mind differ. It first addresses a range of cognitive and motivational differences between imagination and belief which suggest that they're fundamentally different states of mind. Then it addresses imaginative immersion, delusions, and the different norms we apply to the two mental states, which some theorists regard as providing support for a more unified picture of imagination and belief.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2015-07-20
    Imagination, Desire, and Rationality.Shannon Spaulding - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (9):457-476.
    We often have affective responses to fictional events. We feel afraid for Desdemona when Othello approaches her in a murderous rage. We feel disgust toward Iago for orchestrating this tragic event. What mental architecture could explain these affective responses? In this paper I consider the claim that the best explanation of our affective responses to fiction involves imaginative desires. Some theorists argue that accounts that do not invoke imaginative desires imply that consumers of fiction have irrational desires. I argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. added 2015-07-06
    Art and Imagination.Nick Wiltsher & Aaron Meskin - 2016 - In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination. London: Routledge. pp. 179–191.
    It is intuitively plausible that art and imagination are intimately connected. This chapter explores attempts to explain that connection. We focus on three areas in which art and imagination might be linked: production, ontology, and appreciation. We examine views which treat imagination as a fundamental human faculty, and aim for comprehensive accounts of art and artistic practice: for example, those of Kant and Collingwood. We also discuss philosophers who argue that a specific kind of imagining may explain some particular element (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2015-04-25
    The Cognitive Architecture of Imaginative Resistance.Kengo Miyazono & Shen-yi Liao - 2016 - In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. pp. 233-246.
    Where is imagination in imaginative resistance? We seek to answer this question by connecting two ongoing lines of inquiry in different subfields of philosophy. In philosophy of mind, philosophers have been trying to understand imaginative attitudes’ place in cognitive architecture. In aesthetics, philosophers have been trying to understand the phenomenon of imaginative resistance. By connecting these two lines of inquiry, we hope to find mutual illumination of an attitude (or cluster of attitudes) and a phenomenon that have vexed philosophers. Our (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2015-04-13
    Sartre.Robert Hopkins - forthcoming - In Amy Kind (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge. pp. 82-93.
    In The Imaginary Sartre offers a systematic, insightful and heterodox account of imagining in many forms. Beginning with four ‘characteristics’ he takes to capture the phenomenology of imagining, he draws on considerations both philosophical and psychological to describe the deeper nature of the state that has those features. The result is a view that remains the most potent challenge to the Humean orthodoxy that to this day dominates both philosophical and psychological thinking on the topic.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2015-02-27
    Simulation Theory.Shannon Spaulding - 2016 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Handbook of Imagination. Routledge Press. pp. 262-273.
    This is a penultimate draft of a paper that will appear in Handbook of Imagination, Amy Kind (ed.). Routledge Press. Please cite only the final printed version.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2015-02-23
    Imagination.Fiora Salis - 2014 - Online Companion to Problems in Analytic Philosophy.
    In this entry I will offer a systematic novel taxonomy of our imaginative abilities coherent with standard treatments in cognitive science, philosophy of mind and aesthetics. In particular, I will distinguish between the non-propositional imagination and the propositional imagination, which include several further sub-varieties such as the objectual imagination, imagery, experiential imagination, supposition, make-believe and more.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2015-01-27
    Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception.Robert Briscoe - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.
    The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay suggests, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  22. added 2014-04-02
    What It Is to Pretend.Peter Langland‐Hassan - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):397-420.
    Pretense is a topic of keen interest to philosophers and psychologists. But what is it, really, to pretend? What features qualify an act as pretense? Surprisingly little has been said on this foundational question. Here I defend an account of what it is to pretend, distinguishing pretense from a variety of related but distinct phenomena, such as (mere) copying and practicing. I show how we can distinguish pretense from sincerity by sole appeal to a person's beliefs, desires, and intentions – (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2014-04-02
    Ecological Imagination.Steven Fesmire - 2010 - Environmental Ethics 32 (2):183-203.
    Environmental thinkers recognize that ecological thinking has a vital role to play in many wise choices and policies; yet, little theoretical attention has been given to developing an adequate philosophical psychology of the imaginative nature of such thinking. Ecological imagination is an outgrowth of our more general deliberative capacity to perceive, in light of possibilities for thinking and acting, the relationships that constitute any object. Such imagination is of a specifically ecological sort when key metaphors, images, symbols, and the like (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2014-03-13
    The Roots of Imagination.Mostyn W. Jones - 1994 - Dissertation, The University of Manchester
    This work presents a new theory of imagination which tries to overcome the overly narrow perpectives that current theories take upon this enigmatic, multi-faceted phenomenon. Current theories are narrowly preoccupied with images and imagery. This creates problems in explaining (1) what imagination is, (2) how it works, and (3) what its strengths and limitations are. (1) Ordinary language identifies imagination with both imaging (image-making) and creativity, but most current theories identify imagination narrowly with imaging while neglecting creativity. Yet imaging is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. added 2014-03-06
    The Meanings of “Imagine” Part II: Attitude and Action.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (11):791-802.
    In this Part II, I investigate different approaches to the question of what makes imagining different from belief. I find that the sentiment-based approach of David Hume falls short, as does the teleological approach, once advocated by David Velleman. I then consider whether the inferential properties of beliefs and imaginings may differ. Beliefs, I claim, exhibit an anti-symmetric inferential governance over imaginings: they are the background that makes inference from one imagining to the other possible; the reverse is not true, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. added 2014-03-05
    Imaginative Attitudes.Peter Langland‐Hassan - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):664-686.
    The point of this paper is to reveal a dogma in the ordinary conception of sensory imagination, and to suggest another way forward. The dogma springs from two main sources: a too close comparison of mental imagery to perceptual experience, and a too strong division between mental imagery and the traditional propositional attitudes (such as belief and desire). The result is an unworkable conception of the correctness conditions of sensory imaginings—one lacking any link between the conditions under which an imagining (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  27. added 2014-01-22
    On Choosing What to Imagine.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2016 - In A. Kind & P. Kung (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford University Press. pp. 61-84.
    If imagination is subject to the will, in the sense that people choose the content of their own imaginings, how is it that one nevertheless can learn from what one imagines? This chapter argues for a way forward in addressing this perennial puzzle, both with respect to propositional imagination and sensory imagination. Making progress requires looking carefully at the interplay between one’s intentions and various kinds of constraints that may be operative in the generation of imaginings. Lessons are drawn from (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28. added 2013-12-30
    The Imagination Box.Shen-yi Liao & Tyler Doggett - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (5):259-275.
    Imaginative immersion refers to a phenomenon in which one loses oneself in make-believe. Susanna Schellenberg says that the best explanation of imaginative immersion involves a radical revision to cognitive architecture. Instead of there being an attitude of belief and a distinct attitude of imagination, there should only be one attitude that represents a continuum between belief and imagination. -/- We argue otherwise. Although imaginative immersion is a crucial data point for theorizing about the imagination, positing a continuum between belief and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. added 2013-02-13
    Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (9):497-517.
    I argue that any account of imagination should satisfy the following three desiderata. First, imaginations induce actions only in conjunction with beliefs about the environment of the imagining subject. Second, there is a continuum between imaginations and beliefs. Recognizing this continuum is crucial to explain the phenomenon of imaginative immersion. Third, the mental states that relate to imaginations in the way that desires relate to beliefs are a special kind of desire, namely desires to make true in fiction. These desires (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  30. added 2012-06-05
    The Role of Imagination in Creativity.Dustin Stokes - 2014 - In E. Paul & S. B. Kaufman (eds.), The philosophy of creativity. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. added 2012-03-26
    The Meanings of "Imagine" Part I: Constructive Imagination.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (3):220-230.
    In this article , I first engage in some conceptual clarification of what the words "imagine," "imagining," and "imagination" can mean. Each has a constructive sense, an attitudinal sense, and an imagistic sense. Keeping the senses straight in the course of cognitive theorizing is important for both psychology and philosophy. I then discuss the roles that perceptual memories, beliefs, and genre truth attitudes play in constructive imagination, or the capacity to generate novel representations that go well beyond what's prompted by (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  32. added 2012-03-13
    Distinguishing Belief and Imagination.Neil Sinhababu - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):152-165.
    Some philosophers (including Urmson, Humberstone, Shah, and Velleman) hold that believing that p distinctively involves applying a norm according to which the truth of p is a criterion for the success or correctness of the attitude. On this view, imagining and assuming differ from believing in that no such norm is applied. I argue against this view with counterexamples showing that applying the norm of truth is neither necessary nor sufficient for distinguishing believing from imagining and assuming. Then I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33. added 2012-01-04
    Some Questions for Tamar Szabo Gendler. [REVIEW]Tyler Doggett - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):764-774.
    Contribution to a symposium on Gendler's Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  34. added 2011-12-15
    Pretense, Imagination, and Belief: The Single Attitude Theory.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):155-179.
    A popular view has it that the mental representations underlying human pretense are not beliefs, but are “belief-like” in important ways. This view typically posits a distinctive cognitive attitude (a “DCA”) called “imagination” that is taken toward the propositions entertained during pretense, along with correspondingly distinct elements of cognitive architecture. This paper argues that the characteristics of pretense motivating such views of imagination can be explained without positing a DCA, or other cognitive architectural features beyond those regulating normal belief and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  35. added 2011-09-03
    The Heterogeneity of the Imagination.Amy Kind - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):141-159.
    Imagination has been assigned an important explanatory role in a multitude of philosophical contexts. This paper examines four such contexts: mindreading, pretense, our engagement with fiction, and modal epistemology. Close attention to each of these contexts suggests that the mental activity of imagining is considerably more heterogeneous than previously realized. In short, no single mental activity can do all the explanatory work that has been assigned to imagining.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations