Abstract
Cases of akratic behavior are generally seen as paradigmatic depictions of the
knowledge-action gap (Darnell et al 2019): we know what we should do, we judge
that we should do it, yet we often fail to act according to our knowledge. In recent
decades attention has been given to a particular instance of akratic behavior, which
is that of “inverse akrasia”, where the agent possesses faulty moral knowledge but
fails to act accordingly, thus ending up doing the right thing. In particular, two literary
examples are considered as exemplifying this kind of akratic situation: Huckleberry
Finn (Arpaly & Schroeder 1999, Arpaly 2000, Hursthouse 1999, Kleist 2009,
Holton manuscript) and Neoptolemus as understood by Aristotle (NE; Arpaly &
Schroeder 1999). In this paper I will argue that those of Neoptolemus and Huck Finn
are not cases of inverse akrasia (Holton manuscript) but are much better explained
as instances of what Williams (1993) called “moral incapacity”. In particular, the
reason why they fail to act according to their original judgments is due to a lack of
motivation to act accordingly, which is grounded in their moral self-identities (Blasi
1984; Vigani 2016).
The paper will unfold as follows: I will, first, argue that neither Neoptolemus
nor Huck Finn show akratic behavior; thus, they cannot be legitimately labeled as
“inverse akratics” (par 1.); then, I will argue that they act the way they do notwithstanding
their faulty judgments because they are effectively motivated to do so. Such
motivation originates in their moral self-identities and is experienced through the
threat of self-betrayal (par 2); finally, I will argue that when an agent is motivated
to act in a way that is integral with her moral self-identity, acting otherwise is experienced
as something one cannot ultimately do; that is, as a moral incapacity (par
3). This “cannot” is neither a metaphor for an “I shouldn’t”, nor an instance of what
has been recently labeled a “moral impossibility” (Caprioglio Panizza 2020, 2021),
since it does not arise from the normative force of deontic judgments, and it is neither
physically nor psychologically impossible for the agent to act otherwise.