The structure of thoughts

In Markus Werning, Edouard Machery & Gerhard Schurz (eds.), The Compositionality of Meaning and Content. Volume I - Foundational Issues,. Frankfurt, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 169-188 (2005)
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Abstract
In this paper I examine one well-known attempt to justify the claim that thoughts are intrinsically structured, Evans’s justification of the Generality Constraint. I compare this with a rival account, proposed by Peaocke. I end by suggesting that a naïve, Aristotelian realist has no difficulty at all in providing a justification of the Generality Constraint, which is therefore a view that deserves serious consideration.
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