Davidson on value and objectivity

Dialectica 61 (2):203–217 (2007)
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Abstract

According to one version of objectivism about value, ethical and other evaluative claims have a fixed truth-value independently of who makes them or the society in which they happen to live (c.f. Davidson 2004, 42). Subjectivists about value deny this claim. According to subjectivism so understood, ethical and other evaluative claims have no fixed truth-value, either because their truth-value is dependent on who makes them, or because they have no truth-value at all

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Hallvard Lillehammer
Birkbeck College, University Of London

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