Abstract

Nick Bostrom considered a number of simulations and contended that the probability that we are living in one of them is high or at least nonzero. I present arguments to refute the claim that we are or might be in any one of them. Here is a highly dense reasoning why we are not in the simulation: Suppose Simon is in the simulation, and he entertains the idea that he is in the simulation. And he thinks about the word 'apple'. But since he is always in the simulation, he has never interacted with an actual apple, which the word 'apple' refers to. Then Simon must think that "if I am in the simulation, then I never interact with an actual apple, and my understanding about the word 'apple' can only be given by the simulator. And this means I never exercise my reason to gain the understanding about the word 'apple', and never exercise my reason to apply the word 'apple'. Consequently, since what I am thinking right now (namely, this entire thought within the double quotation marks) involves the word 'apple', I am not using reason to think what I am thinking." By denying he is using reason to think, Simon is being incoherent in thinking the preceding thought. To avoid being incoherent, Simon must reject the idea that he is in the simulation. For the similar reason, if we think we are in the simulation, we are being incoherent. More simply, to think that we are in the simulation is to be incoherent. Therefore we cannot actually think that we are in the simulation. Hence, we are not in the simulation. The whole paper is to flesh out the reasoning above.