Against the possibility of a formal account of rationality

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Abstract
I analyze a recent exchange between Adam Elga and Julian Jonker concerning unsharp (or imprecise) credences and decision-making over them. Elga holds that unsharp credences are necessarily irrational; I agree with Jonker's reply that they can be rational as long as the agent switches to a nonlinear valuation. Through the lens of computational complexity theory, I then argue that even though nonlinear valuations can be rational, they come in general at the price of computational intractability, and that this problematizes their use in defining rationality. I conclude that the meaning of "rationality" may be philosophically vague.
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Archival date: 2013-04-03
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