Memory and Personal Identity in Spinoza

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):243-268 (2005)
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Abstract

Locke is often thought to have introduced the topic of personal identity into philosophy when, in the second edition of theEssay,he distinguished the person from both the human being and the soul. Each of these entities differs from the others with respect to their identity conditions, and so they must be ontologically distinct. In particular, Locke claimed, a person cannot survive total memory loss, although a human being or a soul can.

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Martin Lin
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

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