Disagreement and Defeat

In Diego Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism (2013)
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The equal weight view says that if you discover that you disagree with a peer, you should decrease your confidence that you are in the right. Since peer disagreement seems to be quite prevalent, the equal weight view seems to tell us that we cannot reasonably believe many of the interesting things we believe because we can always count on a peer to contest the interesting things that we believe. While the equal weight view seems to have skeptical implications, few epistemologists worry about these implications because the equal weight view is quickly falling out of favor. In this paper, I present an analogical argument for the view and defend it from critics who think that we can justifiably retain confidence in the face of peer disagreement
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Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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Disagreement.Matheson, Jonathan & Frances, Bryan

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