n-1 Guilty Men

In Simon Kirchin (ed.), The Future of Normativity. Oxford: (forthcoming)
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Abstract

We argue that there is nothing that can do the work that normative reasons are expected to do. A currently popular view is that in any given situation, a set of normative reasons (understood as a set of facts, typically about the agent’s situation) always determines the ways we prospectively should or should not respond. We discuss an example that we think shows no such collection of facts could have this normative significance. A radical response might be to dispense with reasons and explain the facts about the ways we should respond using something else entirely (e.g., expected value). We think a more fruitful approach is to explore the possibility of using decision-theoretic tools in a reasons-centred framework.

Author Profiles

Clayton Littlejohn
Australian Catholic University
Julien Dutant
King's College London

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