Incomplete Preference and Indeterminate Comparative Probability
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axaa009 (forthcoming)
Abstract
The notion of comparative probability defined in Bayesian subjectivist theory stems from an intuitive idea that, for a given pair of events, one event may be considered “more probable” than the other. Yet it is conceivable that there are cases where it is indeterminate as to which event is more probable, due to, e.g., lack of robust statistical information. We take that these cases involve indeterminate comparative probabilities. This paper provides a Savage-style decision-theoretic foundation for indeterminate comparative probabilities.
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2020-02-07
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2020-02-07
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82 ( #42,208 of 57,059 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #38,246 of 57,059 )
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