Incomplete Preference and Indeterminate Comparative Probabilities

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (3):795-810 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The notion of comparative probability defined in Bayesian subjectivist theory stems from an intuitive idea that, for a given pair of events, one event may be considered “more probable” than the other. Yet it is conceivable that there are cases where it is indeterminate as to which event is more probable, due to, e.g., lack of robust statistical information. We take that these cases involve indeterminate comparative probabilities. This paper provides a Savage-style decision-theoretic foundation for indeterminate comparative probabilities.

Author's Profile

Yang Liu
Cambridge University

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-02-07

Downloads
481 (#31,485)

6 months
176 (#13,661)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?