Necessary truths, evidence, and knowledge.
Filosofia Unisinos 17 (3):302-307 (2016)
Abstract
According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing about evidence.
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2017-11-04
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28 ( #27,442 of 58,416 )
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