Why Naive Realism?

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237 (2012)
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Abstract
Much of the discussion of Naive Realism about veridical experience has focused on a consequence of adopting it—namely, disjunctivism about perceptual experience. However, the motivations for being a Naive Realist in the first place have received relatively little attention in the literature. In this paper, I will elaborate and defend the claim that Naive Realism provides the best account of the phenomenal character of veridical experience
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Archival date: 2014-07-31
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References found in this work BETA
The Transparency of Experience.Martin, Michael G. F.

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Citations of this work BETA
A New Perceptual Adverbialism.D’Ambrosio, Justin

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