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Heather Logue
University of Leeds
  1. Why Naive Realism?Heather Logue - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237.
    Much of the discussion of Naive Realism about veridical experience has focused on a consequence of adopting it—namely, disjunctivism about perceptual experience. However, the motivations for being a Naive Realist in the first place have received relatively little attention in the literature. In this paper, I will elaborate and defend the claim that Naive Realism provides the best account of the phenomenal character of veridical experience.
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  2. Visual Experience of Natural Kind Properties: Is There Any Fact of the Matter?Heather Logue - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):1-12.
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  3. Good News for the Disjunctivist About the Bad Cases.Heather Logue - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.
    Many philosophers are skeptical about disjunctivism —a theory of perceptual experience which holds roughly that a situation in which I see a banana that is as it appears to me to be and one in which I have a hallucination as of a banana are mentally completely different. Often this skepticism is rooted in the suspicion that such a view cannot adequately account for the bad case—in particular, that such a view cannot explain why what it’s like to have a (...)
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  4. What Should the Naïve Realist Say About Total Hallucinations?Heather Logue - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):173-199.
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  5. The Skeptic and the Naïve Realist.Heather Logue - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):268-288.
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  6. Experiential Content and Naive Realism: A Reconciliation.Heather Logue - forthcoming - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press.
    In the first section of this paper, after briefly arguing for the assumption that experiential content is propositional, I’ll distinguish three interpretations of the claim that experience has content (the Mild, Medium, and Spicy Content Views). In the second section, I’ll flesh out Naïve Realism in greater detail, and I’ll reconstruct what I take to be the main argument for its incompatibility with the Content Views. The third section will be devoted to evaluation of existing arguments for the Mild Content (...)
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  7. Getting Acquainted with Naïve Realism: Critical Notice of Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion.Heather Logue - 2010 - Philosophical Books 51 (1):22-38.
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