Fair equality of chances for prediction-based decisions

Economics and Philosophy 40 (3):557-580 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article presents a fairness principle for evaluating decision-making based on predictions: a decision rule is unfair when the individuals directly impacted by the decisions who are equal with respect to the features that justify inequalities in outcomes do not have the same statistical prospects of being benefited or harmed by them, irrespective of their socially salient morally arbitrary traits. The principle can be used to evaluate prediction-based decision-making from the point of view of a wide range of antecedently specified substantive views about justice in outcome distributions.

Author Profiles

Anders Herlitz
Institute for Futures Studies
Michele Loi
Luiss Guido Carli

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-11-10

Downloads
448 (#51,544)

6 months
193 (#14,262)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?