Philosophy of Economics

Though Mathias Risse and Gabriel Wollner’s _On Trade Justice_ admirably incorporates the history of European philosophy and U.S. government, their otherwise reasonable proposals rest on dubious grounds. The book derives both much of its appeal, and its primary vulnerability, from a cluster of central terms that are situated precariously at the intersection of metaphors and concepts, or what Lakoff and Johnson call “metaphorical concepts.” In this article, I explore the three most important such terms, as featured in the following paraphrase (...) of theirs: “_Trade_ is an _embedded ground_ of justice.” For each italicized term, I conclude, Risse and Wollner vacil-late between its most conceptual and metaphorical meanings, thereby attempting to (a) stretch “trade” to identify prehistoric exchange with global capitalism, so as to (b) rebrand the contextual “ground” of this universal activity as a foundation, even though (c) foundations “embedded” in other foundations simply reduce to their lowest common denominator. The latter, in this case, is global capitalism, the most immoral practices of which they are thereby pressured to defend, including temporary forms of the very exploitation that they so persuasively reconceive and otherwise condemn. (shrink)

This chapter argues that central banks find themselves between a rock and a hard place when it comes to green central banking. Either they endorse the project, exposing them to the charge that they lack the input legitimacy to do so, or they eschew taking into account climate concerns, thus undermining their output legitimacy. Our discourse analysis of central bankers’ speeches shows that disagreements among officials from the same institution regarding green central banking are grounded on issues outside their core (...) expertise. Furthermore, neither the conservative nor the progressive central bankers defend positions that have the potential to overcome the legitimacy dilemma we formulate. (shrink)

La concurrence fiscale internationale est une composante essentielle du paysage fiscal contemporain. Cet essai analyse les responsabilités de l’État dans ce contexte d’interdépendance des systèmes fiscaux. Il soutient que l’État a le devoir 1) de mettre en œuvre le projet collectif défini par sa population, 2) de respecter l’autonomie des autres États et 3) d’assister les pays démunis. Cette conceptualisation des responsabilités étatiques a des conséquences théoriques et pratiques. Du côté théorique, la conjonction des deux premières responsabilités pousse à abandonner (...) la notion traditionnelle de souveraineté́ comme non-ingérence. Aujourd’hui, une notion adéquate de la souveraineté́ doit être sensible aux externalités internationales produites par l’action d’un État. De plus, la conception de la souveraineté́ esquissée ici est compatible avec un impératif d’assistance envers les pays en voie de développement. Du côté pratique, le respect de ces responsabilités étatiques requiert un nouveau régime de coopération fiscale entre les pays. (shrink)

The classical liberal paradigm has always argued for strong economic freedom combined with limits on government power. But it has also been always openminded about using government programs to improve the society. These principles, if applied to today’s society, are simultaneously a criticism of “really existing” welfare state ideology – with its lack of economic freedom and its reliance on the expansive bureaucracy – but also an opportunity for reforming welfare states toward more freedom-based alternatives. There is a utopian potential (...) in classical liberalism. This book articulates how several strands of liberalism, including Austrian school liberalism and Chicago school liberalism, may support something like universal basic income (UBI). (shrink)

Austrian economics emphasizes a priori components of social scientific theory. Most emphatically, Ludwig Mises and Murray Rothbard champion praxeology, a methodology often criticized as extremely aprioristic. Among the numerous justifications and interpretations of praxeology to be found in the primary and secondary literature, conventionalism avoids the charge of extreme apriorism by construing the fundamental axiom of praxeology as analytic instead of synthetic. This paper (1) explicates the tentative structure of the fundamental axiom, (2) clarifies some aspects of a conventionalist defense (...) of praxeology, and (3) appraises conventionalist praxeology according to Rothbardian criteria. While Rothbard provides an essentialist justification of praxeology and embraces extreme apriorism, a mildly aprioristic conventionalist defense of praxeology fares better on Rothbard’s own criteria and is much more compatible with other contemporary methodological positions and economic theories. (shrink)

Although neoclassical economics faces frequent criticism, it remains the dominant paradigm, largely due to its immunisation strategies that rely on unfalsifiable concepts of utility and rationality. In this paper, I use Karl Popper’s philosophy to assess whether these strategies are justified. Firstly, I reconstruct Popper’s ideas on immunisation strategies, situational analysis, the rationality principle, and the metaphysical research programme. Next, I examine how neoclassical economics’ immunisation strategies counter critiques from behavioural economics. I conclude that neoclassical economics’ method does not produce (...) empirical conjectures. I assess and evaluate this finding in relation to the “rationality principle”, as it parallels neoclassical economics’ optimisation axiom. Furthermore, I explore Popper’s relevance in the context of neoclassical economics’ recent incorporation of behavioural economics’ insights to show that my analysis is not purely historical. (shrink)

This dissertation undertakes a philosophical analysis of “natural capital” and argues that this concept has prompted economists to view Nature in a radically novel manner. Formerly, economists referred to Nature and natural products as a collection of inert materials to be drawn upon in isolation and then rearranged by human agents to produce commodities. More recently, nature is depicted as a collection of active, modifiable, and economically valuable processes, often construed as ecosystems that produce marketable goods and services gratis. Nature (...) is depicted as consisting of various unproduced mechanisms or “natural machines” that are first discovered and then channeled so as to serve human ends. In short, nature as an ideal is a kind of garden that is characterized by natural objects purposefully arranged by intentional human agents. This dissertation first lays out working definitions of the key terms, such as capital and Nature, and then traces the historical roots of natural capital in the writings of eminent classical political economists, such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx. I then examine the question of substitutes for “critical natural capital”, and argue that the preservation paradox is warranted: no one can restore or preserve a part of Nature without turning it into an artifact. Following the recent work of Debra Satz and Michael Sandel, I finish my dissertation by situating the question of natural capital in the broader context of whether some goods should not be for sale, particularly those I define as Basic Ecological Goods. (shrink)

Variable-Value axiologies avoid Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion while satisfying some weak instances of the Mere Addition principle. We apply calibration methods to two leading members of the family of Variable-Value views conditional upon: first, a very weak instance of Mere Addition and, second, some plausible empirical assumptions about the size and welfare of the intertemporal world population. We find that such facts calibrate these two Variable-Value views to be nearly totalist, and therefore imply conclusions that should seem repugnant to anyone who (...) opposes Total Utilitarianism only due to the Repugnant Conclusion. (shrink)

This article presents a fairness principle for evaluating decision-making based on predictions: a decision rule is unfair when the individuals directly impacted by the decisions who are equal with respect to the features that justify inequalities in outcomes do not have the same statistical prospects of being benefited or harmed by them, irrespective of their socially salient morally arbitrary traits. The principle can be used to evaluate prediction-based decision-making from the point of view of a wide range of antecedently specified (...) substantive views about justice in outcome distributions. (shrink)

Teaching a compulsory, large-scale Philosophy of Economics (PoE) course to economics students presents distinct challenges. Instructors face a heterogeneous student body with varying levels of interest in the topics, diverse occupational goals and a limited philosophical background. Unlike elective courses, for which students self-select based on interest, a compulsory course entails motivating disengaged students and managing their expectations. We put forward the case for a student-oriented approach to teaching PoE, emphasising four key strategies: recognising students’ limited philosophical knowledge, demonstrating the (...) relevance of PoE to their professional and personal lives, using real-world problems to engage them and avoiding the oversimplification of topics. We argue that PoE instruction should account for the distinct characteristics of economics students, moving beyond a supply-driven approach. Our suggestions aim to enhance student engagement and provide practical guidance for instructors navigating the challenges of teaching PoE at scale. (shrink)

I argue that the discussion around the True Preferences Knowledge Problem in behavioral welfare economics has suffered from a missing distinction between two different knowledge problems: one about welfare, and the other about public policy. Here, I separate those knowledge problems and show that, given their different success conditions, it is no surprise that we haven’t found a satisfactory answer to “the” true preferences knowledge problem. There is an embedded tendency to try to answer the policy knowledge problem by engaging (...) the welfare knowledge problem. I show that the impulse is misguided, and that we do not need to appeal to a complete theory of how preferences are related to welfare to answer questions about policy. However, this does not mean that we need to stop talking about preferences. We can make progress on the policy knowledge problem without appealing to a theory of welfare by focusing on the information that people are giving us about the mistakes they are making. I introduce repudiated preferences as a device that allows us to break out of this cycle and start to make progress in our discussions of nudging and Behavioral Intervention Policies without first solving the welfare knowledge problem. Finally, I acknowledge the challenges that still face this approach, and trace some avenues for how further work could build on these insights. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, James Christensen, Tom Parr and David Axelsen argue that millionaire salaries are unjust and women have no grounds of fairness to unjust salaries in parity with men. They accept that disrespect is expressed toward women when they are paid less than men because of their gender. Their argument largely replicates a similar argument developed earlier by Anca Gheaus. By drawing on the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory, we argue that Christensen et al. (...) and Gheaus hold women to unacceptably high standards of justice and arguably higher standards than men are held to. (shrink)

Real human agents, even when they are rational by everyday standards, sometimes assign different credences to objectively equivalent statements, such as ‘Orwell is a writer’ and ‘E.A. Blair is a writer’, or credences less than 1 to necessarily true statements, such as not-yet-proven theorems of arithmetic. Anna Mahtani calls this the phenomenon of ‘opacity’. Opaque credences seem probabilistically incoherent, which goes against a key modelling assumption of probability theory. I sketch a modelling strategy for capturing opaque credence assignments without abandoning (...) probabilistic coherence. I draw on ideas from judgement-aggregation theory, where we face similar challenges of defining the ‘objects of judgement’. (shrink)

This article explains how social norms can help to distinguish and understand a range of different kinds of social inequality and social hierarchy. My aim is to show how the literature on social norms can provide crucial resources to relational egalitarianism, which has made social equality and inequality into a central topic of contemporary normative political theorizing. The hope is that a more discriminating and detailed picture of different kinds of social inequality will help relational egalitarians move beyond a discussion (...) of the justice or injustice of social equality as a single general category. (shrink)

Soda taxes are controversial. While proponents point to their potential health benefits and the public projects that could be funded with their revenue, critics argue that they are paternalistic and regressive. In this paper, we explore the prospects for designing a just soda tax, one that appropriately balances the often-competing ethical considerations of promoting social welfare, respecting people’s autonomy and ensuring distributive fairness. We argue that policymakers have several paths forward for designing a just soda tax, but that the considerations (...) relevant to ethical policy design are more complicated than is sometimes acknowledged. (shrink)

The Quantum Economics Intelligence Initiative, spearheaded by Quantum Economist PhDs. Kaiola M Liu integrates insights from seminal thinkers like Einstein, Archimedes, Adam Smith, Nick Land, and Sun Tzu. By applying principles of quantum mechanics, this forward-looking project aims to redefine economic modeling, exploring real-world applications and potential benefits. The initiative encompasses foundational studies, economic model applications, incorporation of quantum computing, and analysis of contemporary economic philosophies. Keywords - Quantum Mechanics, Economics, Technological Advancements, Philosophy.

When organizations solve collective action problems or realize values, they do so by means of institutions. These are commonly regarded as self-stabilizing. Yet, they can also be subject to endogenous processes of decay, or so we argue. We explain this in terms of psychological and cultural processes, which can change even if the formal structures remain unchanged. One key implication is that the extent to which norms, values, and ideals motivate individuals to comply with institutions is limited.

We live in times of an increasing polarization in which the margins of the political spectrum begin to dominate our social imagination again. While the neoliberal iteration of the capitalist project suggests an extreme individualism as the normative default position, the devastating impact of the globalized economy on many has reignited the pursuit of socialist alternatives. In this constellation, Simmel’s social theory of modernity can be a useful resource to undercut the return of the old battle between opposite economic systems. (...) This paper argues that two kinds of pluralism can be derived from his conceptualization of the social effects of the money economy. In contrast to one-size-fits-all concepts of freedom, Simmel embraces a social pluralism which acknowledges a plurality of cultural spheres as relevant for the self-actualization of modern individuals, attributing different combinations of independence and embeddedness to them. Moreover, he rejects the social extremes of socialism and individualism, since they fail to properly integrate individual freedom into the social whole without undermining it. Instead Simmel gives us the vision of a pluralist economy in which democratic worker’s cooperatives are combined with an overall liberal market to satisfy both the longing for community and the strive for individual distinction. (shrink)

This paper rigorously examines the primitive foundations of economic reasoning through an original framework based on symbolic logic. Extending previous work, it formalizes economic conceptions (\(\mathbb{C}\)), symbols (\(s_i\)), and introduces a structured language (\(\mathcal{L_{\mathbb{C}}}\)) to define their formation and interpretation. Organized as a continuous chain of declarations and illustrations, the paper offers a concise, systematic approach to understanding the philosophy of economic reasoning through formal representations.

Friedrich Stadler und sein Team schließen über 40 Jahre nach Präsentation der ersten beiden Bände das von Rudolf Haller initiierte Projekt einer umfassenden Werkschau Otto Neuraths (1882–1945) ab. In acht Bänden wird auf fast 5.000 Seiten das Schaffen eines Polyhistors dokumentiert und zugänglich gemacht, dessen intellektueller Spannweite man nicht einmal gerecht wird, wenn man ihn als Philosophen, Nationalökonomen, Gesellschaftstechniker und Aufklärer bezeichnet.

According to relational egalitarianism, justice requires equal relations. In this paper, I ask the question: can equal relations be unjust according to relational egalitarianism? I argue that while on some conceptions of relational egalitarianism, equal relations cannot be unjust, there are conceptions in which equal relations can be unjust. Surprisingly, whether equal relations can be unjust cuts across the distinction between responsibility-sensitive and non-responsibility-sensitive conceptions of relational egalitarianism. I then show what follows if one accepts a conception in which equal (...) relations can be unjust, including why it provides a reason to grant some people less political power than others. (shrink)

Non-Archimedean population axiologies – also known as lexical views – claim (i) that a sufficient number of lives at a very high positive welfare level would be better than any number of lives at a very low positive welfare level and/or (ii) that a sufficient number of lives at a very low negative welfare level would be worse than any number of lives at a very high negative welfare level. Such axiologies are popular because they can avoid the (Negative) Repugnant (...) Conclusion and satisfy the adequacy conditions given in the central impossibility result in population axiology due to Gustaf Arrhenius. I provide a novel argument against them which appeals to the way that good and bad lives can intuitively outweigh one another. (shrink)

Scientists and engineers seek to understand how real-world systems work and could work better. Any modeling method devised for such purposes must simplify reality. Ideally, however, the modeling method should be flexible as well as logically rigorous; it should permit model simplifications to be appropriately tailored for the specific purpose at hand. Flexibility and logical rigor have been the two key goals motivating the development of Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE), a completely agent-based modeling method characterized by seven specific modeling principles. (...) This perspective provides an overview of ACE, a brief history of its development, and its role within a broader spectrum of experiment-based modeling methods. (shrink)

This dissertation looks at a set of interconnected questions concerning the foundations of probability, and gives a series of interconnected answers. At its core is a piece of old-fashioned philosophical analysis, working out what probability is. Or equivalently, investigating the semantic question of what is the meaning of ‘probability’? Like Keynes and Carnap, I say that probability is degree of reasonable belief. This immediately raises an epistemological question, which degrees count as reasonable? To solve that in its full generality would (...) mean the end of human inquiry, so that won’t be attempted here. Rather I will follow tradition and merely investigate which sets of partial beliefs are coherent. -/- The standard answer to this question, what is commonly called the Bayesian answer, says that degrees of belief are coherent iff they form a probability function. I disagree with the way this is usually justified, but subject to an important qualification I accept the answer. The important qualification is that degrees of belief may be imprecise, or vague. Part one of the dissertation, chapters 1 to 6, looks largely at the consequences of this qualification for the semantic and epistemological questions already mentioned. It turns out that when we allow degrees of belief to be imprecise, we can discharge potentially fatal objections to some philosophically attractive theses. Two of these, that probability is degree of reasonable belief and that the probability calculus provides coherence constraints on partial beliefs, have been mentioned. Others include the claim, defended in chapter 4, that chance is probability given total history. -/- As well as these semantic and epistemological questions, studies of the foundations of probability usually include a detailed discussion of decision theory. For reasons set out in chapter 2, I deny we can gain epistemological insights from decision theory. Nevertheless, it is an interesting field to study on its own, and it might be expected that there would be decision theoretic consequences of allowing imprecise degrees of belief. As I show in part two, this expectation seems to be mistaken. Chapter 9 shows that there aren’t interesting consequences of this theory for decision theory proper, and chapters 10 and 11 show that Keynes’s attempt to use imprecision in degrees of belief to derive a distinctive theory of interest rates is unsound. -/- Chapters 7 and 8 provide a link between these two parts. In chapter 7 I look at some previous philosophical investigations into the effects of imprecision. In chapter 8 I develop what I take to be the best competitor to the theory defended here – a constructivist theory of probability. On this view degrees of belief are precise, but the relevant coherence constraint is a constructivist probability calculus. This view is, I think, mistaken, but the calculus has some intrinsic interest, and there are at least enough arguments for it to warrant a chapter-length examination. (shrink)

We present an abstract model of rationality that focuses on structural properties of attitudes. Rationality requires coherence between your attitudes, such as your beliefs, values, and intentions. We define three 'logical' conditions on attitudes: consistency, completeness, and closedness. They parallel the familiar logical conditions on beliefs, but contrast with standard rationality conditions like preference transitivity. We establish a formal correspondence between our logical conditions and standard rationality conditions. Addressing John Broome's programme 'rationality through reasoning', we formally characterize how you can (...) (not) become more logical by reasoning. Our analysis connects rationality with logic, and enables logical talk about multi-attitude psychology. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the absentminded driver problem using two different scenarios. In the first scenario we assume that the driver is capable of reasoning about his degree of absentmindedness before he hits the highway. This leads to a Savage-style model where the states are mutually exclusive and the act-state independence is in place. In the second we employ centred possibilities, by modelling the states (i.e. the events about which the driver is uncertain) as the possible final destinations indexed (...) by a time period. The optimal probability we find for continuing at an exit is different from almost all papers in the literature. In this scenario, act-state independence is still violated, but states are mutually exclusive and the driver arrives at his optimal choice probability via Bayesian updating. We show that our solution is the only one guaranteeing immunity from sure loss via a Dutch strategy, and that – despite initial appearances – it is time consistent. This raises important implications for the rationality of commitment in such scenarios. (shrink)

The city of Kruja dates back to its existence in the 5th and 6th centuries. In the inner city are preserved great historical, cultural, and architectural values that are inherited from generation to generation. In the city interact and coexist three different typologies of dwellings: historic buildings that belong to the XIII, XIV, XV, XIII, XIX centuries (built using the foundations of previous buildings); socialist buildings dating back to the Second World War until 1990; and modern buildings which were built (...) from 1990 onwards. According to the questionnaires, the creation of mathematical models applied to each category will result in contradictory attitudes but also fairy ones based on different percentages. There are underlined 5 quality of life indicators(questions) from a total of 30 questions of the questionnaire, which are involved in mathematical regression and are statistically significant with a significance level p<5% (with a reliability of 95%), which interact for all three categories of buildings. The quality of life indicators: dwelling area, heating mode during winter, level of dwelling improvement, time spent in the dwelling, and monthly electricity payments, are the main actors who will be compared in order to draw conclusions. According to the statistical calculations trend, it is noted that the socialist buildings category does not directly participate in the debate between historic and modern buildings by means of the quality of life indicators (questions). (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 52, Issue 1, Page 5-41, Winter 2024.

تقديم منذ القدم اعتنت الحضارات بالتربية، وأنشأت لذلك مؤسسات تفي بغرض تعليم المهارات والكفايات، وإعادة إنتاج المجتمع. وقد كان ذلك تحت ضغط حاجة الاجتماع، وإقامة المدن والدول، وتجويد الصناعات والمهن. لقد كانت المجتمعات البسيطة، المبنية على العيش وفق ما تهبه الطبيعة مباشرة، بغير حاجة إلى مؤسسات تعلم كيفية اصطياد حيوان أو جني فاكهة أو حفر جذور نبات، حيث كان القدماء والراشدون يمررون المهارات بالقدوة والتقليد، والصغار يتعلمون بالمحاولة والخطأ. وما أن بنيت القرى الأولى وبدأ الإنسان يدجن النبات والحيوان، حتى بدأ (...) التفكير في تجمعات كبرى تسهل حفظ المؤون والدفاع عن النفس والتجارة. مع المدينة والتجارة كان لابد من اختراع الكتابة للتوثيق وحفظ الحقوق. ومع كل ذلك لابد من دولة ترعى هذه الحقوق وتضمن تنفيذها بالقضاء والشرطة، وتنظيمها بالإدارة. فكان لابد أن تظهر المدارس لتخريج الموظفين الإداريين والكتبة كما هو الأمر في الصين القديمة. المدرسة الأولى إذا ارتبطت بالإدارة والسلطة، وبذلك يروي المؤرخون صرامتها الأصلية واقترابها من الجندية، خاصة في مباريات الموظفين الكبار والمتوسطي Le mandarins في الصين القديمة. مع الحضارة اليونانية لا يمكن إلا أن نقف عند تجربتين فريدتين وهما مؤسستا الأكاديميا لأفلاطون، والتي كانت مؤسسة فيها قاعات للدراسة وملعبا رياضيا ومواقع دينية ومكتبة، وتقام فيها دروس وألعاب ومحاضرات. وكما اشترط أفلاطون الهندسة على من أراد أن يتابع الدروس، فقد كانت الرياضيات مادة أساسية في الجامعة. ومن الكتب التي وصلتنا من أفلاطون نفهم الطابع التجريدي القوي للتعلمات، وكذلك الاتجاه السياسي المحافظ. أما ليسي أرسطو، والذي كان يسمى أيضا بالمدرسة المشائية، فقد كان مؤسسة تكاد تكون مثل الجامعات العصرية، بقاعات وممرات للمشي والحوار. وفي المؤسسة متحف ومكتبة. وقد توزعت الدروس بين الفلسفة والبلاغة والشعر والرياضيات والطب والجدل وعلم الفلك والحياة والنبات والأخلاق والسياسة. ولم يكن الليسي يشمل التدريس فحسب، بل وكذلك البحث والتصنيف خاصة. وحتى نفهم المدرسة الأرسطية لابد من ربطها بعلاقتها بالأمبراطورية الأسكندرية إرادة وتمويلا، ومن ثمة كونها كانت رغبة استمرار السلطة لدولة فيليب وللأرستقراطية الأثينية. أما في القرون الوسطى سيتكفل الدين بالتربية وتلقين المعارف: سواء على مستوى الاعتقاد والقيم والأخلاق، أم على مستوى التشريع، أو العلوم. فيتخرج من الجامعات الإسلامية، أو من الكنائس، أو البيع، مفسرون للكتب المقدسة، ومؤرخو حياة الأنبياء والصحابة والأحبار والكهنة. ونبغ علماء لغة ونحو وبيان وأدب، وكان ذلك غالبا لفهم النصوص المرجعية، وبعض المتعة للطلبة والمتأدبين. وانفجر من ذلك كله الفقه لربط الأعمال اليومية بالسنن الدينية، ولتنظيم الحياة الاجتماعية والاقتصادية وشؤون الملك والسلطان. فانتشرت المدنية واتسعت الحضارة واطلع الخريجون على علوم الأمم الأخرى بالترجمة، فظهرت الإلهيات والفلسفة والمنطق. وتطور حسن معاش الناس فظهر الطب والرياضيات والصيدلة والكيمياء والفيزياء. وكان كل ذلك تحت رقابة الفقهاء والقساوسة والكهنة حتى لا تزيغ المعرفة عن الدين في جانبه الأيديولوجي خاصة. د. بن محمد قسطاني أستاذ باحث في علم الاجتماع والأنثروبولوجيا . (shrink)

لا يمكن الحديث عن مدرسة النجاح في المستقبل٬ ما لم يتم استحضار التطور الحاصل في أدوار ووظائف وآليات اشتغال المدرسة٬ من خلال التعرف على سيرورات التحولات التي عرفتها وظائف وأدوار هذه المؤسسة في الماضي والحاضر. ففي الوقت الراهن تحولت هذه الوظائف من التلقين والحشو بالمعارف٬ إلى وظائف أكثر حيوية وتنوعا ودينامية٬ تتجه صوب إيجاد حلول لتحديات اكساب التلميذ مناهج وتقنيات تحصيل المعرفة والبحث٬ وتعزيز قدراته ومهاراته الحياتية٬ وتوسيع خبراته٬ إضافة إلى سعيها لتطوير جاهزيته للشغل وتحقيق الذات والعيش المشترك مع الأفراد (...) داخل المجتمع. لقد بدأ الرهان منذ بداية الإصلاح الأخير على العنصر البشري الذي يعتبر المشعل الذي ينير درب التنمية في المستقبل، فمتعلم اليوم هو مواطن الغد، وبذلك ركزت المدرسة المغربية كل أنشطتها واهتماماتها على هذا المتعلم وجعلته في قلب الاهتمام والتفكير والفعل، وجعلت كل الهياكل والبرامج والمشاريع في خدمته. و في خطوة أخرى جريئة أعد المجلس الأعلى للتربية والتكوين والبحث العلمي رؤية استراتيجية لإصلاح منظومة التربية والتكوين (2015-2030)، التي عملت على إرساء المجلس وانخراطه في سلسلة من الأعمال الرامية إلى تقييم حصيلة تطبيق الميثاق الوطني للتربية والتكوين، واستشراف أفاق تأهيل وتطوير المنظومة الوطنية للتربية والتكوين والبحث العلمي. كما عملت وزارة التربية الوطنية والتكوين المهني على إقرار التدابير ذات الأولوية المتمثلة في الإجراءات الإصلاحية، من خلال إصدار المذكرة الإطار 15/099 بتاريخ 12 أكتوبر 2015 من أجل التنزيل الأولي للرؤية الاستراتيجية 2030-2015. وقد عملنا من خلال هذا العدد، التجربة الثانية ل ″مجلة كراسات تربوية″ المحكمة، على اقتراح قضايا تربوية جوهرية نراها الأجدر بالدراسة والتحليل، والتي ستكون سبيلا لفتح أفاق جديدة على مستوى التكوين والتكوين المستمر بالنسبة للأطر التربوية والطلبة المقبلين على ولوج مهنة التدريس وكذا المهتمين. ذ. الصديق الصادقي العماري المدرير ورئيس التحرير . (shrink)

Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy is organized around an exclusive disjunction of dignity or price, equality or equivalence. In his 1797 Doctrine of Right, however, Kant places enslaved black people on the wrong side of this disjunction when he speculates that their status as currency may offer insight into the origins of money. Recent work in black studies has begun to speculate on the link between blackness and money in modernity, and this paper draws attention to Kant’s role as an unlikely (...) and unwitting precursor for monetary theories of blackness. Precisely in his attempt to secure the priceless and unconditional character of freedom and dignity, it argues, Kant ends up demonstrating the positional value of both. (shrink)

Francis Ysidro Edgeworth’s unduly neglected monograph New and Old Methods of Ethics (1877) advances a highly sophisticated and mathematized account of social well-being in the utilitarian tradition of his 19th-century contemporaries. This article illustrates how his usage of the ‘calculus of variations’ was combined with findings from empirical psychology and economic theory to construct a consequentialist axiological framework. A conclusion is drawn that Edgeworth is a methodological predecessor to several important methods, ideas, and issues that continue to be discussed in (...) contemporary social well-being studies. (shrink)

Humans and animals interact frequently, although the degrees of freedom as well as the consequences are distributed rather unevenly in these interactions. The language of game theory allows to study such interactions systematically. However, while game theory has become increasingly influential in moral and political philosophy, it has done so within a purely anthropocentric framework. Either, it focused on interaction between humans alone, or it treated animals as mere instruments to human welfare. This article argues that a physiocentric extension of (...) game theory is both required and possible, considering different concepts of agency. It is shown that a modern utilitarian environmental ethic is not only compatible with the economic methodology of game theory, but that both can also enrich one another. (shrink)

Carl Knight argues that lexical sufficientarianism, which holds that sufficientarian concerns should have lexical priority over other distributive goals, is ‘excessive’ in many distinct ways and that sufficientarians should either defend weighted sufficientarianism or become prioritarians. In this article, I distinguish three types of weighted sufficientarianism and propose a weighted sufficientarian view that meets the excessiveness objection and is preferable to both Knight’s proposal and prioritarianism. More specifically, I defend a multi-threshold view which gives weighted priority to benefits directly above (...) and below its thresholds, but gives benefits below the lowest threshold lexical priority over benefits above the highest threshold. (shrink)

Modern Monetary Theory and Distributive Justice shows how the macroeconomic framework called modern money theory (MMT) is relevant to the field of political philosophy called distributive justice. Many of the macroeconomic assumptions of distributive justice are unstated and unexamined. The framework of MMT illuminates these assumptions and provides an alternative vision of distributive justice analysis and prescriptions. In particular, MMT holds that modern money is a nominal state issued token (fiat), there is a distinction between nominal assets and real assets, (...) that state money as a nominal token can cause changes in real terms, and that the macroeconomy has historically not operated at capacity. The upshot of these assumptions held by MMT is that state spending can bring about changes in persons’ well-being without traditional redistributive measures via taxation. This is in contradistinction to standard assumptions in the distributive justice literature, which holds that the macroeconomy is at capacity and, thus, redistribution is the necessary mechanism for enacting improvements in well-being. This is a fundamental shift in how distributive justice can be conceived. (shrink)

In this article, the notion of entropology introduced by Claude Lévi-Strauss is applied and developed in the context of Georges Bataille’s anthropological philosophy: Bataille’s project is defined as entropological. Four philosophical vectors are chosen for this: the theory of general economy, the concept of decay, the idea of extinction and the notion of inhumanism. The theory of general economy allows us to understand the immanent terrestrial nature of humanity and the negative – entropic – side of the capitalist economy. The (...) concept of decay gives access to the thought of bodily disintegration and decomposition, which is temporality and mortality that split the subject. The idea of extinction speculates on the consequences of humanity’s destructiveness, libidinally charged inertia, and the extreme perspective of entropy’s impact on the planet. The notion of inhumanism suggests a radical rethinking of the human relationship with alienation and exteriority: Bataille’s philosophy is reinterpreted as inhumanist. I conclude that the Lévi-Strauss’s neologism – entropology – can be productively articulated and actualised within the framework of Bataille’s philosophy. (shrink)

[Book Review] Joseph Heath sometimes plays the role of a gadfly in climate and environmental ethics. He often defends conventional, economics-focused claims which rub many philosophers the wrong way—claims that are at the heart of issues raised in these pages, claims such as that discounting is justifiable, growth is good, or cost-benefit analysis is appropriate in liberal democracies. I think we can all agree that sophisticated defences of conventional positions play an important part in the ecosystem. For philosophers, a gadfly (...) can challenge entrenched conceptions. If we agree that these goals are worthwhile, then this book serves as a useful summary and synthesis of the ways Heath has ably defended conventional claims about climate policy. (shrink)

This paper draws some bold conclusions from modest premises. My topic is an old one, the Neohumean view of practical rationality. First, I show that this view consists of two independent claims, instrumentalism and subjectivism. Most critics run these together. Instrumentalism is entailed by many theories beyond Neohumeanism, viz. by any theory that says rational actions maximize something. Second, I give a new argument against instrumentalism, using simple counterexamples. This argument systematically undermines consequentialism and rational choice theory, I show, using (...) detailed examples of their many social science applications. There is no obvious fix. (shrink)

Public policymakers and institutional decision-makers routinely face questions about whether interventions “work”: does universal basic income improve people’s welfare and stimulate entrepreneurial activity? Do gated alleyways reduce burglaries or merely shift the crime burden to neighbouring communities? What is the most cost-effective way to improve students’ reading abilities? These are empirical questions that seem best answered by looking at the world, rather than trusting speculations about what will be effective. Evidence-based policy (EBP) is a movement that concretizes this intuition. It (...) maintains that policy should be based on evidence of “what works.” Not any evidence will do, however. Following on the heels of its intellectual progenitor, evidence-based medicine (EBM), EBP insists on the use of high-quality evidence produced in accordance with rigorous methodological standards. Though intuitively compelling, EBP has attracted significant criticism from methodologists, political scientists, and philosophers. This chapter provides a critical overview of EBP through a philosophical lens, reviewing and discussing some of the most pressing challenges that EBP faces and outlining some proposals for improving it. I first provide a brief overview of EBP and distinguish a broader and narrower understanding of it. I then review existing lines of criticism of EBP, two of which are considered in detail. The first elaborates how EBP struggles with extrapolation, that is, the use of evidence from study populations to make inferences about the effects of policies on novel target populations. The second maintains that EBP’s methodological tenets are deeply entwined with moral and political values, which can threaten EBP’s promise to promote objectivity in policymaking. Finally, I make some proposals for how EBP could be improved going forward. (shrink)

The good of those who are worse off matters more to the overall good than the good of those who are better off does. But being worse off than one’s fellows is not itself bad; nor is inequality itself bad; nor do differences in well-being matter more when well-being is lower in an absolute sense. Instead, the good of the relatively worse-off weighs more heavily in the overall good than the good of the relatively better-off does, in virtue of the (...) fact that the former are relatively worse off. This paper articulates and defends the view just described. (shrink)

Why should ‘better than’ be transitive? The leading answer in ethics is that values do not change with context. But this cannot be the entire source of transitivity, I argue, since transitivity can fail even if values never change, so long as they are complex, with multiple dimensions combined non-additively. I conclude by exploring a new hypothesis: that all alleged cases of nontransitive betterness, such as Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, can and should be modelled as the result of complexity, not context-relativity.

Templates travel because they offer a tractable format that can be used for model-building in a variety of domains. It is often because of this quality that a particular template is chosen. But one cannot assume that there are always templates ready to model a new phenomenon, and moreover, templates have also been designed at some point. A critical aspect of this designing process is the choice of the mathematical objects with which one hopes to capture this phenomenon. This means (...) that one has to assess which of the properties of different kinds of mathematical objects and which combinations of them are most appropriate. The selection of these objects is based on whether their properties enable the model to perform its function. This selection of mathematical objects is similar to the selection of materials in mechanical design. (shrink)

The founding fathers of neoliberalism are usually imagined as very rational neoclassical economists uninterested in cultural and religious issues. The aim of this paper is to paint a different picture by discussing the ideas of (neo)liberal economists regarding spiritual heritage, with an emphasis on eastern religions. Starting from the existing historiographical debate on the role of Daoist notions in the birth of political economy in 18th-century Europe, as an example of cultural transfer par excellence, argumentation develops into a comparative analysis (...) of philosophical underpinnings of modern laissez-faire liberalism and neoliberalism. The main thesis of the paper is that important epistemological differences between analysed doctrines imply the differences in the attitude of modern economic liberalism towards religion, which is demonstrated via examples of appropriations and translations of eastern heritage. This is a preliminary analysis but with the potential to shed new light on the political theology of contemporary culture and neoliberalism itself. (shrink)

(2023) Employees are commodities to the employer. The employer purchases commodities to maximize profitability. This brief reflection essay looks at a single passage from the “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts” by Marx, Engels and Werke in discussion of what labor is and what it produces. This paper will interpret the passage and defend that interpretation as the case. Then it will look at a possible implication and suggest that it too is the case. This paper will come to argue that employees (...) can never be happy with their work for an employer because commodities are not purchased with happiness of the commodity in mind or as a primary mission for the employer. (shrink)

Contemporary societies are regulated by a complex system, which tends to be exhaustive, supported by growing social and technical interdependence. This system is composed of subsystems: global economic production, liberal political institutions and a social organization based on labour. As a whole, these three dimensions – political, economical, social – tend to compress contemporary life forms into a single way of life, primarily structured by systemic functionality. Although it admits variations of degree (or even, to some extent, qualitative differences), the (...) functional codes (of systems) guide actions daily and impose severe limitations on lifestyles, which are particularly noticeable when the struggle for survival, both economically and socially, mobilizes all of one’s time and energy. The means obliterate the ends, functioning obliterates meaning, survival obliterates the proper human “life”. At the political level, liberal thought masks the “malaise of modern civilization” resulting from these limitations by evacuating the question on forms of life to the private sphere, concurrently with the insistence on an abstract political ethic of the “just”, ultimately determining the form and functioning of the institutions, which overrides any and all ethics of “good”. (shrink)

The brute force concern suggests that self-employment is favorable because being wage-employed entails following directives from an outside source. Gonzalez-Ricoy suggests that there are other instances where following an outside source is favorable, and thus, the brute force concern is no concern at all. In this article, I suggest there to be a difference between those outside directives that are favorable, and wage-employment directives from an employer.