Sensorimotor theory, cognitive access and the ‘absolute’ explanatory gap

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Sensorimotor Theory is the claim that it is our practical know-how of the relations between our environments and us that gives our environmental interactions their experiential qualities. Yet why should such interactions involve or be accompanied by experience? This is the ‘absolute’ gap question. Some proponents of SMT answer this question by arguing that our interactions with an environment involve experience when we cognitively access those interactions. In this paper, I aim to persuade proponents of SMT to accept the following three claims. First, that appeals to cognitive access fail to answer the absolute gap question. Second, that SMT can be read in a way that rejects the gap question. Third, that if proponents of SMT are prepared to read SMT in a way that rejects the absolute gap question, then they can also reject the claim that cognitive access is needed to explain experience.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LOUSTC
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-03-22
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-11-04

Total views
114 ( #25,982 of 43,936 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
57 ( #12,179 of 43,936 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.