Three Errors in the Substance View's Defense

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing known as the “substance view,” all human beings have intrinsic value, full moral standing and, with these, a right to life. The substance view has been defended by numerous contemporary philosophers who use the theory to argue that the standard human fetus has a right to life and, ultimately, that abortion is prima facie seriously wrong. In this paper, I identify three important errors committed by some of these philosophers in their defense of the theory---what I refer to as the “extratheoretical-proposition error,” “quantitative-differences error,” and “non-normative-answer error”---and conclude that these errors render their defense inadequate.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LOVTEI
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-10-05
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-09-30

Total downloads
18 ( #32,597 of 35,440 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #17,150 of 35,440 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.