Mind-body identity and irreducible properties

Philosophy Research Archives 4:196-246 (1978)
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Abstract
The identity theory, advocated as a solution to the mind-body problem by materialists such as Feigl and Smart, has been criticized for implying the existence of irreducible properties. After summarizing the relevant theses of materialism, I consider several versions of the irreducible properties objection, and argue that they are all unsuccessful.
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0164-0771
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LUBMIA
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Archival date: 2019-09-06
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