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Davidson’s Objection to Horwich’s Minimalism about Truth
Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):429-437 (2004)
Abstract
This paper shows how one can respond within truth-theoretic semantics, without appeal to parataxis, to Donald Davidson's objection to the intelligibility of Paul Horwich's statement of the minimalist position on truth.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2011-01-09
Downloads
260 (#57,635)
6 months
80 (#49,931)
2011-01-09
Downloads
260 (#57,635)
6 months
80 (#49,931)
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