Extended Cognition in Science Communication

Public Understanding of Science 23 (8):982-995 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The aim of this article is to propose a methodological externalism that takes knowledge about science to be partly constituted by the environment. My starting point is the debate about extended cognition in contemporary philosophy and cognitive science. Externalists claim that human cognition extends beyond the brain and can be partly constituted by external devices. First, I show that most studies of public knowledge about science are based on an internalist framework that excludes the environment we usually utilize to make sense of science and does not allow the possibility of extended knowledge. In a second step, I argue that science communication studies should adopt a methodological externalism and accept that knowledge about science can be partly realized by external information resources such as Wikipedia.
Reprint years
2013, 2014
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LUDECI
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-06-13
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-01-04

Total views
160 ( #16,127 of 38,069 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #15,815 of 38,069 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.