The Argument for Subject‐Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity

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Abstract
Martine Nida-Rümelin has argued recently for subject-body dualism on the basis of reflections on the possibility of survival in fission cases from the literature on personal identity. The argument focuses on the claim that there is a factual difference between the claims that one or the other of two equally good continuers of a person in a fission case is identical with her. I consider three interpretations of the notion of a factual difference that the argument employs, and I argue that on each of them the argument either begs the question or is unsound.
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The Emergent Self.Hasker, William
The Evolution of the Soul.Swinburne, Richard

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2012-07-26

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