Strength of Justification – The Rational Degree of Certainty Approach

In Steve Oswald (ed.), Argumentation and Inference. Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017. London, GB: College Publications. pp. 315-333 (2018)
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Abstract
In this paper, I present the fundamental ideas of a new theory of justification strength. This theory is based on the epistemological approach to argumentation. Even the thesis of a valid justification can be false for various reasons. The theory outlined here identifies such possible errors. Justification strength is equated with the degree to which such possible errors are excluded. The natural expression of this kind of justification strength is the (rational) degree of certainty of the belief in the thesis.
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