Justification

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  1. Possessing Reasons: Why the Awareness-First Approach is Better Than the Knowledge-First Approach.Paul Silva Jr - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In order for a reason to justify an action or attitude it must be one that is possessed by an agent. Knowledge-centric views of possession ground our possession of reasons, at least partially, either in our knowledge of them or in our being in a position to know them. But on virtually all accounts, knowing P is some kind of non-accidental true belief that P. This entails that knowing P is a kind of non-accidental true representation that P. I outline (...)
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  2. Basic Knowledge and the Normativity of Knowledge: The Awareness-First Solution.Paul Silva Jr - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Many have found it plausible that knowledge is a constitutively normative state, i.e. a state that is grounded in the possession of reasons. Many have also found it plausible that certain cases of proprioceptive knowledge, memorial knowledge, and self-evident knowledge are cases of knowledge that are not grounded in the possession of reasons. I refer to these as cases of basic knowledge. The existence of basic knowledge forms a primary objection to the idea that knowledge is a constitutively normative state. (...)
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  3. Conditionals All the Way Down.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    It is usually accepted that unconditional statements are clearer and less problematic than conditional ones. This article goes against this popular belief by advancing the contrarian hypothesis that all unconditional statements can be reduced to conditional ones due to the way our assumptions support our assertions. In fact, considering the coherentist process by which most of our different beliefs mutually support themselves, the only genuine example of unconditional statements are cases of self-justified beliefs, but these examples are controversial and few (...)
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  4. Experimental Evidence That Knowledge Entails Justification.Alexandra M. Nolte, David Rose & John Turri - forthcoming - In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Oxford studies in experimental philosophy, volume 4. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    A standard view in philosophy is that knowledge entails justification. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. We argue that this admirable and striking research suffers from an important limitation: participants were asked about knowledge but not justification. Thus it is possible that people attributed knowledge partly because they thought the belief was justified. Perhaps though, if given the opportunity, people would deny justification while still attributing knowledge. It is also possible that earlier findings were due to perspective taking. This paper reports (...)
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  5. Epistemic Value in the Subpersonal Vale.J. Adam Carter & Robert D. Rupert - 2020 - Synthese:1-30.
    A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology – one with origins in Plato’s Meno – concerns the value of knowledge, and in particular, whether and how the value of knowledge exceeds the value of mere (unknown) true opinion. The recent literature is deeply divided on the matter of how best to address the problem. One point, however, remains unquestioned: that if a solution is to be found, it will be at the personal level, the level at which states of subjects or (...)
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  6. Against Overconfidence: Arguing for the Accessibility of Memorial Justification.Jonathan Egeland Harouny - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    In this article, I argue that access internalism should replace preservationism, which has been called “a received view” in the epistemology of memory, as the standard position about memorial justification. My strategy for doing so is two-pronged. First, I argue that the considerations which motivate preservationism also support access internalism. Preservationism is mainly motivated by its ability to answer the explanatory challenges posed by the problem of stored belief and the problem of forgotten evidence. However, as I will demonstrate, access (...)
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  7. Scientificity and The Law of Theory Demarcation.Ameer Sarwar & Patrick Fraser - 2018 - Scientonomy: Journal for the Science of Science 2:55-66.
    The demarcation between science and non-science seems to play an important role in the process of scientific change, as theories regularly transition from being considered scientific to being considered unscientific and vice versa. However, theoretical scientonomy is yet to shed light on this process. The goal of this paper is to tackle the problem of demarcation from the scientonomic perspective. Specifically, we introduce scientificity as a distinct epistemic stance that an agent can take towards a theory. We contend that changes (...)
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  8. Why Must Justification Guarantee Truth? Reply to Mizrahi.Howard Sankey - 2019 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 10 (4):445-447.
    This reply provides further grounds to doubt Mizrahi’s argument for an infallibilist theory of knowledge. It is pointed out that the fact that knowledge requires both truth and justification does not entail that the level of justification required for knowledge be sufficient to guarantee truth. In addition, an argument presented by Mizrahi appears to equivocate with respect to the interpretation of the phrase “p cannot be false”.
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  9. Unacknowledged Permissivism.Julia Jael Smith - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):158-183.
    Epistemic permissivism is the view that it is possible for two people to rationally hold incompatible attitudes toward some proposition on the basis of one body of evidence. In this paper, I defend a particular version of permissivism – unacknowledged permissivism (UP) – which says that permissivism is true, but that no one can ever rationally believe that she is in a permissive case. I show that counter to what virtually all authors who have discussed UP claim, UP is an (...)
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  10. Imagination Cannot Justify Empirical Belief.Jonathan Egeland - forthcoming - Episteme:1-7.
    A standard view in the epistemology of imagination is that imaginings can either provide justification for modal beliefs about what is possible (and perhaps counterfactual conditionals too), or no justification at all. However, in a couple of recent articles, Kind (2016; Forthcoming) argues that imaginings can justify empirical belief about what the world actually is like. In this article, I respond to her argument, showing that imagination doesn't provide the right sort of information to justify empirical belief. Nevertheless, it can (...)
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  11. Appropriate Belief Without Evidence.Natalie Alana Ashton - 2015 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (2):7-28.
    ABSTRACT In this paper I defend a version of Wittgensteininan contextualism. This is a view about justification on which some beliefs are epistemically appropriate because evidence cannot be adduced in their favour. I trace the history of the view from Wittgenstein and Ortega to the present day, defend one version from the charge of relativism, and suggest some applications of the view both within and without philosophy.
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  12. On What We Should Believe (and When (and Why) We Should Believe What We Know We Should Not Believe).Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties.
    A theory of what we should believe should include a theory of what we should believe when we are uncertain about what we should believe and/or uncertain about the factors that determine what we should believe. In this paper, I present a novel theory of what we should believe that gives normative externalists a way of responding to a suite of objections having to do with various kinds of error, ignorance, and uncertainty. This theory is inspired by recent work in (...)
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  13. Implicit Bias, Ideological Bias, and Epistemic Risks in Philosophy.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (3):393-419.
    It has been argued that implicit biases are operative in philosophy and lead to significant epistemic costs in the field. Philosophers working on this issue have focussed mainly on implicit gender and race biases. They have overlooked ideological bias, which targets political orientations. Psychologists have found ideological bias in their field and have argued that it has negative epistemic effects on scientific research. I relate this debate to the field of philosophy and argue that if, as some studies suggest, the (...)
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  14. Une sémantique générale des croyances justifiées.Fabien Schang & Alexandre Costa Leite - 2016 - CLE-Prints 16 (3):1-24.
    Nous proposons une logique épistémique quadrivalente AR4.
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  15. Epistemic Pluralism.Fabien Schang - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 239 (60):337-353.
    The present paper wants to promote epistemic pluralism as an alternative view of non-classical logics. For this purpose, a bilateralist logic of acceptance and rejection is developed in order to make an important di erence between several concepts of epistemology, including information and justi cation. Moreover, the notion of disagreement corresponds to a set of epistemic oppositions between agents. The result is a non-standard theory of opposition for many-valued logics, rendering total and partial disagreement in terms of epistemic negation and (...)
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  16. Strength of Justification – The Rational Degree of Certainty Approach.Christoph Lumer - 2018 - In Steve Oswald (ed.), Argumentation and Inference. Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017. London, GB: College Publications. pp. 315-333.
    In this paper, I present the fundamental ideas of a new theory of justification strength. This theory is based on the epistemological approach to argumentation. Even the thesis of a valid justification can be false for various reasons. The theory outlined here identifies such possible errors. Justification strength is equated with the degree to which such possible errors are excluded. The natural expression of this kind of justification strength is the (rational) degree of certainty of the belief in the thesis.
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  17. How Supererogation Can Save Intrapersonal Permissivism.Han Li - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):171-186.
    Rationality is intrapersonally permissive just in case there are multiple doxastic states that one agent may be rational in holding at a given time, given some body of evidence. One way for intrapersonal permissivism to be true is if there are epistemic supererogatory beliefs—beliefs that go beyond the call of epistemic duty. Despite this, there has been almost no discussion of epistemic supererogation in the permissivism literature. This paper shows that this is a mistake. It does this by arguing that (...)
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  18. Habilidade e causalidade: uma proposta confiabilista para casos típicos de conhecimento.Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos - 2014 - In Jaimir Conte & Cezar Mortari (eds.), Temas em Filosofia Contemporânea. Florianópolis, State of Santa Catarina, Brazil: pp. 38-48.
    Debates em epistemologia recente têm se pautado, em grande medida, pelo problema de caracterizar a natureza da justificação. De modo geral, a tarefa tem sido explorar o status epistêmico que faz com que uma crença verdadeira seja uma instância de conhecimento. Este debate traz consigo uma discussão mais ampla acerca do conteúdo da definição de conhecimento, ou seja, uma discussão cujo propósito é identificar o que compõe de forma necessária e suficiente esta noção epistêmica central. No entanto, paralelamente a este (...)
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  19. Having False Reasons.Juan Comesaña & Matthew McGrath - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press. pp. 59-80.
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  20. Knowing How to Put Knowledge First in the Theory of Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):393-412.
    I provide a novel knowledge-first account of justification that avoids the pitfalls of existing accounts while preserving the underlying insight of knowledge-first epistemologies: that knowledge comes first. The view I propose is, roughly, this: justification is grounded in our practical knowledge (know-how) concerning the acquisition of propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). I first refine my thesis in response to immediate objections. In subsequent sections I explain the various ways in which this thesis is theoretically superior to existing knowledge-first accounts of justification. The (...)
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  21. A Theory of Presumption for Everyday Argumentation.David M. Godden & Douglas N. Walton - 2007 - Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (2):313-346.
    The paper considers contemporary models of presumption in terms of their ability to contribute to a working theory of presumption for argumentation. Beginning with the Whatelian model, we consider its contemporary developments and alternatives, as proposed by Sidgwick, Kauffeld, Cronkhite, Rescher, Walton, Freeman, Ullmann-Margalit, and Hansen. Based on these accounts, we present a picture of presumptions characterized by their nature, function, foundation and force. On our account, presumption is a modal status that is attached to a claim and has the (...)
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  22. An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.
    White, Christensen, and Feldman have recently endorsed uniqueness, the thesis that given the same total evidence, two rational subjects cannot hold different views. Kelly, Schoenfield, and Meacham argue that White and others have at best only supported the weaker, merely intrapersonal view that, given the total evidence, there are no two views which a single rational agent could take. Here, we give a new argument for uniqueness, an argument with deliberate focus on the interpersonal element of the thesis. Our argument (...)
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  23. Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief.Peter Murphy - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):602-617.
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  24. Common Ground and Discursive Justification: Approaching the Traditional Epistemological Questions From an Untraditional Angle.Ryan Simonelli - unknown
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  25. Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.
    This collection brings together a selection of my recently published or forthcoming articles. What unites them is their common concern with one of the central ambitions of philosophy, namely to get clearer about our first-personal perspective onto the world and our minds. Three aspects of that perspective are of particular importance: consciousness, intentionality, and rationality. The collected essays address metaphysical and epistemological questions both concerning the nature of each of these aspects and concerning the various connections among them. More generally, (...)
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  26. Why Worry About Epistemic Circularity?Michael P. Lynch & Paul Silva - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999):33-52.
    Although Alston believed epistemically circular arguments were able to justify their conclusions, he was also disquieted by them. We will argue that Alston was right to be disquieted. We explain Alston’s view of epistemic circularity, the considerations that led him to accept it, and the purposes he thought epistemically circular arguments could serve. We then build on some of Alston’s remarks and introduce further limits to the usefulness of such arguments and introduce a new problem that stems from those limits. (...)
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  27. Personal and Doxastic Variants of Epistemic Justification and Their Roles in the Theory of Knowledge.Mylan Engel Jr - 1988 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    Most epistemologists agree that epistemic justification is required for knowledge. This requirement is usually formulated in one of two ways: S knows that p only if S is justified in believing that p. S knows that p only if S's belief that p is justified. Surprisingly and are generally regarded as synonymous formulations of the justification condition. In Chapter 1, I argue that such a synonymy thesis is mistaken and that, in fact, and specify substantively different requirements. requires that the (...)
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  28. A Justification of Empirical Thinking.Arnold Zuboff - 2014 - Philosophy Now 102:22-24.
    Imagine two urns, each with a thousand beads - in one all the beads are blue while in the other only one of the thousand is blue. If one of these urns is pushed forward (based on the toss of a fair coin) and the single bead then randomly drawn from it is blue, we must infer that it is a thousand times more probable that the urn pushed forward is the purely blue one. The hypothesis that this was instead (...)
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  29. Revisionary Intellectualism and Gettier.Yuri Cath - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):7-27.
    How should intellectualists respond to apparent Gettier-style counterexamples? Stanley offers an orthodox response which rejects the claim that the subjects in such scenarios possess knowledge-how. I argue that intellectualists should embrace a revisionary response according to which knowledge-how is a distinctively practical species of knowledge-that that is compatible with Gettier-style luck.
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  30. Coherentism and Inconsistency.William Roche - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):185-193.
    If a subject’s belief system is inconsistent, does it follow that the subject’s beliefs (all of them) are unjustified? It seems not. But, coherentist theories of justification (at least some of them) imply otherwise, and so, it seems, are open to counterexample. This is the “Problem of Justified Inconsistent Beliefs”. I examine two main versions of the Problem of Justified Inconsistent Beliefs, and argue that coherentists can give at least a promising line of response to each of them.
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  31. Non‐Inferentialism About Justification – The Case of Aesthetic Judgements.Fabian Dorsch - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):660-682.
    In this article, I present two objections against the view that aesthetic judgements – that is, judgemental ascriptions of aesthetic qualities like elegance or harmony – are justified non‐inferentially. The first is that this view cannot make sense of our practice to support our aesthetic judgements by reference to lower‐level features of the objects concerned. The second objection maintains that non‐inferentialism about the justification of aesthetic judgements cannot explain why our aesthetic interest in artworks and other objects is limited to (...)
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  32. Criticizing a Difference of Contexts: On Reichenbach’s Distincition Between “Context of Discovery” and “Context of Justification”.Gregor Schiemann - 2002 - In Schickore J. & Steinle F. (eds.), Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook. Max-Planck-Institut. pp. 237-251.
    With his distinction between the "context of discovery" and the "context of justification", Hans Reichenbach gave the traditional difference between genesis and validity a modern standard formulation. Reichenbach's distinction is one of the well-known ways in which the expression "context" is used in the theory of science. My argument is that Reichenbach's concept is unsuitable and leads to contradictions in the semantic fields of genesis and validity. I would like to demonstrate this by examining the different meanings of Reichenbach's context (...)
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  33. Scepticism, Defeasible Evidence and Entitlement.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):439-455.
    The paper starts by describing and clarifying what Williamson calls the consequence fallacy. I show two ways in which one might commit the fallacy. The first, which is rather trivial, involves overlooking background information; the second way, which is the more philosophically interesting, involves overlooking prior probabilities. In the following section, I describe a powerful form of sceptical argument, which is the main topic of the paper, elaborating on previous work by Huemer. The argument attempts to show the impossibility of (...)
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  34. The Unity of Reason.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Clayton Littlejohn John Turri (ed.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion.
    Cases of reasonable, mistaken belief figure prominently in discussions of the knowledge norm of assertion and practical reason as putative counterexamples to these norms. These cases are supposed to show that the knowledge norm is too demanding and that some weaker norm ought to put in its place. These cases don't show what they're intended to. When you assert something false or treat some falsehood as if it's a reason for action, you might deserve an excuse. You often don't deserve (...)
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  35. Justified Believing:Avoiding the Paradox.Gregory W. Dawes - 2012 - In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Springer.
    Colin Cheyne has argued that under certain circumstances an internalist or deontological theory of epistemic justification will give rise to a paradox. The paradox, he argues, arises when a principle of epistemic justification is both justifiably believed (in terms of the theory) and false. To avoid this paradox, Cheyne recommends abandoning the principle of justification-transference, which states that acts of believing made on the basis of a justifiably-believed principle are themselves justified. Since such a principle seems essential to any internalist (...)
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  36. Perceptual Learning and Perceptual Phenomenology (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question Three).Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor - manuscript
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: How does perceptual learning alter perceptual phenomenology?
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  37. Perceptual Learning and Cognitive Penetration (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question Two).Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor - manuscript
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: Can perceptual experience be modified by reason?
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  38. Justification, Ambiguity, and Belief: Comments on McEvoy’s “The Internalist Counterexample to Reliabilism”.Henry Jackman - 2005 - Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (2):183-186.
    Unadorned process reliabilism (hereafter UPR) takes any true belief produced by a reliable process (undefeated by any other reliable process) to count as knowledge. Consequently, according to UPR, to know p, you need not know that you know it. In particular, you need not know that the process by which you formed your belief was reliable; its simply being reliable is enough to make the true belief knowledge. -/- Defenders of UPR are often presented with purported counterexamples describing subjects who (...)
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  39. Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.
    Adequate epistemic justification is best conceived as the appearance, over time, of knowledge to the subject. ‘Appearance’ is intended literally, not as a synonym for belief. It is argued through consideration of examples that this account gets the extension of ‘adequately justified belief’ at least roughly correct. A more theoretical reason is then offered to regard justification as the appearance of knowledge: If we have a knowledge norm for assertion, we do our best to comply with this norm when we (...)
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  40. Justification and the Growth of Error.Sherrilyn Roush - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):527-551.
    It is widely accepted that in fallible reasoning potential error necessarily increases with every additional step, whether inferences or premises, because it grows in the same way that the probability of a lengthening conjunction shrinks. As it stands, this is disappointing but, I will argue, not out of keeping with our experience. However, consulting an expert, proof-checking, constructing gap-free proofs, and gathering more evidence for a given conclusion also add more steps, and we think these actions have the potential to (...)
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  41. Justification and Ways of Believing.Heimir Geirsson - 2002 - Disputatio 1 (12):1 - 11.
    One of the issues that has been hotly discussed in connection with the direct designation theory is whether or not coreferential names can be substituted salva veritate in epistemic contexts. Some direct designation theorists believe that they can be so substituted. Some direct designation theorists and all Fregeans and neo-Fregeans believe that they cannot be so substituted. Fregeans of various stripes have used their intuition against free substitution to argue against the direct designation theory. Some direct designation theorists have used (...)
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  42. Theorizing Justification.Peter J. Graham - 2010 - In Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press.
    The standard taxonomy of theories of epistemic justification generates four positions from the Foundationalism v. Coherentism and Internalism v. Externalism disputes. I develop a new taxonomy driven by two other distinctions: Fundamentalism v. Non-Fundamentalism and Actual-Result v. Proper-Aim conceptions of epistemic justification. Actual-Result theorists hold that a belief is justified only if, as an actual matter of fact, it is held or formed in a way that makes it more likely than not to be true. Proper-Aim theorists hold that a (...)
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  43. The Prima/Ultima Facie Justification Distinction in Epistemology.Thomas D. Senor - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):551-566.
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  44. Deception and Evidence.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.
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Epistemic Regress
  1. Method Coherence and Epistemic Circularity.Will Fleisher - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):455-480.
    Reliabilism is an intuitive and attractive view about epistemic justification. However, it has many well-known problems. I offer a novel condition on reliabilist theories of justification. This method coherence condition requires that a method be appropriately tested by appeal to a subject’s other belief-forming methods. Adding this condition to reliabilism provides a solution to epistemic circularity worries, including the bootstrapping problem.
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  2. Review of Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy by David Pears (2006)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 295-301.
    Pears is an eminent philosopher, notable among W scholars for his “The False Prison: a study of the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy” in 2 volumes published 20 years ago. Based on these facts I expected some deep insights into W in the current volume. There were certainly some good points but overall it was profoundly disappointing. All of behavioral science is about our innate human nature and since W was the first to elucidate the axioms of our universal psychology, I (...)
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  3. Review of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology by Malcolm Budd 203p (1989)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas: Reality Press. pp. 246-266.
    A superb effort, but in my view Wittgenstein (i.e., philosophy or the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) is not completely understood by anyone, so we can hardly expect Budd, writing in the mid 80’s, without the modern dual systems of thought view, and no comprehensive logical structure of rationality, to have grasped him completely. Like everyone, he does not get that W’s use of the word ‘grammar’ refers to our innate Evolutionary Psychology and the general framework of Wittgenstein’s and (...)
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  4. Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem.William Roche - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):212-215.
    Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem. By Atkinson David, Peijnenburg Jeanne.
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  5. Justification, Justifying, and Leite’s Localism.Timothy Perrine - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):505-524.
    In a series of papers, Adam Leite has developed a novel view of justification tied to being able to responsibly justify a belief. Leite touts his view as faithful to our ordinary practice of justifying beliefs, providing a novel response to an epistemological problem of the infinite regress, and resolving the “persistent interlocutor” problem. Though I find elements of Leite’s view of being able to justify a belief promising, I hold that there are several problems afflicting the overall picture of (...)
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  6. Inference Without Reckoning.Susanna Siegel - 2019 - In Brendan Balcerak Jackson & Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31.
    I argue that inference can tolerate forms of self-ignorance and that these cases of inference undermine canonical models of inference on which inferrers have to appreciate (or purport to appreciate) the support provided by the premises for the conclusion. I propose an alternative model of inference that belongs to a family of rational responses in which the subject cannot pinpoint exactly what she is responding to or why, where this kind of self-ignorance does nothing to undermine the intelligence of the (...)
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