Indefinite Extensibility in Natural Language

The Monist 96 (2):295-308 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The Monist’s call for papers for this issue ended: “if formalism is true, then it must be possible in principle to mechanize meaning in a conscious thinking and language-using machine; if intentionalism is true, no such project is intelligible”. We use the Grelling-Nelson paradox to show that natural language is indefinitely extensible, which has two important consequences: it cannot be formalized and model theoretic semantics, standard for formal languages, is not suitable for it. We also point out that object-object mapping theories of semantics, the usual account for the possibility of non intentional semantics, doesn’t seem able to account for the indefinitely extensible productivity of natural language.
Reprint years
2013, 2014
ISBN(s)
0026-9662
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LUNIEI
Revision history
Archival date: 2013-05-13
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2012-08-22

Total views
457 ( #6,783 of 42,948 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
86 ( #6,018 of 42,948 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.