Experiential evidence?

Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1053-1079 (2016)
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Abstract
Much of the intuitive appeal of evidentialism results from conflating two importantly different conceptions of evidence. This is most clear in the case of perceptual justification, where experience is able to provide evidence in one sense of the term, although not in the sense that the evidentialist requires. I argue this, in part, by relying on a reading of the Sellarsian dilemma that differs from the version standardly encountered in contemporary epistemology, one that is aimed initially at the epistemology of introspection but which generalizes to theories of perceptual justification as well
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Archival date: 2014-08-15
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
What is Justified Belief.Goldman, Alvin I.
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Conee, Earl & Feldman, Richard

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Citations of this work BETA
Unconscious Evidence.Lyons, Jack C.

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2014-08-15

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