Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds?

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The New Evil Demon Problem is supposed to show that straightforward versions of reliabilism are false: reliability is not necessary for justification after all. I argue that it does no such thing. The reliabilist can count a number of beliefs as justified even in demon worlds, others as unjustified but having positive epistemic status nonetheless. The remaining beliefs---primarily perceptual beliefs---are not, on further reflection, intuitively justified after all. The reliabilist is right to count these beliefs as unjustified in demon worlds, and it is a challenge for the internalist to be able to do so as well.
ISBN(s)
0031-8205
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LYOSRB
Upload history
Archival date: 2011-07-13
View other versions
Added to PP index
2011-07-13

Total views
921 ( #5,316 of 2,449,002 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #22,674 of 2,449,002 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.