Agency in Compound Action

Journal of Human Cognition 5 (1):4-19 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The Anscombean conception of intentional action endorses that an action's being intentional is in virtue of its internal structure, rather than any extra ingredient. Anscombe (2000) calls it the calculative order "that is there whenever actions are done with intentions," which features its teleological aspect. In his work reviving this tradition, Thompson (2008) highlights its temporal aspect. With the help of the concept "compound action," we shall see that typical intentional action attends to both aspects. The synthesis is met by shifting from the aspect of action to agency. To act intentionally, an agent needs not only the capacity for calculating from a general end to a specific means, but also the capacity for planning: coordinate stages of different actions over time hierarchically, by occupying a certain kind of slots.

Author's Profile

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-04-28

Downloads
109 (#81,853)

6 months
65 (#58,509)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?