Libertarian Agency and Rational Morality: Action-Theoretic Objections to Gauthier's Dispositional Soution of the Compliance Problem

Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):499-525 (1988)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
David Gauthier thinks agents facing a prisoner's dilemma ('pd') should find it rational to dispose themselves to co-operate with those inclined to reciprocate (i.e., to acquire a constrained maximizer--'cm'--disposition), and to co-operate with other 'cmers'. Richmond Campbell argues that since dominance reasoning shows it remains to the agent's advantage to defect, his co-operation is only rational if cm "determines" him to co-operate, forcing him not to cheat. I argue that if cm "forces" the agent to co-operate, he is not acting at all, never mind rationally. Thus, neither author has shown that co-operation is rational action in a pd.
ISBN(s)
0038-4283
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MACLAA
Upload history
Archival date: 2013-02-26
View other versions
Added to PP
2010-06-22

Downloads
300 (#26,971)

6 months
6 (#69,602)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?