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  1. A war of all against all? The close up problem.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    This paper presents a problem for a prisoner’s dilemma model according to which the state of nature would be a war of all against all, which I call “the close up problem.”.
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  2. Business Ethics: Game Theory.Garrett Pendergraft - 2023 - In Lakshmi B. Nair (ed.), Sage Business Foundations.
    Game theory involves deliberating about what to do in light of what other people are likely to do. One of the central frameworks of game theory is the prisoner’s dilemma, in which participants who make rational choices end up in suboptimal outcomes. Using the prisoner’s dilemma to model competition between firms sets the stage for a new and promising approach to business ethics: the market failures approach.
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  3. The Prisoner's Dilemma Paradox: Rationality, Morality, and Reciprocity.Rory W. Collins - 2022 - Think 21 (61):45-55.
    This article examines the prisoner's dilemma paradox and argues that confessing is the rational choice, despite this probably entailing a less-than-ideal outcome.
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  4. Lifting lockdown – a tragedy of the commons.Fausto Corvino - 2020 - openDemocracy.
    The lifting of lockdown is a typical case of the tragedy of the commons, and as such should be regulated by public authority, instead of being left to the ethics and responsibility of single individuals. I would therefore argue that we should think about an intermediate phase between the lockdown and the opening of shops (which in the Italian case is the transition from the red zone to the orange zone): diversified access to commercial activities, on an hourly basis, for (...)
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  5. Team Reasoning: Theory and Evidence.Jurgis Karpus & Natalie Gold - 2016 - In Julian Kiverstein (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind. New York: Routledge. pp. 400-417.
    The chapter reviews recent theoretical and empirical developments concerning the theory of team reasoning in game theoretic interactions.
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  6. Explaining Universal Social Institutions: A Game-Theoretic Approach.Michael Vlerick - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):291-300.
    Universal social institutions, such as marriage, commons management and property, have emerged independently in radically different cultures. This requires explanation. As Boyer and Petersen point out ‘in a purely localist framework would have to constitute massively improbable coincidences’ . According to Boyer and Petersen, those institutions emerged naturally out of genetically wired behavioural dispositions, such as marriage out of mating strategies and borders out of territorial behaviour. While I agree with Boyer and Petersen that ‘unnatural’ institutions cannot thrive, this one-sided (...)
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  7. Prisoner's Dilemma.S. M. Amadae - 2015 - In Prisoners of Reason: Game Theory and Neoliberal Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 24-61.
    As these opening quotes acknowledge, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) represents a core puzzle within the formal mathematics of game theory.3 Its rise in conspicuity is evident figure 2.1 above demonstrating a relatively steady rise in incidences of the phrase’s usage between 1960 to 1995, with a stable presence persisting into the twenty first century. This famous two-person “game,” with a stock narrative cast in terms of two prisoners who each independently must choose whether to remain silent or speak, each advancing (...)
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  8. Economic rationality and the optimization trap.Nikil Mukerji & Julian Nida-Rümelin - 2015 - St. Gallen Business Review 2015 (1):12-17.
    The theme of this issue of the St. Gallen Business Review is "Harmony". For this reason, we would like to discuss whether two aspects of our life- world are in harmony, namely economic optimization and morality. What is the relation between them? According to a widely shared view, which is one aspect of the doctrine of "mainstream economics", the functioning of an economic system does not require moral behaviour on the part of the individual economic agent. In what follows, we (...)
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  9. Prisoner's dilemma doesn't explain much.Robert Northcott & Anna Alexandrova - 2015 - In Martin Peterson (ed.), The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Classic philosophical arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 64-84.
    We make the case that the Prisoner’s Dilemma, notwithstanding its fame and the quantity of intellectual resources devoted to it, has largely failed to explain any phenomena of social scientific or biological interest. In the heart of the paper we examine in detail a famous purported example of Prisoner’s Dilemma empirical success, namely Axelrod’s analysis of WWI trench warfare, and argue that this success is greatly overstated. Further, we explain why this negative verdict is likely true generally and not just (...)
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  10. http://www.academia.edu/5681005/httpyoutu.be_PiCfrt8Sr3I_JOHN_KEATS_AS_A_THINKER_IN_RELATION_TO_CRITICAL_APPRECIATION_OF_HIS_ODE_TO_ANIGHTINGALE.Rituparna Ray Chaudhuri - 2015
    "Romanticism, when attains a fullness of complexity..there occurs of the supernatural unique". http://philpapers.org/profile/112741.
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  11. L'ingranaggio della cooperazione. Teorie dei giochi, cooperazione spontanea e produzione di beni pubblici.Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2014 - In Carlo Lottieri & Daniele Velo Dalbrenta (eds.), La città volontaria. IBL Libri. pp. 23-63.
    A survey of some game-theoretic accounts of the emergence and evolution of spontaneuous cooperation in social and public-good dilemmas.
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  12. Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence.Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte - 2013 - Public Reason 5 (1):3-13.
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  13. Giochi di altruismo. L'approccio evoluzionistico alla cooperazione umana.Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2012 - In Matt Ridley (ed.), Le Origini della Virtù. IBL Libri. pp. 7--38.
    This is the introductory essay to the Italian translation of Matt Ridley's "The origins of virtue", surveying the game-theoretic and evolutionary approaches to the emergence and evolution of cooperation and altruism.
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  14. Oyun: A New, Free Program for Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournaments in the Classroom.Charles H. Pence & Lara Buchak - 2012 - Evolution Education and Outreach 5 (3):467-476.
    Evolutionary applications of game theory present one of the most pedagogically accessible varieties of genuine, contemporary theoretical biology. We present here Oyun (OY-oon, http://charlespence.net/oyun), a program designed to run iterated prisoner’s dilemma tournaments, competitions between prisoner’s dilemma strategies developed by the students themselves. Using this software, students are able to readily design and tweak their own strategies, and to see how they fare both in round-robin tournaments and in “evolutionary” tournaments, where the scores in a given “generation” directly determine contribution (...)
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  15. Giochi di anarchia. Beni pubblici, teoria dei giochi e anarco-liberalismo.Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2011 - Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 29 (1-2):163-180.
    The paper focuses on Anthony de Jasay's "anarcho-liberalism" as based oon his game-theoretic approach to the problem of public goods provision.
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  16. Hume's Natural History of Justice.Mark Collier - 2011 - In C. Taylor & S. Buckle (eds.), Hume and the Enlightenment. Pickering & Chatto. pp. 131-142.
    In Book III, Part 2 of the Treatise, Hume presents a natural history of justice. Self-interest clearly plays a central role in his account; our ancestors invented justice conventions, he maintains, for the sake of reciprocal advantage. But this is not what makes his approach so novel and attractive. Hume recognizes that prudential considerations are not sufficient to explain how human beings – with our propensities towards temporal discounting and free-riding – could have established conventions for social exchange and collective (...)
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  17. Rationality in collective action.Margaret Gilbert - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):3-17.
    Collective action is interpreted as a matter of people doing something together, and it is assumed that this involves their having a collective intention to do that thing together. The account of collective intention for which the author has argued elsewhere is presented. In terms that are explained, the parties are jointly committed to intend as a body that such-and-such. Collective action problems in the sense of rational choice theory—problems such as the various forms of coordination problem and the prisoner’s (...)
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  18. The referee’s dilemma. The ethics of scientific communities and game theory.Tomislav Bracanovic - 2002 - Prolegomena 1 (1):55-74.
    This article argues that various deviations from the basic principles of the scientific ethos – primarily the appearance of pseudoscience in scientific communities – can be formulated and explained using specific models of game theory, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The article indirectly tackles the deontology of scientific work as well, in which it is assumed that there is no room for moral skepticism, let alone moral anti-realism, in the ethics of scientific communities. Namely, on (...)
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  19. Evolution of communication in perfect and imperfect worlds.Patrick Grim - 2000 - World Futures 56 (2):179-197.
    We extend previous work on cooperation to some related questions regarding the evolution of simple forms of communication. The evolution of cooperation within the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has been shown to follow different patterns, with significantly different outcomes, depending on whether the features of the model are classically perfect or stochastically imperfect (Axelrod 1980a, 1980b, 1984, 1985; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak and Sigmund, 1990, 1992; Sigmund 1993). Our results here show that the same holds for communication. Within a simple (...)
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  20. Too much (and not enough) of a good thing: How agent neutral principles fail in prisoner's dilemmas.Michael J. Almeida - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 94 (3):309-328.
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  21. Prisoners' Dilemmas and Reciprocal Altruists.John J. Tilley - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (1-2):261-272.
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  22. Undecidability in the Spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma.Patrick Grim - 1997 - Theory and Decision 42 (1):53-80.
    n the spatialized Prisoner’s Dilemma, players compete against their immediate neighbors and adopt a neighbor’s strategy should it prove locally superior. Fields of strategies evolve in the manner of cellular automata (Nowak and May, 1993; Mar and St. Denis, 1993a,b; Grim 1995, 1996). Often a question arises as to what the eventual outcome of an initial spatial configuration of strategies will be: Will a single strategy prove triumphant in the sense of progressively conquering more and more territory without opposition, or (...)
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  23. Spatialization and Greater Generosity in the Stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma.Patrick Grim - 1996 - Biosystems 37:3-17.
    The iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma has become the standard model for the evolution of cooperative behavior within a community of egoistic agents, frequently cited for implications in both sociology and biology. Due primarily to the work of Axelrod (1980a, 198Ob, 1984, 1985), a strategy of tit for tat (TFT) has established a reputation as being particularly robust. Nowak and Sigmund (1992) have shown, however, that in a world of stochastic error or imperfect communication, it is not TFT that finally triumphs in (...)
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  24. Accounting for the 'Tragedy' in the Prisoner's Dilemma.John Tilley - 1994 - Synthese 99 (2):251–76.
    The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) exhibits a tragedy in this sense: if the players are fully informed and rational, they are condemned to a jointly dispreferred outcome. In this essay I address the following question: What feature of the PD's payoff structure is necessary and sufficient to produce the tragedy? In answering it I use the notion of a trembling-hand equilibrium. In the final section I discuss an implication of my argument, an implication which bears on the persistence of the problem (...)
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  25. Book note: Danielson, P. artificial morality: virtuous robots for virtual games.Luc Bovens - 1993 - Political Studies 41:719.
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  26. Rational Cooperation, Irrational Retaliation.Joseph Mintoff - 1993 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (4):362-380.
    David Gauthier argues that it can be rational to perform a non-maximizing cooperative act, since there are certain situations in which it is rational to adopt an intention to perform a non-maximizing cooperative act, and since if it is rational to adopt an intention to do something, then it is rational to do that thing. An important objection to this argument focuses on the move from the rationality of adopting intentions to the rationality of acting on them. Gregory Kavka argues (...)
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  27. McClennen’s Early Cooperative Solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma.Duncan MacIntosh - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):341-358.
    This paper reviews six attempts to give cooperative solutions to Prisoners Dilemmas: symmetry (agents are in identical situations, so should choose the same way, so should both choose cooperation because that’s better for each), mechanism (each agent should delegate the decision to a machine which will choose cooperation for them provided the other does likewise), inducement (the agents should make a side bet which pays off only upon both cooperating), resolution (each agent should resolve to cooperate, then act on the (...)
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  28. Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality.Duncan Macintosh - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (1-2):3-32.
    I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational action, and rational (...)
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  29. Libertarian Agency and Rational Morality: Action-Theoretic Objections to Gauthier's Dispositional Soution of the Compliance Problem.Duncan MacIntosh - 1988 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):499-525.
    David Gauthier thinks agents facing a prisoner's dilemma ('pd') should find it rational to dispose themselves to co-operate with those inclined to reciprocate (i.e., to acquire a constrained maximizer--'cm'--disposition), and to co-operate with other 'cmers'. Richmond Campbell argues that since dominance reasoning shows it remains to the agent's advantage to defect, his co-operation is only rational if cm "determines" him to co-operate, forcing him not to cheat. I argue that if cm "forces" the agent to co-operate, he is not acting (...)
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  30. The Prisoner's Dilemma and Social Theory: An Overview of Some Issues.Philip Pettit - 1985 - Politics (Currently Australian Journal of Political Science) 20:1-11.
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  31. Prudence, Morality, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma‹.Derek Parfit - 1981 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    "From the Proceedings of the British Academy, London, volume LXV (1979)" - title page. Series: Henrietta Hertz Trust annual philosophical lecture -- 1978 Other Titles: Proceedings of the British Academy. Vol.65: 1979.
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  32. Team reasoning and a measure of mutual advantage in games.Jurgis Karpus & Mantas Radzvilas - 0201 - Economics and Philosophy 34 (1):1-30.
    The game theoretic notion of best-response reasoning is sometimes criticized when its application produces multiple solutions of games, some of which seem less compelling than others. The recent development of the theory of team reasoning addresses this by suggesting that interacting players in games may sometimes reason as members of a team – a group of individuals who act together in the attainment of some common goal. A number of properties have been suggested for team-reasoning decision-makers’ goals to satisfy, but (...)
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  33. The Dark Side of the Force. When computer simulations lead us astray and model think narrows our imagination.Eckhart Arnold - manuscript
    This paper is intended as a critical examination of the question of when and under what conditions the use of computer simulations is beneficial to scientific explanations. This objective is pursued in two steps: First, I try to establish clear criteria that simulations must meet in order to be explanatory. Basically, a simulation has explanatory power only if it includes all causally relevant factors of a given empirical configuration and if the simulation delivers stable results within the measurement inaccuracies of (...)
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