Varieties of Inference?

Philosophical Issues 28 (1):221-254 (2018)
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Abstract

The distinction between inferential and non-inferential justification is supposed to be strictly dichotomous: a justification is inferential or non-inferential but not both (and, barring over-determination, a justified belief is justified inferentially or non-inferentially but not both). Here I'll discuss a type of case that doesn’t fit neatly on either side, at least not on traditional conceptions of that distinction.

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Anna-Sara Malmgren
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences

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