Results for 'dual process theory'

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  1. Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading.Mitchell Herschbach - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:483-497.
    The direct social perception thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, automatic “Type 1” form of mindreading and a slow, effortful “Type 2” form. I will here analyze whether dual process (...)
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  2. Reframing Single- and Dual-Process Theories as Cognitive Models: Commentary on De Neys (2021). [REVIEW]Aliya R. Dewey - 2021 - Perspectives in Psychological Science 16 (6):1428–31.
    De Neys (2021) argues that the debate between single- and dual-process theorists of thought has become both empirically intractable and scientifically inconsequential. I argue that this is true only under the traditional framing of the debate—when single- and dual-process theories are understood as claims about whether thought processes share the same defining properties (e.g., making mathematical judgments) or have two different defining properties (e.g., making mathematical judgments autonomously versus via access to a central working memory capacity), (...)
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  3. Metacognitive control in single- vs. dual-process theory.Aliya R. Dewey - 2023 - Thinking and Reasoning 29 (2):177-212.
    Recent work in cognitive modelling has found that most of the data that has been cited as evidence for the dual-process theory (DPT) of reasoning is best explained by non-linear, “monotonic” one-process models (Stephens et al., 2018, 2019). In this paper, I consider an important caveat of this research: it uses models that are committed to unrealistic assumptions about how effectively task conditions can isolate Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning. To avoid this caveat, I develop a coordinated (...)
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  4. Smooth Coping: An Embodied, Heideggerian Approach to Dual-Process Theory.Zachariah A. Neemeh - 2021 - Adaptive Behavior 1:1-16.
    Dual-process theories divide cognition into two kinds of processes: Type 1 processes that are autonomous and do not use working memory, and Type 2 processes that are decoupled from the immediate situation and use working memory. Often, Type 1 processes are also fast, high capacity, parallel, nonconscious, biased, contextualized, and associative, while Type 2 processes are typically slow, low capacity, serial, conscious, normative, abstract, and rule-based. This article argues for an embodied dual-process theory based on (...)
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  5. Dual processes, dual virtues.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2237-2257.
    I argue that virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism are complementary. They do not give competing accounts of epistemic virtue. Rather they explain the excellent functioning of different parts of our cognitive apparatus. Reliabilist virtue designates the excellent functioning of fast and context-specific Type 1 cognitive processes, while responsibilist virtue means an excellent functioning of effortful and reflective Type 2 cognitive processes. This account unifies reliabilist and responsibilist virtue theory. But the virtues are not unified by designating some epistemic norm (...)
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  6. Towards a dual process epistemology of imagination.Michael T. Stuart - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-22.
    Sometimes we learn through the use of imagination. The epistemology of imagination asks how this is possible. One barrier to progress on this question has been a lack of agreement on how to characterize imagination; for example, is imagination a mental state, ability, character trait, or cognitive process? This paper argues that we should characterize imagination as a cognitive ability, exercises of which are cognitive processes. Following dual process theories of cognition developed in cognitive science, the set (...)
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  7. Dual-system theory and the role of consciousness in intentional action.Markus E. Schlosser - 2019 - In Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Cameron Sims (eds.), Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience. Leiden: Brill. pp. 35–56.
    According to the standard view in philosophy, intentionality is the mark of genuine action. In psychology, human cognition and agency are now widely explained in terms of the workings of two distinct systems (or types of processes), and intentionality is not a central notion in this dual-system theory. Further, it is often claimed, in psychology, that most human actions are automatic, rather than consciously controlled. This raises pressing questions. Does the dual-system theory preserve the philosophical account (...)
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  8. Dual PECCS: A Cognitive System for Conceptual Representation and Categorization.Antonio Lieto, Daniele Radicioni & Valentina Rho - 2017 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 29 (2):433-452.
    In this article we present an advanced version of Dual-PECCS, a cognitively-inspired knowledge representation and reasoning system aimed at extending the capabilities of artificial systems in conceptual categorization tasks. It combines different sorts of common-sense categorization (prototypical and exemplars-based categorization) with standard monotonic categorization procedures. These different types of inferential procedures are reconciled according to the tenets coming from the dual process theory of reasoning. On the other hand, from a representational perspective, the system relies on (...)
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  9. (1 other version)Théories à processus duaux et théories de l’éducation : Le cas de l’enseignement de la pensée critique et de la logique.Guillaume Beaulac & Serge Robert - 2011 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 6 (1):63-77.
    Many theories about the teaching of logic and critical thinking take for granted that theoretical learning, the learning of formal rules for example, and its practical application are sufficient to master the tools taught and to take the habit of using them. However, this way of teaching is not efficient, a conclusion supported by much work in cognitive science. Approaching cognition evolutionarily with dual-process theories allows for an explanation of these insufficiencies and offers clues on how we could (...)
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  10. Do rape cases sit in a moral blindspot?Katrina L. Sifferd - 2023 - In Samuel Murray & Paul Henne (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. Bloomsbury.
    Empirical research has distinguished moral judgments that focus on an act and the actor’s intention or mental states, and those that focus on results of an action and then seek a causal actor. Studies indicate these two types of judgments may result from a “dual-process system” of moral judgment (Cushman 2008, Kneer and Machery 2019). Results-oriented judgements may be subject to the problem of resultant moral luck because different results can arise from the same action and intention. While (...)
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  11. Moral-Dilemma Judgments.Bertram Gawronski, Nyx Ng & Michael T. Dale - forthcoming - In Simon Laham (ed.), Handbook of Ethics and Social Psychology. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
    The current chapter provides an overview of research on responses in moral dilemmas where maximization of outcomes for the greater good (utilitarianism) conflicts with adherence to moral norms (deontology). Expanding on a description of the traditional paradigm to study moral-dilemma judgments (i.e., the trolley problem), the chapter reviews the most prominent dual-process account of moral-dilemma judgments, normative conclusions that have been derived from this account, and criticisms raised against this line of work. The following sections review advances in (...)
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  12. From Is to Ought. How Scientific Research in the Field of Moral Cognition Can Impact the Criminal Law.Levin Güver - 2019 - Cognitio: Student Law and Society Forum 1 (2):1–22.
    Rapid technological advancements such as fMRI have led to the rise of neuroscientific discoveries. Coupled with findings from cognitive psychology, they are claiming to have solved the millennia-old puzzle of moral cognition. If true, our societal structures – and with that the criminal law – would be gravely impacted. This thesis concerns itself with four distinct theories stemming from the disciplines above as to what mechanisms constitute moral judgement: the Stage Model by KOHLBERG, the Universal Moral Grammar Theory by (...)
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  13. (1 other version)Thinking Twice about Virtue and Vice: Philosophical Situationism and the Vicious Minds Hypothesis.Guy Axtell - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):7-39.
    This paper provides an empirical defense of credit theories of knowing against Mark Alfano’s challenges to them based on his theses of inferential cognitive situationism and of epistemic situationism. In order to support the claim that credit theories can treat many cases of cognitive success through heuristic cognitive strategies as credit-conferring, the paper develops the compatibility between virtue epistemologies qua credit theories, and dual-process theories in cognitive psychology. It also a response to Lauren Olin and John Doris’ “vicious (...)
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  14. Brains, trains, and ethical claims: Reassessing the normative implications of moral dilemma research.Michael T. Dale & Bertram Gawronski - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (1):109-133.
    Joshua Greene has argued that the empirical findings of cognitive science have implications for ethics. In particular, he has argued (1) that people’s deontological judgments in response to trolley problems are strongly influenced by at least one morally irrelevant factor, personal force, and are therefore at least somewhat unreliable, and (2) that we ought to trust our consequentialist judgments more than our deontological judgments when making decisions about unfamiliar moral problems. While many cognitive scientists have rejected Greene’s dual-process (...)
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  15. Moral Intuitions from the Perspective of Contemporary Descriptive Ethics.Petra Chudárková - 2019 - Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 41 (2):259-282.
    In the last twenty years, there has been an enormous growth of scientific research concerning the process of human moral reasoning and moral intuitions. In contemporary descriptive ethics, three dominant approaches can be found – heuristic approach, dual-process theory, and universal moral grammar. Each of these accounts is based on similar empirical evidence combining findings from evolutionary biology, moral psychology, and neuroethics. Nevertheless, they come to different conclusions about the reliability of moral intuitions. The aim of (...)
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  16. The Influence of Situational Factors in Sacrificial Dilemmas on Utilitarian Moral Judgments.Michael Klenk - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (3):593-625.
    The standard way to test alternative descriptive theories of moral judgment is by asking subjects to evaluate (amongst others) sacrificial dilemmas, where acting classifies as a utilitarian moral judgment and not acting classifies as a deontological moral judgment. Previous research uncovered many situational factors that alter subject’s moral judgments without affecting which type of action utilitarianism or deontology would recommend. This literature review provides a systematic analysis of the experimental literature on the influence of situational factors on moral judgments in (...)
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  17. A Dual-Component View of Propositional Grasping.John Dilworth & Dylan Sabo - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):511-522.
    On a traditional or default view of the grasping or understanding of a singular proposition by an individual, it is assumed to be a unitary or holistic activity. However, naturalistic views of cognition plausibly could analyze propositional thinking in terms of more than one distinctive functional stage of cognitive processing, suggesting at least the potential legitimacy of a non-unitary analysis of propositional grasping. We outline a novel dual-component view of this kind, and show that it is well supported by (...)
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  18. Some Socratic Modesty: A Reconsideration of Recent Empirical Work on Moral Judgment.David Sackris & Michael T. Dale - 2024 - Journal of Value Inquiry 1:1-23.
    One way to interpret the work of Joshua Greene (2001; 2008; 2014) is that the wave of empirical research into moral decision-making is a way for us to become more confident in our ability to gain moral knowledge. We argue that empirical research into moral judgment has shown (both survey-based and brain-based) that the grounds of moral judgment are opaque on several dimensions. We argue that we cannot firmly grasp what the morally relevant/irrelevant features of a decision context are, understand (...)
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  19.  52
    Theories of Consciousness From the Perspective of an Embedded Processes View.Nelson Cowan, Nick I. Ahmed, Chenye Bao, Mackenzie N. Cissne, Ronald D. Flores, Roman M. Gutierrez, Hayse Braden, Madison L. Musich, Hamid Nourbakhshi, Nanan Nuraini, Emily E. Schroeder, Neyla Sfeir, Emilie Sparrow & Luísa Superbia-Guimarães - manuscript
    Considerable recent research in neurosciences has dealt with the topic of consciousness, even though there is still disagreement about how to identify and classify conscious states. Recent behavioral work on the topic also exists. We survey recent behavioral and neuroscientific literature with the aims of commenting on strengths and weaknesses of the literature and mapping new directions and recommendations for experimental psychologists. We reconcile this literature with a view of human information processing (Cowan, 1988; Cowan et al., 2024) in which (...)
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  20. The formation and revision of intuitions.Andrew Meyer & Shane Frederick - 2023 - Cognition 240 (C):105380.
    This paper presents 59 new studies (N = 72,310) which focus primarily on the “bat and ball problem.” It documents our attempts to understand the determinants of the erroneous intuition, our exploration of ways to stimulate reflection, and our discovery that the erroneous intuition often survives whatever further reflection can be induced. Our investigation helps inform conceptions of dual process models, as “system 1” processes often appear to override or corrupt “system 2” processes. Many choose to uphold their (...)
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  21. The bitter truth about sugar and willpower.Miguel Vadillo - 2017 - Psychological Science:1-8.
    Dual-process theories of higher order cognition (DPTs) have been enjoying much success, particularly since Kahneman’s 2002 Nobel prize address and recent book Thinking, Fast and Slow (2009). Historically, DPTs have attempted to provide a conceptual framework that helps classify and predict differences in patterns of behavior found under some circumstances and not others in a host of reasoning, judgment, and decision-making tasks. As evidence has changed and techniques for examining behavior have moved on, so too have DPTs. Killing (...)
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  22. Non-propositional intuition, intuitive belief and ‘intuition that p’.Cyrill Mamin - manuscript
    According to a popular view in philosophy, intuition is a singular propositional attitude. In this paper, I outline an opposite account on “garden-variety intuition”, i.e. intuition that people experience in their daily lives. The account is based on a distinction between intuition on the processing level, ‘intuitive belief’ and ‘intuition that p’. Immediacy and certainty prove to be the phenomenal features of intuitive beliefs and intuitions that p. Regarding the processing level, I suggest to combine dual-process theory (...)
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  23.  36
    Reflective Reasoning for Real People.Nick Byrd - 2020 - Dissertation, Florida State University
    1. EXPLICATING THE CONCEPT OF REFLECTION (under review) -/- To understand how ‘reflection’ is used, I consider ordinary, philosophical, and scientific discourse. I find that ‘reflection’ seems to refer to reasoning that is deliberate and conscious, but not necessarily self-conscious. Then I offer an empirical explication of reflection’s conscious and deliberate features. These explications not only help explain how reflection can be detected; they also distinguish reflection from nearby concepts such as ruminative and reformative reasoning. After this, I find that (...)
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  24. Moral Lessons from Psychology: Contemporary Themes in Psychological Research and their relevance for Ethical Theory.Henrik Ahlenius - 2020 - Stockholm: Stockholm University.
    The thesis investigates the implications for moral philosophy of research in psychology. In addition to an introduction and concluding remarks, the thesis consists of four chapters, each exploring various more specific challenges or inputs to moral philosophy from cognitive, social, personality, developmental, and evolutionary psychology. Chapter 1 explores and clarifies the issue of whether or not morality is innate. The chapter’s general conclusion is that evolution has equipped us with a basic suite of emotions that shape our moral judgments in (...)
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  25. Morality Play: A Model for Developing Games of Moral Expertise.Dan Staines, Paul Formosa & Malcolm Ryan - 2019 - Games and Culture 14 (4):410-429.
    According to cognitive psychologists, moral decision-making is a dual-process phenomenon involving two types of cognitive processes: explicit reasoning and implicit intuition. Moral development involves training and integrating both types of cognitive processes through a mix of instruction, practice, and reflection. Serious games are an ideal platform for this kind of moral training, as they provide safe spaces for exploring difficult moral problems and practicing the skills necessary to resolve them. In this article, we present Morality Play, a model (...)
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  26. Moral Implications from Cognitive (Neuro)Science? No Clear Route.Micah Lott - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):241-256.
    Joshua Greene argues that cognitive (neuro)science matters for ethics in two ways, the “direct route” and the “indirect route.” Greene illustrates the direct route with a debunking explanation of the inclination to condemn all incest. The indirect route is an updated version of Greene’s argument that dual-process moral psychology gives support for consequentialism over deontology. I consider each of Greene’s arguments, and I argue that neither succeeds. If there is a route from cognitive (neuro)science to ethics, Greene has (...)
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  27. Building machines that learn and think about morality.Christopher Burr & Geoff Keeling - 2018 - In Christopher Burr & Geoff Keeling (eds.), Proceedings of the Convention of the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour (AISB 2018). Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour.
    Lake et al. propose three criteria which, they argue, will bring artificial intelligence (AI) systems closer to human cognitive abilities. In this paper, we explore the application of these criteria to a particular domain of human cognition: our capacity for moral reasoning. In doing so, we explore a set of considerations relevant to the development of AI moral decision-making. Our main focus is on the relation between dual-process accounts of moral reasoning and model-free/model-based forms of machine learning. We (...)
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  28. Towards a Theory of Everything Part I - Introduction of Consciousness in Electromagnetic Theory, Special and General Theory of Relativity.RamLakhan Pandey Vimal - 2010 - Neuroquantology 8 (2):206-230.
    Theory of everything must include consciousness. In this Part I of the series of three articles, we introduce the subjective experience (SE) and/or proto‐experience (PE) aspect of consciousness in classical physics, where PEs are precursors of SEs. In our dualaspect‐ dual‐mode PE‐SE framework, it was hypothesized that fundamental entities (strings or elementary particles: fermions and bosons) have two aspects: (i) material aspect such as mass, charge, spin, and space‐time, and (ii) mental aspect, such as experiences. There are three (...)
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  29. Moral Anxiety: A Kantian Perspective.Charlie Kurth - 2024 - In David Rondel (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Anxiety. New York: Lexington Books.
    Moral anxiety is the unease that we experience in the face of a novel or difficult moral decision, an unease that helps us recognize the significance of the issue we face and engages epistemic behaviors aimed at helping us work through it (reflection, information gathering, etc.). But recent discussions in philosophy raise questions about the value of moral anxiety (do we really do better when we’re anxious?); and work in cognitive science challenges its psychological plausibility (is there really such an (...)
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  30. No luck for moral luck.Markus Kneer & Edouard Machery - 2019 - Cognition 182 (C):331-348.
    Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that people judge morally lucky and morally unlucky agents differently, an assumption that stands at the heart of the Puzzle of Moral Luck. We examine whether the asymmetry is found for reflective intuitions regarding wrongness, blame, permissibility, and punishment judg- ments, whether people’s concrete, case-based judgments align with their explicit, abstract principles regarding moral luck, and what psychological mechanisms might drive the effect. Our experiments produce three findings: First, in within-subjects experiments favorable to reflective (...)
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  31. Rethinking Cognitive Mediation: Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and the Perceptual Theory of Emotion.Christine Tappolet & Bruce Maxwell - 2012 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (1):1-12.
    Empirical assessments of Cognitive Behavioral Theory and theoretical considerations raise questions about the fundamental theoretical tenet that psychological disturbances are mediated by consciously accessible cognitive structures. This paper considers this situation in light of emotion theory in philosophy. We argue that the “perceptual theory” of emotions, which underlines the parallels between emotions and sensory perceptions, suggests a conception of cognitive mediation that can accommodate the observed empirical anomalies and one that is consistent with the dual-processing models (...)
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  32. On the Cognitive Bases of Knowledge Ascriptions.Mikkel Gerken - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    I develop an epistemic focal bias account of certain patterns of judgments about knowledge ascriptions by integrating it with a general dual process framework of human cognition. According to the focal bias account, judgments about knowledge ascriptions are generally reliable but systematically fallible because the cognitive processes that generate them are affected by what is in focus. I begin by considering some puzzling patters of judgments about knowledge ascriptions and sketch how a basic focal bias account seeks to (...)
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  33. Facing death from a safe distance: saṃvega and moral psychology.Lajos L. Brons - 2016 - Journal of Buddhist Ethics 23:83-128.
    Saṃvega is a morally motivating state of shock that -- according to Buddhaghosa -- should be evoked by meditating on death. What kind of mental state it is exactly, and how it is morally motivating is unclear, however. This article presents a theory of saṃvega -- what it is and how it works -- based on recent insights in psychology. According to dual process theories there are two kinds of mental processes organized in two" systems" : the (...)
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  34. The Logic of Fast and Slow Thinking.Anthia Solaki, Francesco Berto & Sonja Smets - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):733-762.
    We present a framework for epistemic logic, modeling the logical aspects of System 1 and System 2 cognitive processes, as per dual process theories of reasoning. The framework combines non-normal worlds semantics with the techniques of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. It models non-logically-omniscient, but moderately rational agents: their System 1 makes fast sense of incoming information by integrating it on the basis of their background knowledge and beliefs. Their System 2 allows them to slowly, step-wise unpack some of the (...)
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  35. Just Another Article on Moore’s Paradox, But We Don’t Believe That.Iskra Fileva & Linda A. W. Brakel - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5153-5167.
    We present counterexamples to the widespread assumption that Moorean sentences cannot be rationally asserted. We then explain why Moorean assertions of the sort we discuss do not incur the irrationality charge. Our argument involves an appeal to the dual-process theory of the mind and a contrast between the conditions for ascribing beliefs to oneself and the conditions for making assertions about independently existing states of affairs. We conclude by contrasting beliefs of the sort we discuss with the (...)
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  36. THE CAUSAL-PROCESS-CHANCE-BASED ANALYSIS OF CONTERFACTUALS.Igal Kvart - manuscript
    Abstract In this paper I consider an easier-to-read and improved to a certain extent version of the causal chance-based analysis of counterfactuals that I proposed and argued for in my A Theory of Counterfactuals. Sections 2, 3 and 4 form Part I: In it, I survey the analysis of the core counterfactuals (in which, very roughly, the antecedent is compatible with history prior to it). In section 2 I go through the three main aspects of this analysis, which are (...)
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  37. Two Kinds of Cognitive Expertise.Elijah Chudnoff - 2019 - Noûs 55 (2):270-292.
    Expertise is traditionally classified into perceptual, cognitive, and motor forms. I argue that the empirical research literature on expertise gives us compelling reasons to reject this traditional classification and accept an alternative. According to the alternative I support there is expertise in forming impressions, which further divides into expertise in forming sensory and intellectual impressions, and there is expertise in performing actions, which further divides into expertise in performing mental and bodily actions. The traditional category of cognitive expertise splits into (...)
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  38. Sculpting the space of actions. Explaining human action by integrating intentions and mechanisms.Machiel Keestra - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Amsterdam
    How can we explain the intentional nature of an expert’s actions, performed without immediate and conscious control, relying instead on automatic cognitive processes? How can we account for the differences and similarities with a novice’s performance of the same actions? Can a naturalist explanation of intentional expert action be in line with a philosophical concept of intentional action? Answering these and related questions in a positive sense, this dissertation develops a three-step argument. Part I considers different methods of explanations in (...)
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  39. AI Can Help Us Live More Deliberately.Julian Friedland - 2019 - MIT Sloan Management Review 60 (4).
    Our rapidly increasing reliance on frictionless AI interactions may increase cognitive and emotional distance, thereby letting our adaptive resilience slacken and our ethical virtues atrophy from disuse. Many trends already well underway involve the offloading of cognitive, emotional, and ethical labor to AI software in myriad social, civil, personal, and professional contexts. Gradually, we may lose the inclination and capacity to engage in critically reflective thought, making us more cognitively and emotionally vulnerable and thus more anxious and prone to manipulation (...)
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  40. Moral Thinking, More and Less Quickly.G. Skorburg, Mark Alfano & C. Karns - manuscript
    Cushman, Young, & Greene (2010) urge the consolidation of moral psychology around a dual-system consensus. On this view, a slow, often-overstretched rational system tends to produce consequentialist intuitions and action-tendencies, while a fast, affective system produces virtuous (or vicious) intuitions and action-tendencies that perform well in their habituated ecological niche but sometimes disastrously outside of it. This perspective suggests a habit-corrected-by-reason picture of moral behavior. Recent research, however, has raised questions about the adequacy of dual-process theories of (...)
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  41. Tirer la responsabilité au clair : le cas des attitudes implicites et le révisionnisme.Luc Faucher - 2012 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 7 (1):179-212.
    Dans cet article, je considère l’influence possible des recherches récentes sur les attitudes en psychologie sociale, principalement dans le paradigme des théories des processus duaux [dual process theories], sur notre compréhension de la responsabilité. La thèse que je soutiens est que certaines révisions à notre façon de comprendre la responsabilité et nos pratiques d’attribution de la responsabilité pourraient être justifiées par ces travaux. Avant de présenter les révisions que j’introduis, je décris les grandes lignes du paradigme que j’utiliserai, (...)
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  42. On the Cognitive Parsimony of Paralogical Arguments and their Impact in Automated Persuasion: Findings and Lessons Learned for Building Automatic Counter-Arguers.Antonio Lieto - 2023 - In Online Lectures. pp. 1-14.
    Persuasive technologies can adopt several strategies to change the attitudes and behaviors of their users. In this work I synthesize the lessons learned from three empirical case studies on automated persuasion that have been carried out in the last decade in the contexts of: persuasive news recommendations, social robotics, and e-commerce, respectively. In particular, such studies have assessed, in the technological domain, the effects of nudging techniques relying on well known persuasive argumentation schemas and on framing strategies. In discussing the (...)
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  43. The Normative Significance of Empirical Moral Psychology.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2020 - Diametros 17 (64):1-5.
    Many psychologists have tried to reveal the formation and processing of moral judgments by using a variety of empirical methods: behavioral data, tests of statistical significance, and brain imaging. Meanwhile, some scholars maintain that the new empirical findings of the ways we make moral judgments question the trustworthiness and authority of many intuitive ethical responses. The aim of this special issue is to encourage scholars to rethink how, if at all, it is possible to draw any normative conclusions by discovering (...)
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  44. Forgiveness and Moral Repair.Kathryn J. Norlock - 2022 - In Manuel Vargas & John Doris (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
    Forgiveness has enjoyed intense scholarly interest since the 1980s. I provide a historical overview, then identify themes in the literature, with an emphasis on those relevant to the moral psychology of forgiveness in the twenty-first century. I conclude with some attention to dual-process theories of moral reasoning in order to suggest that key debates in forgiveness are not at odds so much as they may be aligned with the different moral aims of moral and mental processes that differ (...)
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  45. Morele meningsverandering: eerherstel voor de rede.Maarten van Doorn - 2022 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 114 (1):42-48.
    In dit artikel betwist ik het gangbare idee dat de rede ontoereikend is voor morele motivatie, met name in relatie tot universele ethische kwesties. Door een uitgebreide verkenning van de Dual-Process Theory (DPT) stel ik dat onze morele intuïties zowel trainbaar zijn als een inherente neiging hebben naar universalistische overwegingen. Ik betoog dat sociale rechtvaardiging en de drang naar rationele argumentatie een cruciale rol spelen in het vormen en veranderen van onze morele standpunten. Concluderend pleit ik voor (...)
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  46. Means-End Reciprocity and the Aims of Education Debate.Guy Axtell - manuscript
    In the centennial year of John Dewey’s classic, Democracy and Education (1916), this paper revisits his thesis of the reciprocity of means and ends, arguing that it remains of central importance for debate over the aims of education. The paper provides a Dewey-inspired rebuttal of arguments for an ‘ultimate aim,’ but balances this with a development of the strong overlaps between proponents of pragmatism, intellectual virtues education (Jason Baehr) and critical thinking education (Harvey Siegel). Siegel’s ‘Kantian’ justification of critical thinking (...)
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  47. fMRI reveals reciprocal inhibition between social and physical cognitive domains.Anthony I. Jack, Abigail Dawson, Katelyn Begany, Regina Leckie, Kevin Barry, Angela Ciccia & Abraham Snyder - 2013 - NeuroImage 66:385-401.
    Two lines of evidence indicate that there exists a reciprocal inhibitory relationship between opposed brain networks. First, most attention-demanding cognitive tasks activate a stereotypical set of brain areas, known as the task-positive network and simultaneously deactivate a different set of brain regions, commonly referred to as the task negative or defaultmode network. Second, functional connectivity analyses show that these same opposed networks are anti-correlated in the resting state. Wehypothesize that these reciprocally inhibitory effects reflect two incompatible cognitive modes, each of (...)
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  48. Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?David Thorstad - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):396-413.
    Bounded rationality gets a bad rap in epistemology. It is argued that theories of bounded rationality are overly context‐sensitive; conventionalist; or dependent on ordinary language (Carr, 2022; Pasnau, 2013). In this paper, I have three aims. The first is to set out and motivate an approach to bounded rationality in epistemology inspired by traditional theories of bounded rationality in cognitive science. My second aim is to show how this approach can answer recent challenges raised for theories of bounded rationality. My (...)
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  49. (1 other version)Will Hominoids or Androids Destroy the Earth? —A Review of How to Create a Mind by Ray Kurzweil (2012).Michael Starks - 2016 - In Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization-- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 2nd Edition Feb 2018. Las Vegas, USA: Reality Press. pp. 675.
    Some years ago I reached the point where I can usually tell from the title of a book, or at least from the chapter titles, what kinds of philosophical mistakes will be made and how frequently. In the case of nominally scientific works these may be largely restricted to certain chapters which wax philosophical or try to draw general conclusions about the meaning or long term significance of the work. Normally however the scientific matters of fact are generously interlarded with (...)
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  50. Hume’s Science of Emotions: Feeling Theory without Tears.Mark Collier - 2011 - Hume Studies 37 (1):3-18.
    We must rethink the status of Hume’s science of emotions. Contemporary philosophers typically dismiss Hume’s account on the grounds that he mistakenly identifies emotions with feelings. But the traditional objections to Hume’s feeling theory are not as strong as commonly thought. Hume makes several important contributions, moreover, to our understanding of the operations of the emotions. His claims about the causal antecedents of the indirect passions receive support from studies in appraisal theory, for example, and his suggestions concerning (...)
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