A Theory of Judicial Constitutional Design

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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to describe how judges engage in constitutional design, irrespective of legal tradition. I examine in great detail the role of the judge: as a conflict solver, as a member of an institution, as part of the political system and as a human being, for those are factors that intervene in the activities he makes. I later analyze the dynamics that a Constitution can have: the change in their structure conceptualized as interpretation, mutation and resistance and their relation. Interpretation is the determination of the scope of a norm, mutation is the change of meaning without amendment and resistance is a concept that bridges the first two, which is the capacity of the constitutional rule to adapt to the political game and to assume mutations. Finally, these concepts are intertwined in order to show how judges by means of their function, (re)design the Constitution by means of adjudication and policymaking (rule issuance by the stating of precedent).
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MANATO-7
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Archival date: 2018-04-02
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2018-04-02

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