Empirical status of Block's phenomenal/access distinction

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):153-154 (1997)
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Abstract
P/A (Block's phenomenal/access) confounds a logical distinction with an empirical claim. Success of P/A in its logical role has almost no bearing on its plausibility as an empirical thesis (i.e., that two kinds of consciousness exist). The advantage of P/A over a single-consciousness assumption is unclear, but one of Block's analogies for P (liquid in a hydraulic computer) may be used to clarify the notion of consciousness as cognitive “hardware.”.
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