Modularist explanations of experience and other illusions

Consciousness and Cognition 76 (76):102828 (2019)
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Debates about modularity invariably involve a crucial premise about how visual illusions are experienced. This paper argues that these debates are wrongheaded, and that experience of illusions is orthogonal to the core issue of the modularity hypothesis: informational encapsulation.
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Archival date: 2019-10-22
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